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 MIGRATION, STATE, AND A SHI’A MINORITY 
 
This study explores the question of who are the Qizilbash people of Kabul. My 
research uses the ethnohistorical method for the study of Qizilbash history and 
culture. The Qizilbash history is reconstructed in a chronological and thematic 
manner by including data from a wide range of anthropological and historical 
sources that contains primary sources, memoirs, hagiographies, images, maps, 
participant observation, and in-person interviews. The advent of the Qizilbash 
coincides with the advances of the Safavid Sufi order that arose in the Iranian 
Plateau. This study then explains the reason behind the Qizilbash migration to 
the eastern frontier city of Kabul and ends by discussing the shifting Qizilbash 
relations with the modern state of Afghanistan. The latter part helps us better 
understand the Shi’a question in the context of Afghanistan, 1880-1978. This 
study, for the first time places the stories of a relatively small, but influential 
urban Shi’a group within the broader state-formation efforts that materialized 
in Kabul (constitutionalism, modernity, urbanization) prior to the Soviet Union 
invasion of 1979.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The purpose of Anthropology is to make the world safer for human differences” 
                         ~ Ruth Benedict 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
I. Research Objective 
 
  Afghanistan has been in an unending state of turmoil since the Marxist 
inspired coup d’état by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 
April 27, 1978. The country’s ceaseless conflicts between 1978 and 2001 led to 
the loss and plunder of archival collections and an unprecedented departure of 
academics. The ongoing Taliban and Islamic State alliance brings Afghanistan 
closer to another round of Sunni-Shi’a strife (Sarwar 2015). The confluence of 
these calamities has either stopped or severely limited anthropological efforts to 
explore the mosaic of peoples, cultures, and religions that live in this country. 
One of Afghanistan’s influential ethnic groups who have been victims to this 
hindrance are the Qizilbash of Kabul. 
  The Qizilbash story in premodern and modern Kabul remains essentially 
unexplored. Accounts of the Qizilbash migration from Persia to Kabul, as the 
elite cavalrymen and administrators in Nadir Shah’s army are often repeated 
without much analysis and contextualization. The above narrative is true, but 
partially. The real story is more complex. This reductionist account emanates 
from parochial histories that were produced during the height of 20th century 
ethno-nationalism. Deliberate reductionism masks the changing Qizilbash ties 
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with the state, hides the discriminatory state policies, and covers the Qizilbash 
struggles for constitutional parity. It depicts them in monolithic terms, without 
any effort to consider their experiences and to explain the motive behind their 
migration to Kabul. Parochial accounts also obscures the intellectual, cultural, 
and professional contributions that Qizilbash have made throughout the years. 
To fulfill this void in the field of anthropology, my study focuses on the themes 
of Qizilbash history, migration, and their significance in the formation of pre-
modern Afghan dynasties. My study also focuses on the changing relations of 
the Qizilbash communities with the modern nation-state of Afghanistan until 
the armed Marxist takeover of 1978.  
 The goal of this study is to trace the history of the Qizilbash, explain the 
cultural shifts, and understand the processes of state-formation in Afghanistan 
from the viewpoint of this Shi’a minority. Did the Afghan state policies produce 
enduring biases that deepened social fragmentation rather than to homogenize 
the populace? How did the state’s anti-Shi’a decrees fatwa affect the collective 
identity of the Qizilbash? How did the Qizilbash use shrine visitation and ritual 
to transmit their history, preserve their customs and identity in the face of 
coercive ethno-nationalism? 
 
A. Qizilbash: A Brief Look  
  Who are the Qizilbash of Afghanistan? Ahmad Mohebbi, a local historian, 
identifies the Qizilbash as descendants of the Oghuz Turks who migrated from 
Central Asia to the Iranian Plateau in late-11th century (Mohebbi 2011, 17). For 
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Ehsan Puzhohish, a local researcher, Qizilbash are not ethnically homogenous. 
He considers them as a mixed tribal confederation that initially consisted of 
Turkic clans who then merged with Iranians in the 16th century Safavid Persia 
under the Qizilbash epithet (Puzhohish 2005, 9-13). Mushtaq Kabir, President 
of Afghanistan’s Qizilbash Solidarity Council (AQSC), Shura Insejam Qizilbash 
Afghanistan, revealed to me in our 2014 conversations that Qizilbash people of 
Kabul are now Persian and not Turkish speakers. Kabir continued to mention 
the Qizilbash are mostly urbanites and have sizeable population in “Andkhuy, 
Baghlan, Badakhshan, Farah, Ghazni, Ghor, Herat, Helmand, Kabul, Logar, 
Mazar-e Sharif, Qandahar, and Qunduz” (Kabir 2014).  
Map 1: Afghanistan 
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  Roger Savory, scholar of Safavid Persia, in Encyclopedia of Islam (second 
edition) not only acknowledges the existence of a substantial Shi’a minority in 
“Kabul and in the high valleys of Foladi on the western edge of Hazarajat,” but 
also defines the term Qizilbash in the following manner, “The word is used both 
in a general and a specific sense. In general, it is used loosely to denote a wide 
variety of extremist Shi’a sects, which flourished in Anatolia and Kurdistan 
from the late-13th century onwards” (Savory 2006). Savory continues to write, 
“strictly speaking, the term Qizilbash should be applied only to those Turkmen 
inhabiting eastern Anatolia, northern Syria, and the Armenian highlands which 
were converted by the Safavid da’wa and became the disciples of the Safavid 
shaykhs at Ardabil. However, the term was also loosely applied to certain non-
Turkish speaking Iranian tribes which supported the Safavids … and Kurds 
and Lurs” (Savory 2006).  
   What is the population of the Qizilbash? There are no reliable statistics 
in the Afghanistan National Archives or in the AQSC office to confidently reply 
to this question. Kabir explained to me that, “Qizilbash was not acknowledged 
by the state as an official ethnic category in the 20th century. Qizilbash people 
either registered as Tajiks or as Pashtuns when identification card tazkira, was 
issued” (Kabir 2014). Kabir continued to explain, “the Tajik and Pashtun ethnic 
groups are largely Sunni Muslims. It was a deliberate state policy to understate 
the Shi’a population in Afghanistan” (Kabir 2014). However, there are a couple 
of 20th century estimates available to us from Western academics. The first is 
from Ludwig Adamec, who estimated the Qizilbash population at about 40,000 
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in middle of the 20th century (Adamec 2012). The second estimate comes from 
1960s by Vartan Gregorian, who agrees with Roger Savory, that the Qizilbash 
population is about 60,000-200,000 (Gregorian 1969; Savory 2006).  
  AQSC, however, considers today’s Qizilbash population to be larger than 
the estimates provided by Adamec, Gregorian, and Savory. The table below is 
the result of an independent survey that was conducted by AQSC surveyors’ 
shortly after the ratification of the 2004 constitution. AQSC clarified to me that 
the question marks in the table below indicate regions that are unsafe to travel 
to or places where people simply identify themselves as al-Tashayo Afghanistan 
or the Shi’a of Afghanistan to avoid any ethnic connotation. According to the 
AQSC survey report, the average household has 6.6 children.  
Table 1. Qizilbash Population 
Provinces  Districts Households 
Badakhshan  Darwaz 1450-1500 
Baghlan Pul-i Khumri 900 
Balkh Mazar-e Sharif 3000 
Bamiyan Panjab, Waras 1200 
Farah  ? 
Faryab  ? 
Ghazni Jeghatoo, Khawaja Umari, City of Ghazni, Ghughiani ? 
Helmand Gerishk 700 
Herat City of Herat  1500 
Kabul District 1-6, 10, 15, and Paghman ? 
Logar Koshi, Dara-e Suf Over 50% 
Nangarhar Jilalabad ? 
Nimruz  ? 
Oruzgan Tarin Kowt ? 
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Paktia Gardez ? 
Parwan Dah Moskeen 400 
Qandahar District 1, Toop Khana ? 
Qunduz Imam Sahib 1100 
Sar-e Pul City of Sar-e Pul 400 
Takhar Taluqan 800 
Wardak Day Mirdad, Hisa-i Dowom-e Bihsud, Qaria Momki ? 
   
  In another conversation with Mushtaq Kabir at the AQSC headquarters, I 
asked about the Qizilbash arrival to Kabul. Kabir went on to say it was “during 
the Safavid State, 1501-1722, that the Qizilbash migrated from Persia to Kabul 
as part of military division to protect the frontiers and the trade routes between 
India, Persia, and Central Asia” (Kabir 2014). Over the course of time, Qizilbash 
garrison guards came to hold key political and financial positions with the pre-
modern polities. The Qizilbash units “primarily held administrative and military 
posts within the premodern Afghan dynasties. The Qizilbash officials played an 
integral role in the Durranid Dynasty, 1747-1823. With some ebb and flow, the 
Qizilbash role in the administration remained intact until the delineation of the 
modern Afghan state by the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission in late 19th 
century” (Kabir 2014).  
  With the expansion of ethno-nationalism in the twentieth century, “the 
Qizilbash were discriminated against on two bases: their Twelver Shi’a religious 
beliefs and Persian language” (Mousavi 2006). From 1880 to 1978, there were 
several state decrees banning Shi’as from openly practicing their rituals. Shi’as 
remained absent from the upper echelon positions in the Ministries of Defense, 
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Interior, and Foreign Affairs (Zia 2014). Outside of these important institutions, 
a limited number of Qizilbash served in influential capacities. Regardless of the 
state discrimination against the Shi’a, Qizilbash remained among the country’s 
“intelligentsia” social class and producers of high culture until the PDPA coup 
in 1978 (Poullada 1973, 16-17).  
  The Qizilbash believe in the Doctrine of Twelve Imams Ithna Ashari, Shi’a 
denomination of Islam. According to the Shi’a interpretation of history, Prophet 
Muhammad’s ‘legitimate’ and ‘rightful’ heir was his son-in-law, Ali, while Sunni 
Muslims disagree. The Shi’a believe that twelve direct heirs starting with Imam 
Ali carried on Muhammad’s line of descendants. When the Sunni denomination 
of Islam became the ‘official’ national religion in modern state of Afghanistan, it 
subjected the Shi’a population to a great deal of micro-aggressions and explicit 
discrimination. To avoid stigmatization in school and work, Qizilbash routinely 
kept their religious identity secret by practicing Taqiyya, a method of protective 
dissimilation (Dupree 1979, 681). A Qizilbash elder who practiced dissimilation 
by changing his family name from Ali Mardan (Persianate Shi’a) to Mardanzai 
(Zai, customary Pashto ending that means son of) told me, “his patriotism and 
conformity to state policies was no longer under heavy suspicious gaze of the 
government” (Mardanzai 2015). It was a practical strategy for some to abandon 
part of their identity. Years of Taqiyya however had irreversible consequences 
on the personal identity and communal solidarity of the Qizilbash. 
  To understand the underlying cause of why some Qizilbash reverted to 
Taqiyya, we must turn to the story of state-formation in Afghanistan. 
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B. Modern Afghanistan: A Closer Look 
 
Abdurrahman Khan was enthroned as the founder of the modern state of 
Afghanistan in 1880. He declared himself the “light of the nation and religion” 
(Barfield 2010, 147). Abdurrahman ruled “directly and autocratically without 
relying on intermediaries” in order to consolidate and expand the reach of the 
newly delineated state (Barfield 2010, 147). The dilemma of how to unite the 
diverse ethnolinguistic groups was a central concern for Abdurrahman Khan’s 
administration, 1880-1901, and his son, Habibullah, 1901-1919. Both rulers 
relied extensively on British aid to construct a standing army to eliminate any 
real or alleged threats of dissent. The Shi’a residents of the country in general 
saw Abdurrahman’s “iron fist” policies, invasive espionage system, and brutal 
torture techniques as acts of hostility. Between 1880 and 1901, large number 
of Shi’a households moved to Persia or to the Indian subcontinent to escape 
Abdurrahman’s wrath.1 
After four long decades of indirect colonialism under the protection of the 
British-Raj, Afghanistan gained her independence in the aftermath of the Great 
War in 1919. The young monarch, Amanullah Khan, initiated a rapid set of 
reforms, similar to those of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Shah in 
Persia, to launch the hindered process of Afghanistan’s modernization. Part of 
Amanullah’s political modernization required the ratification of the country’s 
first constitution in 1923. It meant moving away from the previous “iron fist” 
                                                          
1 The Khavaris in today’s Iran is a group of Shi’a people with Hazara or Barbari origins. The word khavar means 
“east” and Khavari means “person from the east.” 
9 
 
approach and “creating an Afghan national-identity” in a different way (Akhlaq 
2015). Amanullah’s nation-formation action gained traction with elite urbanites 
and with subjugated Shi’a populace who believed nationalism would advance 
their legal status as a collective minority.  
To reduce the engrained sectarian and tribal identities, Afghanistan’s 
first constitution “discouraged any mention of ethnolinguistic groups by name, 
calling all citizens Afghan” (Dupree 1979, 680). However, it only legalized the 
Hanafi jurisprudence of Sunni religious law in a country with about 20% Shi’a 
population. To implement Johann G. Herder’s model of nationalism one land, 
one people, and one language, came with a steep cost.2 The making of ‘Afghan’ 
national-identity aimed to erase the identity of the less powerful ethnic groups. 
The parochial accounts ignored the histories and contributions of minorities. 
This system of knowledge creation became part of the state’s modus operandi 
that essentially never disappeared in the post-protectorate Afghanistan until 
1978. 
 The Marxist revolutionaries ousted the Muhammadzai Dynasty in 1978. 
The military takeover forever ended the dynastic system. Despite PDPA’s fiery 
rhetoric of equality for all, social justice, and uprooting the entrenched ethno-
sectarian pyramid model that Abdurrahman Khan had implemented, the PDPA 
stance toward the Qizilbash did not translate to palpable improvements. There 
are two reasons to explain PDPA’s behavior. First, the Qizilbash were perceived 
as intellectual and commercial elites, who had benefited from warm ties with 
                                                          
2 The German-Afghan relations began in midst of the First World War and expanded in 1920s.  
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the Muhammadzai Dynasty. Second, with the fall of Muhammad Reza Shah 
Pahlavi in neighboring Iran, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s declaration to export the 
revolutionary brand of Shi’ism to ostracized Shi’a groups, the Qizilbash leaders 
were either purged or came under the surveillance of PDPA’s notorious State 
Intelligence Agency, KhAD.  
  Civil and religious leaders, who enjoyed tremendous social capital, were 
regarded as Khomeini’s “fifth column.” PDPA feared that Shi’a leaders could 
galvanize the masses, university students, and the financial elites, who could 
undermine the Marxist/Leninist principles they wanted to implement. A 2013 
probe by the Netherlands National Police, “The Afghanistan Death List: Afghans 
Killed by the State, 1978-79,” has the names of the outspoken Shi’a activists, 
intellectuals, and clerics who vanished in the Stalinist style of purges hujum, 
which swept through the country in the first two years of the PDPA existence. 
During the Marxist experiment, 1978-92, few Qizilbash joined the PDPA ranks, 
but most prominent Qizilbash either were silenced or became disengaged from 
politics as they migrated to regional or western countries as the anti-PDPA war 
escalated.    
 With the demise of the Soviet backed PDPA regime in April 16, 1992, the 
Pakistan based Afghan resistance groups failed to concede equal appointments 
for the Shi’a people in the Peshawar Accord.3 Virtually all the Mujahidin parties 
that were formed during the Soviet War, 1979-92, crystalized around locality or 
                                                          
3 The Peshawar Accord, a peace and power-sharing agreement that established the post-Marxist era Islamic State of 
Afghanistan. All anti-Soviet resistance parties except for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s the Hezb-e Islami signed it. 
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sectarian subcultures that previously existed in Afghanistan. The Mujahidins’ 
refusal to compromise with one another culminated to a destructive Civil War, 
1992-96 (Coll 2004). Qizilbash districts of Kabul were battered and looted. The 
Afshar Massacre is one episode that highlights the tragedy of Qizilbash during 
the Civil War (Mobashir 2014). Hundreds of women and children were killed in 
their own homes as they slept at night (Afsharyan et al. 2014). 
  The Mujahidin’s incompetent government was replaced by the extremist 
Taliban regime in 1996. Under the auspices of Mullah Omar, Taliban founded 
the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, 1996-2001. The Taliban, an explicit anti-
Shi’a regime, soared to power with the assistance of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and 
Pakistan (Rashid 2000). For the Taliban, the Shi’a people are not “orthodox” 
Muslims. Taliban banned prayer in Shi’a mosques, congregation halls Takia-
Khana, and shrines. Taliban intended to reclaim “true” Islam and mounted a 
harsh campaign of coercion and harassment against dissidents, women, and 
Shi’as (Crews and Tarzi 2008, 29-30). Apart from banning visitation to shrines 
and Shi’a religious observances, Mullah Omar also outlawed the celebration of 
the Persian New Year Nowruz. Taliban viewed Nowruz as a Zoroastrian custom. 
Qizilbash residents of Bagh-e Ali Mardan, in central Kabul, were persecuted for 
celebrating the Nowruz (Mobashir 2014). The draconian Taliban policies led to 
another round of Shi’a exodus.  
  The American led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) finally 
dislodged the Taliban in December 2001 when Mullah Omar refused to end his 
so-called “hospitality” of Osama bin Laden and to distance themselves from Al-
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Qaeda terror network. After 9/11, Shi’a leaders within Afghanistan and in the 
diaspora voiced their concerns for constitutional equality. The notion of full 
emancipation was not negotiable under any circumstances. Shi’as embraced 
the pluralistic ideals adopted by the National Unity Government Dawlat Melli, 
in the Bonn Agreement of 2001. Shi’as eagerly welcomed “the establishment of 
a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic, and fully representative 
government” (The Council on Foreign Relations 2001). The Shi’a jurisprudence 
fiqh Jafari, was finally ratified in the Constitution of 2004 (unlike the previous 
Constitutions of 1923, 1933, 1964, 1976, 1987, and 1990). It might be suitable 
to quote the American Civil Rights activist, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., “The arc 
of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”   
  Afghanistan's 2004 Constitution recognizes fourteen main ethnic groups: 
Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Baloch, Turkmen, Nuristani, Pamiri, Brahui, 
Arab, Gujar, Qizilbash, Aimaq, and Pashai. After years of repression, Qizilbash 
are now legally allowed to celebrate their rituals and have autonomy over how 
they document and represent their history without the fear of stigmatization or 
persecution by the state. In other words, Qizilbash are for the first time in the 
modern Afghanistan the masters of their own future. The political pendulum 
has swung toward the principles of power-sharing, inclusiveness, and market 
economy. The phrase Qizilbash even appears in the third stanza of the new 
National Anthem, Sorud Melli (Panjshiri 2011). Below is part of the broad-based 
National Anthem in English. 
         This land is Afghanistan 
     It is the pride of every Afghan 
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     The land of peace, the land of the sword 
     Its sons are all brave 
 
     This is the country of every tribe 
     The land of Baloch and Uzbeks 
     Pashtuns and Hazaras 
     Turkmens and Tajiks 
 
                                               With them, Arabs and Gurjars 
                                               Pamiris, Nuristanis 
                                               Brahuis and Qizilbash 
                                               Also Aimaqs and Pashayis  
 
                                               This Land will shine forever, 
                                               Like the sun in the blue sky 
                                               In the chest of Asia, 
                                               It will remain as the heart forever  
      … 
      
 
 
II. Research Significance 
 
  Data about Qizilbash history and their changing relation with the state 
are fragmented. Jamil Hanifi, a native anthropologist, mentions, “there is an 
urgent need for systematic and properly produced ethnographic knowledge 
about the cultural communities and relations of power in Afghanistan.” (Hanifi 
2001). Ethnographic exploration has always been a complicated undertaking in 
Afghanistan. Access to source materials, political pressure, and official ideology 
have always had a decisive say in how reality is interpreted. Holistic research 
on minorities was, and to a lesser degree remains, a highly delicate endeavor 
since it closely intertwines with the techniques and strategies of power.    
  The state sees reassertion of ethnic and sectarian identity as a movement 
in the direction of nativism and ethnogenesis with little or no practical value for 
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the future of the country in today’s interconnected globalized age. This mindset 
leaves the ethnographer “in an anthropological no man’s land, condemned to a 
kind of analytical bricolage and wavering between fear of making points that 
are banal to other anthropologists on the one hand, and the temptation to draw 
sweeping conclusions on the basis of limited data on the other” (Reeves 2007, 
18). With this dilemma in mind, the question arises why an Ethnohistory of the 
Qizilbash: Migration, State, and a Shi’a Minority appeal to other anthropologists, 
area studies specialists, and ethnohistorians?  
  There are several important reasons with palpable effects. So let us look 
at each one more carefully. My dissertation sets at the nexus of politics (state-
formation), identity (language and religion), and history (minority perspective). 
It will help us arrive at a more nuanced understanding of state versus society 
from the vantage point of an influential urban minority group. This study is not 
merely an ethnographic analysis of chronological events, but a holistic study of 
an urban Shi’a group from the pre-modern period to advent of a Marxist state. 
My study is concerned with events, over the long arc of history, because they 
signify the outward expression of a non-pluralistic political culture. 
  The ethnographic present is difficult to understand without evaluation of 
the past. As the American social critic, James Baldwin, reminds us, history “is 
not the past. History is the present. We carry our history with us. To think 
otherwise is criminal” (Hedges 2017). With Baldwin’s excerpt in mind, my hope 
is to help resist the paralyzing power of anti-Shi’a attitudes. The top-down 
process of “nation-formation is not yet complete” in Afghanistan (Akhlaq 2015). 
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The predicament of national identity lies at the root of today’s social, political, 
and cultural frictions. Coercive identity reinforces fragmentation rather than 
allowing the fusion of an organic nation-state.  
  Lastly, my dissertation speaks to a much broader topic. The inter-Islamic 
difference that underpins the non-inclusive policies are in full display today in 
parts of the Middle East. The ongoing Sunni-Shi’a antagonism not only affects 
the safety and lives of Millions in the region, but also affects the diplomatic ties 
between Muslim majority countries and their Western counterparts, trade, and 
the future of the Westphalian State System. Let us now see what set of factors 
produced this discourse of Sunni-Shi’a animosity.  
 
A. Sunni-Shi’a Conflict: Historical Dimension 
The Sunni-Shi’a conflict that is unfolding across Middle East is political, 
not doctrinal. After the removal of Taliban, 2001, and Saddam Hussein, 2004, 
some pundits have commented on what they see as a rise of a “Shi’a Crescent,” 
a vast region that stretches from the eastern shore of the Mediterranean to the 
southern slope of the Hindu Kush south to the Gulf of Aden.4 Historically, the 
Sunni-Shi’a conflicts were not about Islam’s doctrine of monotheism tawhid, 
prophethood nubuwa, and eschatology qiyama. The conflicts were not over the 
foundational five pillars (Testimony, Prayer, Charity, Fasting, and Pilgrimage). 
Apart from the minor disputes over inheritance laws, ablution ritual, and call 
to prayers, at the heart of the sectarianism remains the political questions of: 
                                                          
4 King Abdullah of Jordan first used the phrase “Shi’a Crescent” during a NBC News interview in 2008. 
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1) Doctrine of Imamate, the belief of ‘infallibility’ of the first twelve Shi’a imams, 
and 2) Succession, proper leadership qualities for temporal power and spiritual 
guide. 
  Today’s Sunni-Shi’a conflict is a byproduct of politics and market forces 
interwoven with age-old grievances (Nasr 2016). Its historical roots extend back 
to the formative period of Islam in 632-680 (Crone 2005). For Shi’as, Ali ibn abi 
Talib, cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad, was the chosen successor 
of the nascent Muslim community. The declaration of Imam Ali’s designation as 
the rightful leader happened near the Khum Pond in 632. Islam’s internal split, 
however, deepened at the Battle of Siffin, referred by all sides as the First Civil 
War fitna in 657. Islam's internal split further intensified when Ali’s second son 
Husayn (the third Shi’a Imam) and his companions and family were mercilessly 
massacred at the Battle of Karbala (in modern Iraq) in 680, at the order of the 
second Umayyad Caliph, Yazid. This event is referred to as Islam’s Second Civil 
War fitna (Crone 2005). Shi’as belief after the Battle of Karbala, the Umayyads 
and the Abbasids continued to monopolize political power under the rubric of 
the normative center of Islam or “orthodoxy” while the ostracized “heterodox” 
Shi’as lived in the shadows of the Caliphate until the Mongols sacked Baghdad 
in 1258.  
  The post-Mongol period was a key period for Twelver Shi’a Ithna Ashari 
revival. After the Il-Khanid, 1256-1335, and the Timurid eras, 1370-1507, the 
Sunni-Shi’a conflict took another decisive turn in 1501. Shah Ismael, along 
with the steadfast support of the Qizilbash followers’ murids declared the Ithna 
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Ashari form of Shi’a Islam as the ‘official’ religion of the Safavid Empire, 1501-
1722. The Safavids’ adherence to the Shi’a denomination was political, but it 
also had a religious principle behind it. Ismael derived his political legitimacy 
from Shi’a the “Concept of Imamate” (Jahanpour 2014). Ismael’s chief rival, the 
Ottoman Sultan, carried the title of Caliph, which the Shi’as did not recognize. 
The Battle of Chaldiron in 1514 divided the Safavid territories apart from the 
Ottoman jurisdictions (Momen 1985). With the breakdown of the pre-modern 
“Gunpowder Empires,” the imperial model of government was replaced by the 
nation-states (Hodgson 1974). The Shi’a communities in the Middle East and 
Central Asia had to take on a new identity to redefine their relations with the 
emerging states.  
  The question of old sectarian identity vis-à-vis the new national identity, 
as well as the representation of ethno-religious minorities in the new nation-
states remain unsettled to this day. The Sunni-Shi’a struggles remains at the 
heart of today’s regional difficulties. The issue of “orthodoxy” and “heterodoxy” 
has not been finalized despite the al-Azhar University confirmation on Shi’a 
Islam in July 6, 1959.5   
                                                          
5 On July 6, 1959, Head of al-Azhar University Mahmood Shaltoot, said: 
1) Islam does not require a Muslim to follow a particular school of thought Madh’hab. Rather, we say: every 
Muslim has the right to follow one of the schools of thought, which has been correctly narrated, and its verdicts have 
been compiled in its books. Moreover, everyone who is following such schools of thought can transfer to another 
school, and there shall be no crime on him for doing so. 
2) The Jafari school of thought, which is also known, as Shi’a Imami Ithna Ashari” is a school of thought that is 
religiously correct to follow in worship as are other Sunni schools of thought 
Muslims must know this, and ought to refrain from unjust prejudice to any particular school of thought, since the 
religion of Allah and His Divine Law was never restricted to a particular school of thought.  
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B. Shi’a Population 
 
  Today there are around 1.5 billion Muslims living in the world. That is 
about 20% of the world population. The majority of the Muslims are Sunnis, 
and approximately 10-20% belong to the Shi’a denomination of Islam (Heinz 
2007, x). According to the 2009 Pew Research, there are about 154-200 Million 
people in the world who classify themselves openly as Shi’a. The exact number 
of Shi’a population remains unknown since most countries do not collect data 
on sectarian dissimilarities. Also, in most Muslim majority countries Shi’as do 
not openly express their religious identity in fear of social backlash. About 116-
147 Million Shi’as live in the Middle East and South Asia and Millions more in 
diaspora. Countries with the largest Shi’a population are Iran, Pakistan, India, 
and Iraq.  
  Iran is home to 35% of the world’s Shi’as. India, Pakistan and Iraq each 
has at least 16 Million Shi’as. There are substantial Shi’a populations (meaning 
over one Million people) in Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, and Yemen. Shi’as constitute the majority of the total 
population in Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Bahrain. The table below displays the 
countries with a large Shi’a populace (Pew Research Center 2009). Afghanistan 
now has a population of about 30 Million people and nearly 20% belong to the 
Shi’a denomination (mostly Ithna Ashari and a small Ismaeli community). That 
is approximately 3-5 Million people. Accurate statistical data on this subject is 
not available in Kabul, as least not when I was conducting my fieldwork. The 
Head of Afghanistan’s Shi’a Council, Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, agrees with the 
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estimate of 5 Million (Mohseni 2014).6  
Table 2. Shi’a Population 
Country Population  
Iran 66-70 Million 
Pakistan 17-26 Million 
India 16-24 Million 
Iraq 19-22 Million 
Turkey 7-11 Million 
Yemen 8-10 Million 
Azerbaijan 5-7 Million 
Afghanistan 3-4 Million 
Syria 3-4 Million 
Saudi Arabia 2-4 Million 
Nigeria <4 Million 
Lebanon 1-2 Million 
Tanzania <2 Million 
Kuwait 500,000-700,000 
Germany 400,000-600,000 
Bahrain 400,000-500,000 
Tajikistan ~400,000 
United Arab Emirates 300,000-400,000 
United States ~200,000-400,000 
Oman ~100,000-300,000 
United Kingdom ~100,000-300,000 
                                                          
6 Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, a Qizilbash from Qandahar, is considered the most powerful Shi’a cleric today in 
Afghanistan. 
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Bulgaria ~ 100,000 
Qatar ~ 100,000 
World Total 154-200 Million 
 
 
C. State System vs. Sectarian Blocs  
  Today’s regional powers - Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey - are expanding 
their geopolitical reach and sectarian rivalries in the fragile societies or “failed 
states” of the Middle East (Noelle-Karimi 2000, 4-5). The regional geopolitical 
rivalry coupled with the Taliban and Islamic State resurgence has rekindled the 
sectarian resentments in Afghanistan. The Westphalian State System principle 
of non-interference is now under assault by extremists on both sides as the 
Middle East appears to be moving in the path of more pan-regional sectarian 
blocs. The policies of the regional powers is deeply intermingled with sectarian 
interests, which is divided into two blocs. The “east to west” bloc is under the 
auspices of Tehran, Baghdad, and Damascus while the “north to south” axis is 
maintained by Doha, Ankara, and Riyadh.  
  The new Saudi-Iran-Turkey regional hegemony has rekindled the deep-
rooted sectarian resentments. This geopolitical situation unavoidably possesses 
risks for the survival of the Westphalian State System in the region as personal 
loyalties and collective religious identities further crystalize. The Guardian daily 
newspaper reported in 2016 that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard is now “recruiting 
hundreds of Shias in Afghanistan, the Fatemiyon Division, to fight on behalf of 
Syrian president Bashar Asad” (Rasmussen 2016). While the Fatemiyon Unit is 
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fighting alongside Syrian government forces, within Afghanistan, anti-Shi’a 
views are no longer found in official state policy. They are, however, apparent in 
the form of suicide attacks, carried out by militant groups like the Taliban and 
the Islamic State. In 2011, President Hamid Karzai cancelled his trip to United 
Kingdom after the deadly blasts in Kabul’s Qizilbash neighborhood (Chindawol) 
and in Mazar-e Sharif during the Ashura rituals (Popalzai and Walsh 2011). It 
is report that 58 people lost their lives and dozens more were seriously injured 
(Popalzai and Walsh 2011). 
  Apart from the constant fear of suicide attacks on the Shi’a congregation 
halls, many of the Qizilbash elders whom I spoke with in Kabul think that they 
are “underrepresented in the sphere of politics siyasat” (Azami 2014). Having 
little political representation in the upper tier of the state has left them with no 
real power or authority other than within their own neighborhoods. Qizilbash 
people simply do not have the same caliber of patronage ties that Afghanistan’s 
larger ethnic groups have. Here is a short list of concerns that were repeatedly 
conveyed by my interlocutors (an in-depth treatment of the present challenges 
remain outside the scope of this study). 1.) Qizilbash ancestral neighborhoods 
and burial places are threatened by the new urban plan, 2.) Name of localities 
and schools founded by Qizilbash have been being renamed, 3.) The National 
Museum of Afghanistan has no Shi’a cultural artifacts in its ethnology display, 
and 4.)Books published by Ministry of Education have no discussion on Shi’a 
Islam. The last point is significant because students remain unfamiliar. 
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III. Literature Review  
 
  The Soviet invasion in December 1979 and the dislodging of the Taliban 
by the US and NATO allies in 2001 have led to a proliferation of scholarly and 
journalistic books that have added volumes to the study of Afghanistan. Most 
of the newer publications primarily concentrate on Afghanistan’s “institutional 
decay,” loss of human capital or “brain drain” (the largest human displacement 
since the Indian sub-continent partition, 1947), economic dependency, and rise 
of militant extremism under the banner of Islam (Shahrani 2010, 2002; Crews 
and Tarzi 2008; Rubin 2002; Maley 2001; Roy 1990).  
  There are also several in-depth studies by native scholars that discusses 
the origin and changing milieu of political, economic, and military ties between 
Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union (Payind 1989; Reshtia 1984). The 
sociopolitical reforms and cultural changes that were manifested in the urban 
centers of Afghanistan was enabled by sizeable Soviet and American economic 
and technological aid that poured in the country shortly after the Second World 
War. The outside aid also created a sharp split between urban and rural areas, 
what Thomas Barfield calls the “Two Afghanistans” (Barfield 2010). The influx 
of outside assistance also facilitated to end the country’s customary posture of 
political, commercial, and academic isolationism, which was its hallmark from 
the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1880 until the close of the Second 
World War (except the reformist Amani Decade, 1919-1929). That is the good 
news.  
  The bad news is that the post-1979 conflicts has stopped and/or severely 
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limited the ethnographic study of people, cultures and languages that reside in 
that country, a process that started in the 1950s and concluded with the anti-
Western attitudes of the Afghan Marxists (Monsutti 2013). We still do not have 
in-depth or “classic” ethnographic studies on several social groups including 
the Ithna Ashari Shi’as, Ismaelis, Hindus, Sufis, and the diminishing Jewish 
population. The country’s rich cuisine, handicraft, art, dance, music (classical, 
folklore, and pop) have not enjoyed much attention from professional scholars. 
Western trained academics who conducted extensive studies before the Soviet 
War have acknowledged the importance of Qizilbash in their publications, but 
have paid little consideration to the question of who are the Qizilbash of Kabul 
(Adamec 1975; Dupree 1980; Gregorian 1969; McChesney 1989; Schurmann 
1962). There is no recent in-depth study on the Qizilbash in the American and 
European anthropological circles since Louis Dupree’s (1979) article, “Further 
notes on Taqiyya: Afghanistan,” and his (1984) encyclopedia entry, “Qizilbash,” 
in Muslim People: A World Ethnographic Survey. Given this relatively bare 
landscape of ethnographic studies, I hope to begin to fill this lacuna.  
  There has been a degree of intellectual awakening in Kabul with the new 
freedoms of religion and expression that were ratified in the 2004 Constitution. 
Since 2004, we have witnessed an awakening of the Qizilbash minority through 
the pen. Thus far, two books that focuses on different aspects of the Qizilbash 
have been published. The first account is by Ahmad A. Mohebbi, Qizilbash and 
Hazara amidst the Pages of Afghanistan History (2011). Mohebbi’s book, as the 
title suggests, is focused on the relations between the two Shi’a ethnic groups. 
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He starts with the arrival of Seljuq Turks in the 11th century and ends with the 
coronation of Abdurrahman in 1880. Mohebbi does not deal with the advent of 
the modern State, nation-formation, and the question of Shi’a minority and the 
state. His approach neglect oral stories, and falls short of what anthropologists’ 
call a “bottom-up” approach.  
  The second book is by Ehsan M. Puzhohish, Qezilbash of Afghanistan: 
History and Culture (2005). It centers on Qizilbash in modern Afghanistan and 
highlights their involvement in the expansion of state institutions: education, 
sciences, sports, and literature. A discussion of the state to Qizilbash however, 
is missing. The notion of how the forces of nationalism affected the collective 
identity and communal organization of Qizilbash is not discussed. The role of 
sacred landscapes (shrines) and rituals in the preservation of Shi’a identity is 
not addressed. Mohebbi and Pazhohish do not take into account the wave of 
recent books and articles that have come out in western academic circles about 
the transformation and rise of the Qizilbash in the post-Timurid period. There 
is hardly any discussion of the development of the Safavid-Qizilbash ties. Both 
books suffer from the lack of anthropological research method and a theoretical 
framework.  
  One of the in-depth articles that discusses the Qizilbash-Safavid affinity 
in the post-Timurid period is Szuppe’s (1996) piece “Kinship ties between the 
Safavids and the Qizilbash Amirs in late sixteenth-century Iran.” In an earlier 
article, “The Ghazi background of the Safavid State,” Mazzoui (1972) discusses 
the prominent part Qizilbash warriors ghazis, played in the rise of the Safavids 
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until the siege and economic decline of Isfahan in 1722. Apart from Mazzoui 
and Szuppe, other scholars have also closely studied aspects of the Qizilbash 
etymology and transformation in Safavid Persia and Anatolia (Allouche 1983; 
Arjomand 1981; Babayan 2004; Bashir 2006, 2014; Imber 1979, Karakaya-
Stump 2004, 2008; Kondo 1999; Roemer 1990; Matthee 1988, Minorsky 1982, 
Savory 1964, 1965, 1975, 1995, Tapper 1974, and Zarinebaf-Shahr 1997).  
  Like Mohebbi, some of the previously mentioned scholars also engage at 
length with the migration of the Oghuz Turks to Persia. For example, Vladimir 
Minorsky, eminent Russian scholar of Persian history and culture, elaborates 
on the Turkish migration from eastern part of Anatolia to northwestern region 
of Persia: namely of the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu (Minorsky 1982). 
However, neither Minorsky nor any other scholar mentioned above devote any 
ink to the reason behind the migration of Qizilbash to Kabul. The Qizilbash 
movement to Kabul has not yet been closely studied. The scholarship written 
on the Qizilbash of Persia and Anatolia (Alevism and Bektashi Sufi Order) have 
not included the Qizilbash of Kabul.  
  Similarly, the seminal studies on Ithna Ashari Shi’a Islam have also not 
encompassed the history of Qizilbash in Kabul (Arjomand 1988; Dabashi 2011; 
Heinz 2007; Karolewski 2008; Marcinkowski 2010; Momen 1985; Mottahedeh 
2000, Nakash 2006; Nasr S. H. 1988; Nasr V. 2007; Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008).  
 On the other hand, there is another cluster of rich scholarship that centers on 
the rise of modern nation-state of Afghanistan. This body of scholarship alludes 
to the Qizilbash but without much specificity. These studies treat the country 
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as a static and monolithic “buffer state” on the periphery of powerful colonial 
authorities – Czarist Russia and the British Empire. Any discussion of internal 
dynamics and historical intricacies that have shaped the country’s trajectory 
remain absent.  
  The body of literature that covers Afghanistan’s state-formation process 
falls into four distinct, and yet, interrelated categories.  The first body is the so-
called “Great Game” accounts. In the 19th century, colonial ethnographers were 
key informers in shaping British and Russian perspectives, which led to the 
delineation of Afghanistan in the second half of the 19th century. Two volumes 
that draw from the 19th century accounts are Peter Hopkirk’s (1992) The Great 
Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, and Shah M. Hanifi’s (2011) 
Connecting Histories in Afghanistan: Market Relations and State Formation on a 
Colonial Frontier. Hopkirk describes the events that took place in Central Asia 
and in Persia within the framework of “containment” and “retreat” strategies.7 
He sees the chain of developments in Kabul as derivative of the Russo-British 
rivalry, particularly from the perspective of the British in India to safeguard the 
“Jewel in the Crown.” Conversely, Hanifi’s book is not a chronological account 
of geopolitical proceedings in Central Asia. It is rather from the perspective of a 
“colonial frontier” in eastern Afghanistan. For Hanifi, the declining role of trade 
and finance after the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny, and the subsequent British Forward 
Policy takes center stage. Neither authors offer any explanation of how the 
colonial policies coupled with the declining commercial situation that befell on 
                                                          
7 Concepts in Anthropological Society of London 
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Kabul between the two Anglo-Afghan Wars, 1842-80, affected the Qizilbash in 
Kabul. Hanifi treats the Qizilbash in homogenous terms and makes pejorative 
statements.  
  The second body of scholarship that discusses state-formation are the 
anthropologies and histories that flourished after the Truman Doctrine, which 
ushered in a new era in the understanding of global affairs and “area studies” 
(Lockman 2004). Dupree’s (1973) Afghanistan offers a thorough overview of 
how the country “developed from a tribal and politically unstable polity toward 
a system of representative government.” A detailed explanation of the Qizilbash 
is not the primary concern of his work. Dupree’s short article (1979), however, 
“Further notes on Taqiyya: Afghanistan” presents the practice of dissimulation 
Taqiyya, among the Qizilbash bureaucrats. It offers insights on how Qizilbash 
civil servants reverted to “protective dissimulation” or a de-identification tactic 
in order to avoid stigmatization or loss of career during the late Muhammadzai 
Dynasty, 1929-78. The practice of Taqiyya and the absence of legal equality for 
the Shi’a jurisprudence fiqh, problematizes the so-called “Democracy Decade,” 
1964-73. Aside from Dupree’s Afghanistan, the other seminal book on Afghan 
state-formation is Vartan Gregorian’s (1969) Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. 
Gregorian masterfully interweaves the topics of tribe, Islam, and adaptation of 
modernity as he tries to situate Afghanistan within the international arena. The 
intensification of coercive nation-formation that transpired in Kabul after the 
Second World War remains outside of his positivist purview.  
  The third body of scholarship is less ambitious in scope and offers details 
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about specific historical episodes and personalities. This set is a mix of political 
dictionaries and biographies that revolve around the obsolete concept of “great 
men.” This type of research also flourished after the Second World War, but it 
was stopped when the Soviet War erupted. The dictionaries include Ludwig W. 
Adamec’s Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, and Jamil M. Hanifi’s (1976) 
Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan. The monograph of the rulers 
include works such as, Ganda Singh’s (1977) Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of 
Modern Afghanistan, and Hasan M. Kakar’s (1979) The Reign of Amir Abd al-
Rahman Khan. It is important to note that the state to Qizilbash interworking 
are not discussed in these insightful dictionaries and informative biographies. 
  The final group of state-formation process is the “official” state accounts 
that denied history and historicity to disempowered minorities. The parochial 
narratives are guilty of selective historicism and propagating the vision of the 
state. The concept of what Duara (1997) refers to as “Rescuing history from the 
Nation.” Parvanta (2002) in Afghanistan: A Country without a State expands on 
this concept. He tells us “Afghan historiography concentrated to a large extent 
on representing the Afghan history as continuum that linked the present 
statehood to a larger past.” The creation of primordial myths in what Benedict 
Anderson (2006) calls the “imagined communities” were disseminated through 
state-sponsored institutions such as, Siraj al-Akhbar Afghaniya weekly paper, 
Da Pashtu Maraka, the Pashto Academy of Sciences, and the Historical Society 
of Afghanistan. An example of selective historicism is HSoA (1957) anthology, 
Men and Events through 18th and 19th Century Afghanistan, which only covers 
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the history and contribution of Pashtun great men.  
  The “official” histories have rarely confirmed, but more often contradicted 
the interpretation of the past as experienced by ordinary inhabitants (Dadabaev 
2014). The discrepancy between accounts of the state (impersonal) and actual 
experiences of subgroups (personal) like the Qizilbash tell a different tale.   
 
IV. Outline of Chapters 
 
  During my conversations with a prominent Qizilbash intellectual and 
author, Asef Ahang, said the following to me:    
Academics should leave the comfort of university campuses and talk 
directly with the people. Ahistorical praise of history causes chauvinism. 
An objective recognition of the past deters its repetition. Scholars must 
uncover the past so lessons could be drawn for the present. There is no 
alternate path for enduring peace and progress in Afghanistan.    
            
With Ahang’s observation in mind, below is an overview of the chapters. This 
dissertation is a careful examination of the Qizilbash-State ties in Afghanistan. 
Chapter 1 starts with a discussion of what ethnohistory is. Why and how am I 
using this approach for my research? Using the ethnohistorical method of the 
Americanist Sociocultural Paradigm enables me to integrate data from a variety 
of eclectic sources that includes primary sources, newspapers, hagiographies, 
participant observation, in-person interviews, images, and secondary materials 
to reconstruct the history of “the forgotten people” such as the Qizilbash. To 
contextualize or weave together the local stories within meta-history, I rely on 
the technique of “zoom-in” and “zoom-out” known as the scalar framework 
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(Schayech 2016). The blend of ethnohistorical method and scalar framework 
not only enables me to study the Qizilbash from the bottom-up, but I also 
argue that it is a suitable method of conducting research in conflict-ridden 
societies.  
  Chapter 2 explores the origin, etymology, and evolution of the Qizilbash 
until the advent of pre-modern Afghanistan in 1747. It looks into the debate of 
whether Qizilbash is a specific ‘ethnic’ or a more general ‘epithet.’ because it is 
a topic with palpable political and social implications. This chapter integrates 
canonical sources and published scholarship to elaborate on the understudied 
themes of Qizilbash tribes, social organization, and culture. Chapter 3 explores 
the history of the Qizilbash in Kabul from Nadir Shah’s assassination in 1747 
until the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 1880.  What transpired in the Qizilbash 
quarters, which were situated in the eastern cities, after Nadir’s murder? What 
roles did the Qizilbash help fulfill in the fledgling Durranid Dynasty? Why did 
the Durranid rulers rely upon members of a Shi’a minority to help secure their 
power? How were loyalties formed in middle of the 18th century? Did anything 
change for the Qizilbash in Kabul after the two Anglo-Afghan Wars? To answer 
these complex questions satisfactorily, this chapter brings into the Qizilbash 
discourse primary sources that were produced during the successive Durranid 
and Barakzai Dynasties, 1747-1929.  
  Chapter 4 divides the Qizilbash migration to Kabul into three distinctive, 
yet interrelated waves. When did they migrate to Kabul? How and why did the 
Qizilbash of Anatolia and Persia end up Kabul? How did the Qizilbash sustain 
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their lives in Kabul? What can we learn about their culture and neighborhoods 
– Chindawol and Murad Khani? To understand the “push” and “pull” dynamics 
behind their migration, I use a combination of primary and secondary sources, 
as well as bringing fresh data from archives and fieldwork. Chapter 4 examines 
their family structure and explains their education mechanism, both of which 
were imperative for the reproduction of the Qizilbash military and bureaucratic 
ethos. 
  Chapter 5, State and the Shi’a Question, 1880-1978, describes how the 
rise of nationalism affect the collective identity and the cultural practices of the 
Qizilbash. After the delineation of Afghanistan in 1880, the Qizilbash remained 
critical to the State. Given this fact, then why anti-Shi’a decrees were issued? 
How did the different modes of state power “interpolate” and ostracize the Shi’a 
Qizilbash? What were the new bureaucratic “red tapes”? Were the Qizilbash 
involved in the anti-totalitarian movements? Did the breakup of communities 
trigger the paradox of assimilation and antagonism? How did the Shi’a clerical 
establishment react to these deep cultural transformations that swept swiftly 
through Kabul? How did the Qizilbash use pilgrimage to sacred sites, including 
Ziyarat-e Sakhi to retain their identity? 
  Aside from my findings, the concluding chapter tackles the question of 
whether coercive nationalism moved Afghanistan toward a pathway of “political 
modernity” or did it unleash a cycle of grievances and violence that still burns. 
What are the lessons learned for today’s state-builders to improve the ideals of 
tolerance, inclusiveness, and pluralism? 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Ethnohistorical Method 
 
 
“Rather than restricting history to written traditions or western epistemology, it 
may be argued that every cultural tradition, each linguistic group, has its own 
particular sense of the past”  
  ~ Raymond J. DeMallie, “These Have No Ears”: Narrative and the Ethnohistorical 
Method, 1983 
 
“Travel is fatal to prejudice, bigotry, and narrow-mindedness, and many of our 
people need it sorely on these accounts. Broad, wholesome, charitable views of 
men and things cannot be acquired by vegetating in one little corner of the earth 
all one’s lifetime” 
                                                                  ~ Mark Twain, The Innocents Abroad, 2010 
 
                                  
I. What is Ethnohistory? 
  Ethnohistory or historical anthropology is an established sub-discipline 
in the Americanist school of sociocultural anthropology (Darnell 2001). It is a 
disciplinary hybrid, which emphasizes the synthesis of written resources and 
ethnographic data to study the cultures, histories, and transformations of the 
past and present societies. Alfred L. Kroeber, a proponent of the Boasian 
method of historical particularism, tells us, “Historical reconstruction from 
ethnographic data is a different thing from writing of history from documents 
extending over a range of datable time” (Kroeber 1935). Practitioners of 
ethnohistory, however, go beyond the direct interpretation of older manuscripts 
or entirely relying on ethnographic presentism. Ethnohistorians also use a 
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diverse array of sources that extends to the study of literature, rituals, places, 
oral stories, memoirs, maps, artifacts, arts, and images (Arxtell 1979). The 
objective of ethnohistory is to attain an in-depth or holistic knowledge of a 
specific human society, with stress on longue durée rather than particular 
events. According to Raymond D. Fogelson, a renowned scholar in the 
discipline, ethnohistory is about causes and effects, historical structures, and 
not just events that affect the lives and experiences (Fogelson 1989). An 
ethnohistorical method offers a systematic and substantial exploration of little 
known facets of culture and history, which exist outside the panoramic 
purview of metahistory. It is rather a humanistic way of aligning itself with the 
theory of studying “history from the bottom up,” which is replete with data 
from which value can be gained.  
  Apart from ethnohistory’s definition and application, Michael Harkin in, 
“Ethnohistory’s Ethnohistory: Creating a Discipline from the Ground Up,” tells 
us about the intellectual advances in this subfield since Boasian Anthropology. 
Harkin observes, “Ethnohistory was part of the general rapprochement between 
history and anthropology in the mid-to-late 20th century” (Harkin 2010). For 
Harkin, ethnohistory originated from the 1946 Indian Claims Act by the United 
States Congress to hear claims of indigenous tribes against the state to resolve 
longstanding territories lost as a result of broken federal treaties. Ethnohistory, 
therefore, appeared with a more ‘practical’ rather than a ‘theoretical’ emphasis.  
 Since 1946, the Department of Anthropology at Indiana University has played 
a central role in advancing and teaching the theoretical and applied aspects of 
34 
 
Ethnohistory. IU was instrumental in establishing the American Society for 
Ethnohistory and its premier quarterly journal, Ethnohistory (Hickerson, 1988). 
Ethnohistory has remained a popular anthropology course at IU, taught by one 
of its prominent practitioners and authors, Raymond J. DeMallie, Director of 
the American Indian Studies Research Institute.  
  Outside the United States, ethnohistory’s geographic latitude expanded 
to Latin America in the 1980s, where archival resources and prospects for in-
person interview, and participant observation were abundant. Ethnohistory’s 
scope then extended into Melanesia, a region where recent European contact 
with indigenous populations allowed researchers to document and explain the 
post-contact developments. The processes of transformation in the Melanesian 
society as a result of contact with the complex industrialized societies enabled 
scholars’ to address the deeper theoretical question of whether Melanesia was a 
distinct “racial” or “cultural” area. Since the early-2000s, anthropologists use 
ethnohistory more regularly in South Asia. Some recent scholarship uses the 
ethnohistorical method to trace the history of the fabled infantryman sepoy, in 
India within the military labor market (Kolff 2002). Ethnohistory was also used 
for understanding the formation of social identity and racialization in pre/post-
colonial India (Dirks 2007).  
  The ethnohistorical approach is also well-suited for writing histories of 
what Eric Wolf (2010) refers to as “people without history.” Ethnohistory offers 
a practical technique to successfully link individual biographies and communal 
stories with broader processes in Central Asia and Middle East. It is a needed 
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“new direction in study of Islamic majority societies, politics, and movements 
rather than state and empire narratives” (Karakaya-Stump 2008). It is useful 
for an informed study of the urban and non-urban groups who are without a 
deep knowledge of their origin, history, and culture (Wolf 2010). Ethnohistory 
is not an exercise in the principles of ethnogenesis or primordialism, a reaction 
to the current economic and cultural globalization, but is rather engaged with 
the lasting anthropological themes of migration, adaptation, and transformation. 
It offers us a space to understand the strategies individuals and communities 
used to cope with changes caused by interaction with the global economic and 
political order. Historical anthropologists study societies to recreate the essence 
of a cultural system (lifeways and change of a people over time) at a juncture in 
its evolution before that rural or urban essence was lost by acculturation to the 
larger outside world (Camaroff Jean and John 1992).    
II. Research Methodology: Recollecting the Past 
 
  For the first time in human existence, majority of the world’s population 
lives in cities (Lachmann 2013; Gmelch and Zenner 1988). My study primarily 
centers on the Qizilbash of Kabul. Kabul has been an active city in the regional 
commerce and transnational flow of ideologies, what the globalization theorist, 
Arjun Appadurai (1996) calls the “global ethnoscapes.” The rise of Kabul shows 
is the culmination of growth and development that involves changes effected by 
modern education, movement of the people, and engagement with the economic 
order (Kazma 2016). The people who inhabited Kabul, by virtue of their 
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membership in complex social and political organization have a range of 
specialized roles. The presence of ranking and stratification reflects the process 
of increasing social complexity. Kabul is not only the dwelling place of modern 
man, but it is also a sprawling space that affects the organization, outlook, and 
behavior of its inhabitants. One of the most interesting phenomena among the 
residents of Kabul is the persistence of ethnic and religious identities despite 
top-down nationalism and rapid cosmopolitanism. The question then arises as 
to why, and how the Qizilbash have managed to keep, or lack thereof, their 
identity and culture in spite of state policies. Before I can reply to this 
question, my aim in the remainder of this section is to explain why and how I 
pursued a historically and theoretically informed ethnography.  
  To begin with, there are palpable personal safety concerns in today’s 
conflict-ridden Kabul for Western-trained anthropologists. To avoid any 
unnecessary attention, I decided not to stay in the compound of the American 
Institute of Afghanistan Studies when I visited Kabul for my fieldwork in 2014. 
There was a barrage of Taliban attacks. Suicide attackers targeted the NATO 
led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and ‘foreigners’ in remote 
and civilian areas. On August 5, 2014, Harold Greene, U.S. Army General, was 
killed and fifteen others were injured at a military training academy in Kabul 
(Rosenberg and Cooper 2014). Five days later, four more civilians were killed 
and 17 wounded near the entrance of Kabul International Airport (Constable 
and Hasan 2014). I was less than one kilometer away from the epicenter of this 
explosion when it occurred. The blast discouraged me from going out freely in 
37 
 
public areas. On August 20, a NATO Sergeant “was stabbed to death on the 
streets of Kabul” as I was on my way to the archives of the National Museum, 
which is located in southern Kabul (Popalzai and Hanna 2014). On September 
16, three more ISAF soldiers lost their lives “when a Taliban suicide car bomber 
attacked a foreign motorcade” close to the American Special Operation Base in 
the heart of the city (Fishel 2014).  
  Apart from the indiscriminate series of the Taliban suicide attacks, my 
fieldwork also coincided with the post-2014 Presidential Election dispute that 
unfolded between the opposing political camps of Ashraf Ghani and Abdallah 
Abdullah. The post-election dispute, which lasted for months, threatened 
overall institutional security in Kabul. The post-election bickering was finally 
mediated in a diplomatic manner by the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, to 
form a Unity Government. The combined dangers of suicide attacks and post-
election dispute caused the United States Department of State to announce 
travel warnings and urge extreme caution against travel or stay in Afghanistan. 
Below is the travel warning that was issued by the Embassy of the United 
States in Kabul during the violent summer of 2014. 
U.S. citizens traveling to Afghanistan despite this warning should avoid 
being predictable in their movements, including varying routes and times 
in commutes or other routine travel. The U.S. Embassy urges U.S. 
citizens to remain vigilant and avoid areas where westerners congregate, 
such as hotels and guesthouses. Do not discuss travel plans or other 
personal matters with strangers, or in public places. U.S. citizens in 
Afghanistan should regularly monitor Emergency Messages for U.S. 
Citizens Embassy of the United States in Kabul, Afghanistan, as well as 
the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs website. All U.S. 
citizens in Afghanistan are encouraged to enroll in the Smart Traveler 
Enrollment Program (STEP). By enrolling, U.S. citizens make it easier for 
the Embassy to contact them in case of emergency. 
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 As a naturalized U.S. citizen, prior to my departure to Kabul, I completed the 
online registration form, Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP), which is 
posted on the U.S. Embassy website. STEP sends out electronic notifications 
via cellphone and email in case of an unforeseen emergency. Suicide attackers, 
however, detonated first before an alert was received.  
  The next reason why I pursued a historical ethnography is indirectly 
related to the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS) actions in Afghanistan. 
HTS was an Army support program that continued from late 2001 to December 
2014. HTS employed social scientists and area studies experts with language 
abilities to provide the U.S. commanders with an understanding of the local 
population in the districts in which they were deployed. The HTS undertakings 
took place in the semi-rural towns and remote villages when I visited Kabul for 
fieldwork. Nonetheless, it added unwarranted layers of hurdles for independent 
trained ethnographers in almost every corner of the country. Particularly, for 
researchers like myself who are interested in the culture and history of Shi’a 
groups. HTS has made the Shi’a communities very sensitive to the idea of being 
subject of research sources. I was often given that mistrustful gaze of being a 
collaborator with the U.S. Army or a clandestine “agent” for the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). Thus, it took further effort on my part, with the help 
of my host family and local scholars, to create a level of mutual trust on the 
ground with my Qizilbash interlocutors. In Kabul, a “low trust society,” it is 
almost impossible to facilitate contact, schedule interviews with individuals, 
arrange talks with curators or do participant observation in any Shi’a religious 
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rituals.  
  Third, there are local factors that make research on a Shi’a community 
difficult. The rise of revolutionary Shi’ism in Iran has made the idea of research 
on Shi’a groups a very sensitive topic. Although the initial wave of revolutionary 
fervor, which emanated from Iran and flourished during the Soviet-Afghan War 
within its dependent parties such as the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, has 
faded away. Nowadays, “Shi’as are America’s silent partner in the Global War 
on Terrorism” (Nakash 2006, 9). This major shift in geopolitics was/is evident 
in the current anti-Taliban and anti-ISIS wars in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. 
Nevertheless, in today’s Kabul the word “Shi’a” or its more formal derivative “al-
tashayo” is often equated with the Iranian subsidized parties of the 1980s and 
90s. Seldom, in some informal settings, Shi’a social activists or human rights 
advocates are referred to as Jasos Akhund-ha, “spies of the Iranian mullahs.” 
For ordinary residents, the words Shi’a or political Shi’ism often evokes sour 
memories of armed conflict, despair, and destitution that people regrettably 
endured in the Civil War of 1990s. The complex relationship between Iran and 
Afghanistan’s Shi’as makes the job of a Western trained ethnographer very 
difficult.  
  There is an additional local factor why I pursued a historically informed 
ethnography. Prior to the Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-89, the absence of Western 
academic studies on various Shi’a ethnic groups in Afghanistan was tied to the 
“historical accident.” European contact with Muslim societies during the “Age 
of Discovery and Exploitation” started with the Sunni polities of Central Asia, 
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Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Indonesia. Colonial powers interacted more 
with the Mughals and Ottomans than with the Shi’a enclaves living in the 
landlocked Afghanistan. British and Russian ethnographers, emissaries, and 
travelers were occupied with the physical terrain and definite political matters 
that were perceived as having a ripple effect. Matters emanating from the royal 
palace took primacy. Culture and in-depth history of smaller groups such as 
the Qizilbash remained largely outside the research scope of the British and 
Russian ethnographers in the 19th century. A trend that was repeated over the 
course of 20th century by many local authors who cited the 19th century British 
and Russian ethnographies without the proper critical analysis of why and how 
evidence(s) was produced (Pitt 1972).    
  The final reason why I am studying the Qizilbash from a historical angle 
rather than focusing on presentism is theoretical. Since the paradigmatic shift 
away from grand theory that culminated in what Marcus and Fischer termed a 
“Crisis of Representation” in anthropology (Ortner 1984, 126). Anthropology 
has shied away from exclusive theoretical accounts that are void of empirical 
data and cannot be supported by local accounts. The dominant examples of 
yesteryear were the World System Theory and the new fad of Postmodernism. 
Subaltern scholars like Dipesh Chakrabarty have raised questions about the 
universal validity of grand theories and positivism. In his book, Provincializing 
Europe (2000), Chakrabarty calls for a shift from theoretical tendencies toward 
a more empirical consideration that is in line with the views and experiences of 
those who are being studied. This aligns Chakrabarty’s argument with the 
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basic tenets of ethnohistory. As Michael Harkin reminds us, “anthropology was 
envisioned as a means of getting to know the indigenous people of the land” 
(Harkin 2010, 114). In addition, the “broadening of historical angle on 
anthropological data has brought growing awareness on the limitations of the 
ethnographic present” and on exclusively theoretical suppositions (Hickerson 
1988, xv).  
  Below is a breakdown of different techniques that enabled me to recollect 
the Qizilbash past. 
 
A. Interviews 
  Can oral stories tarikh-e zinda be taken seriously in an ethnohistorical 
project? For practitioners of ethnohistory oral accounts alone cannot provide a 
full and impartial picture. However, as Clifford Geertz once said, “oral tradition 
can enlarge the discourse of human knowledge.” At the same time, academics 
must be wary of the politics of story-telling and native discourse (Clifford and 
George 1986). Oral histories “can be a perplexing and time-consuming 
business” that is usually shaped by human experiences, desires, identification, 
and mentality (Basso 2001, 37). For instance, policies concerning 
representation is linked to a person’s view of history and politics. Sometimes it 
is in contrast to the political ideologies and practices of the time. The paradox 
between the official narratives and the local discourses remain an intellectual 
dilemma. One-way to verify the validity of the oral accounts is to conduct 
enough one-on-one and focus group interviews to establish a crosscheck 
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mechanism. Usually, the undeniable facts resurface in different interviews. 
  How did I hand factual discrepancies? I conducted follow-up interviews 
with the same person or focus group. If the question at hand was still unclear, 
when appropriate, local academics, primary and secondary texts (if available) 
were consulted in order to find the underlying cause of an issue. I also sought 
the assistance of Sayed A. Mousavi, native anthropologist, and Ghulam Farooq 
(Social Sciences Dean, Kabul University) who referred me to local researchers, 
and editor of a newspaper, Chindawol Kohan, when I encountered inconsistent 
accounts.  
  How to stay within a framework? Afghanistan has a range of subcultures 
that are based on ethnicity, class, language, and religion. No ethnic group lives 
exclusively in one province. The Qizilbash have an uneven urban population 
distribution in cities across Afghanistan. In Kabul, they are spread throughout 
the city, but some are clustered in a few specific neighborhoods mahallas. The 
mahallas include Chindawol and Murad Khani (among others), places where 
Qizilbash people have historically lived and are also sites of elaborate cultural 
and religious ceremonies that are deeply embedded with meaning. Residents of 
these mahallas share a common story of origin and transformation that makes 
the recognition and preservation of these neighborhoods vital. For Qizilbash, it 
involves the practice of “speaking with names,” of ancestors, dates, and events 
(Basso 2001). To link the local experiences with the broader developments, and 
to understand how adaptation and continuity in a mahalla worked itself out, I 
relied on scalar framework. Scalar framework allowed me “to zoom in and zoom 
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out of my bounded unit of analysis” (Kazma 2016, 19).  
  Although I was not born or raised in Chindawol or Murad Khani, I vividly 
remember my paternal grandmother taking me with her there when I was very 
young as she made her shrine visitation. The delightful taste and smell of halva 
and warm nan, that she used to feed me is still in my mouth. I visited the same 
places, decades later, as part of my fieldwork. It was the type of native or halfie 
ethnography that “breaks your heart” (Behar 1997; Altorki 1988). As Behar 
reminds us, site-based study is influenced by the presence of the researcher in 
the site of study. This ethnography, however, is not an intertwining of my own 
personal experiences with my study. Below is a recent Persian poem by Asad 
Shamel (a Qizilbash native of Chindawol who lives in San Diego) that captured 
my emotions as I studied these mahallas. 
هبیرغ 
متفگ کرت ار مروشک مدوب ناوج یلیخ هکینامز 
متشگزاب اجنآ هب یلاسنایم هب هکینامز رد و 
تاخنش یمن ارم یسک ام هلحم و اه هچوک رد اما 
!یا هچوک نامه ، دندرکیم یزاب ام یا هچوک رد هکیاه هچب 
 یزاب دوخ نسمه ی اه هچب اب زین نم ،رود ینامز هکمدرکیم  
،دنتسیرگن یم معضو رس هب هک یلاح رد و دنتفرگ ار مرود 
؟ییآ یم اجک زا...هبیرغ...یه : دنتفگ رخسمت و بجعت اب 
 
لماش دسا 
 
Stranger 
When I was very young I left my country 
When I returned there in my mature years 
Nobody knew me in our streets and neighborhood [mahalla] 
Kids who were playing in our streets, that same street! 
Many years ago, I also played on this street with kids my own age 
They encircled me, gazing at my face and appearance 
With surprise and mockery said: “Hey Stranger… where have you come from?” 
 
Asad Shamel (Shamel 2014) 
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  How did I conduct the in-person dialogs? I positioned myself in a semi-
structured and unstructured interview format to allow for maximum input by 
my interlocutors. I used the “snowball and respondent-driven sampling (RDS)” 
techniques to move from the known to the unknown and elicit specifics about 
their actual experiences (Bernard 2006, 251). These interviewing techniques 
are in line with the “emic method” (discover and describe from within) derived 
from the Boasian Theory of Historical Particularism. My discussions with a rich 
palette of personalities were recorded, if permitted. I solicited data in both one-
on-one and in-group interviews about their views of Qizilbash history, politics, 
and the state. I usually started the interview process after the social formalities 
were done. While interviewing, I listened and recorded the dialogs. I deployed 
the “up streaming” or “snowball” technique to proceed from one fact to another 
by asking related questions to get a more complete depiction (Washburn 1961). 
Throughout the interviewing process, I strived to be “reflexive” and within the 
bounds of Institutional Review Board (IRB) to protect the rights and welfare of 
my interlocutors (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).  
  Below are my structured questions that I asked from my interlocutors. 
  1.) Who are the Qizilbash?  
  2.) What can you tell me about their history?  
  3.) What makes a Qizilbash identity?  
         4.) Can you describe the social markers or symbols of their identity?  
  5.) Were Qizilbash treated as the “other” by the state because of their  
  belief and language Farsi Setezi? If so, how can you explain the relatively   
  high number of them who served in the various Afghan administration?  
  6.) How do you see the past state to Qizilbash relations?  
After the conclusion of the interview(s), I always asked my interlocutors about 
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any unpublished manuscripts, letters, or newspapers they might have in their 
private collection that could enrich my study. Afghanistan’s National Archives 
and National Museum do not have an archive on Shi’a heritage that can aid us 
understand the Qizilbash history through the lens of their own experiences. 
Figure 1. Group Interview 
 
Figure 2. One-on-one Interview 
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Figure 3. National Archives 
 
 
  When I returned to Indiana University, I transcribed and translated my 
interviews to map the data of my interlocutors. I also used the content analysis 
practice to weave through the text collected during the face-to-face interviews. I 
indexed and coded key terms (events, dates, policies, and practices) and looked 
for recurrent themes that were examined for validation of data accuracy either 
through library research or through social media. I continuously used social 
media (Facebook), email, and phone calls to follow-up on open-ended themes 
by asking further clarification questions. The combination of library materials 
and social media were effective cross-examination method. See Appendix 2 for 
a complete list of libraries, online depositories, and archives that enabled my 
research. 
47 
 
Figures 4-5. Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University (Inside and Outside) 
  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Kabul University Library Afghanistan Studies Collection 
Figure 7. Library Nasir Khusraw 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 A History of Qizilbash: Origin, Etymology, and Evolution, 1501-1747 
 
 
 “It is a tradition among the People of Asia who are known and named by others 
for the type and color of hats and turbans they wear” 
      ~ Saeed Nafisi, A Contemporary Social and Political History of Iran, 1956 
 
                        
 
 
I. Origin   
  One of the leading developments in the early modern world was the rise 
of a powerful tribal confederation, Qizilbash, in Safavid Persia, 1501-1722. The 
Safavids with the military backing of their Qizilbash Sufi, murids, replaced the 
short-lived Turkic sultanates of Aq Qoyunlu and Qara Qoyunlu. The early 
Qizilbashs “shared the Central Asian Turkic political tradition and a vision of 
conquest rooted in the Mongol aspirations of world empire” (Balabanlilar 2007, 
1). The Safavids soon adopted gunpowder technology after their loss to the rival 
Ottomans in 1514 (Lomazoff and Ralby 2013). Use of gunpowder enabled them 
to expand the polity, continue with the Shi’a proselytization policies da’wa, and 
form a centralized administration that would have a profound impact into the 
modern period.   
  The Qizilbash of Afghanistan share a common origin with the Safavids in 
Persia. The Qizilbash relations with Babur, the founder of the Mughal Dynasty, 
1526-1707, and connections with the Abdali chieftains go as far back as 1588. 
49 
 
The sixteenth century proselytization of the Qizilbash missionaries Khulafa and 
Naqibs, in Balkh and Bamiyan are part of the Qizilbash history in Afghanistan, 
outside of the scope of this research. Similarly, the history of Qizilbash in parts 
of Farah, Herat, Qandahar, and Ghazni are part of the Safavid expansions. My 
intention, however, is to trace and situate the history of the Qizilbash in Kabul 
within a larger regional framework.  
  To understand the Shi’a question within the processes of state-formation 
in modern Afghanistan, we must start with the history of this tripartite expanse 
before the advent of the nation-state system. By revisiting the main social and 
political changes that occurred in the early modern era enables us to see how 
the Qizilbash organized, emerged, and transformed. By situating the Qizilbash 
in the larger regional context allows us to grasp the continuities and raptures 
in their culture. Before we answer the Shi’a question in Afghanistan, we begin 
this chapter with the question of who are the Qizilbash. 
 
A. Etymology 
  The phrase Qizilbash (also spelled as Kizilbash or Qezelbash) was used 
by Ottomans to denote a mix of Turkic speaking people that flourished in the 
vicinity of Ardabil. Qizilbash is a term that has been used by local scribes and 
outside travelers for more than five centuries now (Morton 1993, 227). The 
adjective “Qizil” translates to red, and the noun “bash” means head. Qizilbash 
literally translate to as redhead. Qizilbash figuratively translates to red hat or 
crimson headgear, which was initially worn by the Sufi murids as a distinctive 
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symbol of their firm allegiance to the Safavid Order, and not to the Ottoman 
divan. The Safavid Order similar to other 14th-15th century orders “provided a 
focus for collective identity whereby whole communities were brought into the 
fold of Islam, with details of observance and ritual to be worked out later” 
(DeWeese 1996, 188). The Qizilbash red headgear was initially not “an object of 
deep religious symbolism,” but served as a communal identity marker (Bashir 
2014, 379). 
Map 2: Ardabil 
   
  The referent of the word Qizilbash has undergone numerous shifts over 
time. It was first applied to the disciples’ murids of Shaykh Hayder’s Sufi Order 
in Ardabil, 1460-88. The phrase nobility hat kolah-e fakhr, and Hayder’s Crown 
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Taj-e Hayderi, ensued to display the Sufis discontent with the Ottoman policies 
(Mirjafari 1979, 158-59). A precise depiction of who these warrior murids were 
is not an easy undertaking. The Sufi murids were mostly Turkmen pastoralists 
and semi-nomads. Ethnically, the Qizilbash were initially comprised of Oghuz 
Turks, but after the formation of the Safavid State merged and intermarried 
with Kurds, Persian tribes and notables, and to a lesser extent with influential 
clerics who claimed to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad Sayyids, via his 
grandson Hasan and Husayn ibn Ali.8 
The aftermath of Mongol and Timurid conquests fostered an ambiance of 
weak social, political, and economic life in Persia. By the late-fifteenth century, 
the Safavi Sufi Order had attracted a large number of murids, who had become 
subjugated to the Ottoman expansionism and heavy taxation. The Safavi Sufi 
Order embraced the Shi’a denomination of Islam to set themselves politically 
apart from the Sunni Ottomans. To legitimize their political desire vis-à-vis the 
Ottoman Caliphate, the Safavids drew from early Islamic history – the question 
of succession after Muhammad passed away in 632. Safavids vowed on 
removal of falsehood batil, with truth haqq. This contrast between truth and 
falsehood or “us” and “them” (what I label inter-Islamic orientalism) laid the 
foundation for the formation of a communal identity that did not exist before 
(Royce 1982, 12).  
                                                          
8 It is important to note that in 14th and 15th centuries, “Sufism provided not only the organizational structures by 
which societal groups are being aligned, but also the terminology and discursive structure used to think about and talk 
about these communities; moreover, this is happening at the same time that these communities are being Islamized 
and herein lies one crucial “mechanism” by which Sufi Shaykhs should be understood as “spreading Islam” (a function 
often ascribed to them, but rarely explored more deeply” (DeWeese 1996, 188). 
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In 1487, Shaykh Hayder’s murids began to wear the red hats with twelve-
fold tarqs. The twelve-fold hat was not a sign of the twelve revered Shi’a imams 
or to remember the red hairband that Ali (first Imam) wore during Conquest of 
Khyber in 629 (Mirjafari 1979, 160). The red headgear was the outward symbol 
of Sufis who had devoted themselves to the Safavid directive and authority. In 
1491, Fazlullah Khunji-Isfahani, an Aq Quyunlu historian, remarks in Tarikh-i 
Alam ara-yi Amini that the word tark, which is differs from tarq, means to quit 
the pursuit of immoral desires (Mirjafari 1979, 159). For Khunji-Isfahani, the 
twelve abstentions a Sufi ought to refrain from include: 1) Jealously, 2) Spite, 
3) Anger, 4) Rancor, 5) Egotism, 6) Cavil, 7) Selfishness, 8) Lasciviousness, 9) 
Cruelty, 10) Gluttony, 11) Sleepiness, and 12) Evils (Mirjafari 1979, 159).  
  Apart from the twelve moral abstentions prescribed by Khunji-Isfahani, 
the red hat also provided Hayder’s warrior murids with a practical purpose. The 
hat, made out of wool protected their head from enemy strikes. The edge of the 
hat that covered the head was tight. The hat’s interior was sown with a strip of 
lining to safeguard the person’s head from a rough interior. The hat gradually 
came tighter at the top, like a cone.  
  Despite the use of the word Qizilbash in numerous primary sources, its 
etymology remained relatively unknown in academic circles until recent times. 
Richard Hartmann, a German scholar, on one occasion prior to the Great War 
“considered the elucidation of their provenance as a task of Oriental Studies” 
(Roemer 1990, 27). Since Hartmann’s early 20th century comment, scholars 
have successfully traced the origin of the word Qizilbash, and its changes over 
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the centuries in the Safavid and Ottoman areas. Let us visit some definitions of 
Qizilbash that have surfaced since Harmann’s observation. Roger M. Savory, a 
Safavid historian and Iranologist, describes Qizilbash in Encyclopedia of Islam 
as:  
The word is used in both a general and a specific sense. In general, it is 
used loosely to denote a wide variety of extremist Shi’a sects, which 
flourished in Anatolia and Kurdistan in the late 13th century onwards, 
including such groups as the Alevis. …  
 
In its specific sense, Kizilbash is a term of opprobrium applied by the 
Ottoman Turks to the supporters of the Safavid, and adopted by the 
latter as a mark of pride. ...  
 
Strictly speaking the term Kizilbash should be applied only to those 
Turkmen tribes inhabiting eastern Anatolia, northern Syria and the 
Armenian highlands, which were converted by the Safavid da’wa, 
invitation or call, and became the disciples of the Safavid sheikhs at 
Ardabil. The term, however, was also applied to certain non-Turkish 
Iranian tribes, which supported the Safavids, for instance the tribes of 
Talish, Siyah-Kuh, Karadja-dagh, Kurds, and Lurs.  
 
 
 
Hans R. Roemer agrees with Savory’s description. Roemer equates Qizilbash 
with the military units that constituted Shah Ismael’s main forces who could at 
once put 70,000 to 80,000 warriors with horse skills in the battlefield (Roemer, 
1990, 29). Roemer concurs with Savory that the Qizilbash was not a completely 
Turkmen organization. He writes:  
Not every member of Turkish ancestry was ipso facto Qizilbash. The 
name was also applied to others who accepted his belonging to the 
Qizilbash movement and was officially admitted as a member by way of 
bestowing upon him the red headgear - a privilege not necessarily 
reserved for men of Turcoman origin. There were also Qizilbash who were 
not Turkish (e.g., Najm-i Sani, Ismael’s famous vakil, or Kurds like the 
Chigani tribe).  
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  Shahzad Bashir, a leading Qizilbash scholar, prudently traces the origin 
and evolution of the term Qizilbash in his 2014 article titled, “The Origins and 
Rhetorical Evolution of the Term Qizilbash in Persianate Literature.” He reviews 
a set of primary sources that were produced in 1491-1680. The table below 
lists the sources that were assessed by Bashir to determine when and how the 
term Qizilbash was used. Bashir’s assessment ends in the late-1680s because 
under the last Safavid ruler, Sultan Husayn, 1694-22, commissioning history 
writing came to a sudden stop because of two reasons: 1) internal Shi’a schism 
in Isfahan, and 2) the “tribal outbreaks” on the eastern periphery of the empire. 
The table below shows Bashir’s sources in a chronological fashion. 
Table 3. Safavid Primary Sources 
Timeline Sources Used 
1488: death of Shaykh 
Hayder 
Khunji-Isfahani, Alam-ara-yi Amini [1491] No 
1501: rise of Ismael I Nimdihi, Tabaqat-i Mahmud Shahi [1501-02] No 
 Khunji-Isfahani, Mihmannama-yi Bukhara 
[1509] 
No 
 Khunji-Isfahani, Suluk al-muluk [1514] No 
1510: capture of Herat Lahiji, Tarikh-i Khani [1516] No 
1524: death of Ismael I Khwandamir, Habib al-siyar [1524] Yes 
1530: death of Babur Amin Hiravi, Futuhat-i Shahi [1530] No 
 Babur, Baburnama [1530] Yes 
 Qasimi Gunabadi, Shah Ismael-nama [1533] No 
 Zayn ad-Din Vasifi, Badayi al-vaqayi [1538] Yes 
 Husayni, Tarikh-i ilchi-yi Nizam Shah [1545] Yes 
1544-45: Humayun in 
Safavid  
Mirza Haydar Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi [1546] Yes 
 Amir Mahmud, Tarikh-i Shah Ismael va Shah 
Tahmasp [1550] 
Yes 
1556: death of Humayun Sayyid Yahya Qazvini, Lubb al-tavarikh [1555] No 
 Shah Tahmasp, Tazkira [1561] Yes 
 Ghifari Qazvini, Tarikh-i Jahanara [1563-64] Yes 
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 Ibn al-Karbala-i, Rawzat al-jinan va Jannat al-
janan [1567] 
Yes 
 Navidi Shirazi, Takmilat al-akhbar [1570] Yes 
1576: death of Tahmasp Budaq Munshi Qazvini, Javahir al-akhbar [1576] Yes 
 Hasan Beg Rumlu, Ahsan al-tavarikh [1577] Yes 
 Gulbadan Begum, Humayunnama [1570s] No 
 Jawhar Aftabchi, Tazkirat al-vaqi’at [1580] No 
1587: Abbas I begins 
reign 
Bayazid Bayat, Tarikh-i Humayun [1590] Yes 
 Qazi Ahmad Qummi, Khulasat al-tavarikh [1590] Yes 
 Abd al-Qadir Badauni, Muntakhab al-tavarikh 
[1595] 
Yes 
 Afushtah-I Natanzi, Nuqavat al-asar [1598] Yes 
 Anonymous, Tarikh-i Qizilbashan [1600] Yes 
 Muhammad Yar b. Arab Qataghan, Musakhkhar 
al-bilad [1600] 
Yes 
1605: death of Akbar Nurullah Shushtari, Majalis al-mu’minin [1602] No 
 Iskandar Munshi, Tarikh-i Alam-ara-yi Abbasi 
[1616] 
Yes 
1629: death of Abbas I Mirza Beg Junabadi, Rawzat al-Safaviyya [1626] Yes 
1666: death of Safi II Muhammad Yusuf Valah Isfahani, Khuld-i barin 
[1667] 
Yes 
 Vali Quli Shamlu, Qisas al-khaqani [1674] Yes 
 Anonymous, Alam-ara-yi Shah Ismael/Safavi 
[1680] 
Yes 
 Bijan, Tarikh-i Jahangusha-yi Khaqan [1680] Yes 
 
  To see how the meaning of the word Qizilbash evolved from 1491-1680. 
Bashir divides his examination into three phases (Bashir 2014, 385-86): 
In the first phase, the use of the red headgear in the beginning of Safavid 
history was a way to consolidate a subset within Turkomans around the 
Safavid house. Evidence from the fifteenth century indicates the 
headgear to have been in use as a matter of uniform prior to the wide 
promulgation of the term Qizilbash. This phase reflects the process of 
transition between the Aq Qoyunlu and the Safavids, which was gradual 
and extended in time rather than occurring suddenly in 1501.  
 
Bashir’s first phase includes the era prior to the rise of the Safavid Shi’a State 
in 1501. Khunji-Isfahani’s (1491), Alam-ara-yi Amini, and Nimdihi’s (1501-02), 
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Tabaqat-i Mahmud Shahi volumes do not contain the word Qizilbash. Qizilbash 
steadily gains meaning in the Persian primary sources after the establishment 
of the Safavid State. Bashir writes (Bashir 2014, 385-86):  
 
In the second phase, the headgear acquired greater political signification 
after the proclamation of the dynasty. This also led to the consolidation 
(if not the very generation) of the term Qizilbash, which is reflected in the 
progressively greater use of the term with the passage of time. The fact 
the term is not present universally across all sources reveals aspect of 
on-going negotiations surrounding identity and literary projection by 
various authors. In particular, it is significant that some of the earliest 
court historians like (Hiravi, Gunabadi) do not use the term and remains 
absent from Qazvini’s works that was finished as late as 1555. 
 
The usage of the term Qizilbash in the early years of the Safavid State remains 
inconsistent in the Persian primary sources. Court historians from the start of 
Shah Ismael’s reign until the beginning of Shah Abbas’s reign in 1587 use the 
word Qizilbash intermittently since there is a lack of agreement on its meaning 
and identity. It is not until the late 16th century that the term goes from being 
a surface signifier to a symbol endowed with religio-historical weight (Bashir 
2014, 385-86): 
 
In the third phase, we see it become connected emphatically to the story 
of the dynasty’s origins, which became even more legendary and 
ideologically significant with the passage of time. Additionally, the term 
itself and the headgear also become associated closely with promulgation 
of Twelver Shi’ism as state religion, which was a major part of the 
dynasty’s identity. The fact that works produced during the last phase of 
the history such as, Iskandar Beg Munshi have greatly influenced 
modern research in Safavid history. It explains why it is common to see 
late stories about the origin of the headgear and the term Qizilbash 
attributed to the period of Safavid origins without problematization.  
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II. Qizilbash and the Fall of the Safavids   
  Qizilbash history and identity took on a new course with the collapse of 
the Safavid State. The inability of the last Safavid Shah, Sultan Husayn 1694-
1722, to successfully reform the highly centralized religio-bureaucratic system 
to meet the changing social and economic dynamics in the eastern cities had 
irreversible implications. Another main reason for “the decline of the Safavids 
was the neglect of the army” (Lockhart 1938, 2). The Qizilbash Sufis who were 
instrumental in the rise of the Safavids had been relegated to provincial cavalry 
or frontier commanders in favor of two new cadres. The musketeers’ ghulams, 
who were captured and moved to the imperial capital from the Caucasus. The 
Perso-Turkic imperial bodyguard Shahsevans, who were devoted to Shah and 
not to the Sufi headmaster Pir.  
  The army’s top-down chain of command had eroded with the relegation 
of the Qizilbash. Sultan Husayn, therefore, was unable to prevent the Yomut 
raids into Khorasan or revive the lucrative Gilan Silk trade, which squeezed the 
Persian rug industry and the imperial revenues. Sultan Husayn’s inability was 
also revealed when he refused to curb the authority of the powerful Shaykh al-
Islam, Mohammad Baqer Majlesi, who led the persecution and exile of Sufis to 
eastern frontiers (Momen 1985, 112). The Sunni-Shiite schism in the eastern 
provinces was intensified because of Majlesi’s actions. The disruptions in the 
province of Sistan were not dealt with in an effective diplomatic manner even 
though Abdali nobility of Herat and Ghilzai elites of Qandahar had established 
relations with the Safavids. The situation worsened under the newly appointed 
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Safavid Governor of Qandahar, Gurgin Khan, who reverted to excessive force, 
instead of conciliatory measures, to “strengthen the Persian authority in this 
wild region” (Axworthy 2009, 36).  
  The Baluch uproar was temporarily suppressed. Chaos in Qandahar and 
Baluchistan areas reintensified to the point where the caravan trade with India 
came to a standstill. Traders were concerned and ordinary people opposed the 
heavy-handed Safavid policies in Qandahar. Some Qandahari residents under 
the guidance of Mahmud Hotak, Chief of Ghilzai Pashtun tribe, took the matter 
in their own hands. Mahmud Hotak defeated the incoherent Safavid military in 
1722, at the Battle of Gulnabad, which resulted in the siege of Isfahan. Safavid 
forces were under the “command of a French mercenary, Philippe Colombe,” 
and not the Qizilbash cavalry who had brought their ancestors to the forefront 
of political prominence (Morgan 1988, 149).  
  The socioeconomic condition neither in Qandahar nor in Persia improved 
with the Afghan takeover. Mahmud executed Sultan Husayn, the Safavid royal 
princes, and 3,000 Qizilbash Shahsevan bodyguards (Dupree 1984, 638). The 
destruction of Isfahan crushed the centralized bureaucratic administration and 
the strong office of Shaykh al-Islam. Isfahan, which had gradually become the 
political, cultural, and social nucleus of the Shi’as, sent shockwaves across the 
triangular Safavid zone of influence, which covered lands between the Tigris, 
Amu, and Indus Rivers. Under the short reign of the Hotakis, 1722-129, Peter 
the Great attained territories of Darband, Rasht, and Baku to gain maritime 
control of the Caspian Sea. The Ottomans marched to cities of Hamadan and 
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near Kermanshah without any Hotaki resistance. Mahmud Hotak also tolerated 
the Yomut raids in Khorasan and enslavement of Shi’as that followed (Quddusi 
1960, 96). Trade and exchange with the Dutch East India Company’s posts in 
Isfahan, Kerman, and Bander Abbas plummeted. By 1729, it appeared as if the 
vast Safavid area would have the same “fate that befell Poland in the eighteenth 
century, partial or complete partition between her neighbors” (Axworthy 2009, 
xv).  
  Immense anti-Hotaki discontent grew in Persia. The Qizilbash Amirs and 
Provincial/Frontier Commanders, along with the support of some Shi’a clerics 
did not sit idle to witness the breakup of the state their ancestors had diligently 
assembled. So how did the Qizilbash react to the Hotaki takeover? 
 
III. Nadir Afshar, 1729-1747 
  Increased discontent among the Persian elites led to action. The Safavid 
prince, Tahmasp II, and some Qizilbash commanders amassed an army under 
the guidance of a former Qizilbash musketeer tufangchi, named Nadir Afshar. It 
was a collective goal to quickly topple the Hotakis, pacify the Sistan province so 
trade with India could resume, and repel the Ottomans, Russians, and Yomuts 
from Persia.  
  Nadir Afshar, as a former musketeer, had captured some Yomut “raiders 
and slavers” in Khorasan (Axworthy 2007, 638). Nadir, thus, had a firsthand 
awareness of the importance of firearms (gunpowder technology), mobility, and 
daily training for his new army. Apart from his military skill and leadership, he 
60 
 
also possessed a degree of diplomatic skills. He restored political unity between 
the powerful Afshars and Qajars, Qizilbash subtribes. He also forged an Abdali-
Ghilzai alliance in order to have a Sunni battalion in his military to manage the 
disorders in the eastern cities. As the commander of the army, Nadir assembled 
a multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian military, which led to his “brilliant victories” 
(Minorsky 1955, 253). In about seven years, 1729-36, Nadir Afshar managed to 
channel the immense domestic discontent into a cohesive military movement, 
which enabled him to rise from the head of the military to head of the state.  
  In 1736, after attaining extraordinary prestige through military victories, 
Nadir Afshar initiated a Quriltay, political and military council, in the Mughan 
Plain (place in northwestern Persia near Caucuses). The commanders, chiefs, 
and Sayyids of Isfahan officially declared him the Shah of Persia. He replaced 
the Safavid figurehead, Tahmasp, as the new premier of the state. The notable 
Golestana family served Nadir throughout the Afsharid era (McChesney 1983). 
After his coronation, Nadir signed a series of treaties with Ottoman, Russian, 
Mughal, and Khivan emissaries to resolve old and emerging difficulties. Nadir 
however, faced two formidable domestic challenges. First, how to legitimize his 
rule as Shah after two plus centuries of Safavid rule (Nadir’s ancestry did not 
extend back to Muhammad). Second, how to garner enough taxes to maintain 
the military machine he had assembled.  
  Nadir Shah also distanced himself from the late-Safavid religious policies 
that had caused its downfall. By lessening the sectarian issue in the periphery, 
he was able to focus on modernizing Persia’s military. To have a mobile cavalry 
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with firearms, he mounted cannons on horses and camels to traverse the rocky 
terrains of the Iranian Plateau. Next, he established a maritime presence in the 
Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea to defend against the European fleets. A robust 
naval existence would also allow Persia to become part of the growing maritime 
trade and not entirely relying on the fading Gilan Silk Trade and the unreliable 
overland “Silk Road” routes. 
Figure 8. Mounted Gun Apparatus 
Figure 9. Zamburak Canon 
  
   
  To diminish sectarianism, Nadir reduced the influence of the rigid Shi’a 
clerics by confiscating their endowments waqf. As a result, some of the leading 
clerics moved to Najaf (site of Imam Ali’s mausoleum). He sent an edict all over 
the empire, enforcing the cessation of sabb, cursing of the first three Caliphs 
(Abu Bakr, Omar, and Osman) which was offensive to the Sunni denomination 
of Islam (Tucker 1994, 163). Moreover, he introduced the Jafari Madh’hab, to 
the Ottomans in order to express his criticism of the anti-Ottoman 
millenarianism that had occurred before Shah Ismael, 1501. Nadir Shah’s 
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rapprochement with the Ottomans consisted of five points. 1) Recognition of 
the Jafari Madh’hab as a fifth school of Islam, 2) construction of a pillar in the 
Ka’ba to honor its official existence, 3) appointment of Shi’a hajj caravan leader 
without any harassment, 4) exchange of emissaries between the Ottoman 
Sultan and himself, and 5) release of Shi’a captives and prohibition of 
enslaving more Shi’as (Tucker 1994, 167).  
  The influential Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam, however, rejected Nadir Shah’s 
suggestion. He “issued a fatwa condemning the Jafari Madh’hab as a heretical 
innovation” (Tucker 1994, 171). The question of “orthodoxy” and “unorthodoxy” 
therefore remained unsettled between the two leading centers of Islamic power 
(Ottomans and Afsharids) in 1730s. By middle-to-end of the 18th century, both 
the Persian Shahs and the Ottoman Sultans turned their attention to a new set 
of insurmountable challenges that the British and Russian expansions in the 
region presented. Reaction to European military superiority and ‘modernity’ will 
be discussed in Chapter 5. Let us now respond the question of how to garner 
enough revenues for his military-administrative system. 
 
A. Indian Expedition 
  Nadir Shah seized the eastern commercial city of Qandahar after Husayn 
Khan capitulated in 1737. During the siege of Qandahar residents “from Kabul 
also had offered their help because they were angry with Husayn Khan” who 
had ravaged the overland caravan exchange (Floor 2009, 66). Nadir “spared the 
lives of Husayn Khan and leading Qandahari families at the intercession of the 
63 
 
former’s sister,” Zainab (Floor 2009, 78). To make sure the “Silk Road” stayed 
open from any future disorder, he reverted to the old practice of ‘resettlement.’ 
Resettlement was an effective tactic that became part of Nadir Shah’s internal 
policies (Axworthy 2007, 643). He relocated a large number of Abdali families 
from Nishapur and elsewhere in Khorasan to Qandahar oasis and offered them 
fertile farmlands that previously belonged to the Hotaki Ghalzais. The Hotakis 
were relocated from Qandahar to the lands vacated by the Abdalis (Lockhart 
1938, 120).  
  Nadir Shah then conscripted both Abdali and Ghalzai men were in army. 
He also freed Ahmad Khan and his older brother Zulfiqar Khan from the Hotaki 
prison. He appointed Ahmad Khan on his staff as a yasawal, orderly officer. He 
employed Zulfiqar as a government officer in the Mazandaran region. While in 
Qandahar, Nadir appointed Abdul Ghani Khan to govern Qandahar in place of 
the unreliable Husayn Khan. Other Abdali chieftains were designated to govern 
the semi-urban places in Farah, Helmand and Nimruz. The Abdalis, who relied 
on the military assistance of the Qizilbash garrison, already oversaw Herat. The 
relocation and empowerment of the Abdalis in the eastern cities was vital in the 
later formation of the Durranid Dynasty. To Durranid-Qizilbash affinities to be 
discussed in Chapter 3.   
  During the year and half-long siege of Qandahar, Nadir Shah ordered a 
new small city, Nadirabad, to be built close to the river for his troops to survive 
the hot weather (de Planhol 2010). While in Nadirabad, he finalized his Mughal 
Campaign, and also received an Ottoman emissary led by Mustafa Pasha who 
64 
 
carried a personal letter from Constantinople in response to the proposal of the 
Jafari Madh’hab. The Sultan offered: 
  Excuses for his inability to recognize the Jafari sect or to agree to the  
  erection of a fifth pillar in the Ka’ba. The Sultan also stated that the  
  sending of the Persian pilgrims to Mecca via Syria might give rise to    
  trouble. He concluded by begging Nadir to excuse his acceptance of the  
  first two points. In regard to the third point, he suggested that the  
  Persian pilgrims should proceed to Mecca via Najaf (Lockhart 1938,  
  121).  
 
 The Najaf to Mecca route for Hajj pilgrimage was not under the control of Shi’a 
clerics in Hilla seminary. Nadir was not pleased with the reply of the Ottoman 
dignitaries. He sent Ali Mardan Khan Shamlu with the Ottoman envoy back to 
Constantinople. He instructed them to ask Sultan Mahmud I to reassess his 
views on the Jafari proposition by the time he returns from Mughal India. As 
Nadir left for Delhi, he left behind a sizeable garrison of Qizilbash musketeers 
and arms in Nadirabad. Along the path to Delhi, Nadir Shah also left behind 
trustworthy Qizilbash battalions in Ghazni to guard the communication and 
supply routes, preserve order, and collect taxes.  
  When Nadir Shah reached Kabul, he sent an envoy headed by Shahbaz 
Khan to Muhammad Shah in Delhi. He accused the Mughals of instigating the 
Baluchistan and Qandahar uproars under the umbrella of curbing the Safavid 
Shi’a growth (Tucker 1998, 212). The Mughal emperor, however, did not reply 
to him - a breach in diplomatic etiquette. Nadir Shah left a division of “12,000 
man Qizilbash garrison in Kabul” (Dupree 1984, 639). The Qizilbash division 
established an administrative base in districts of Afshar and Chindawol, rear 
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guard, which remains to this day.9 The Qizilbash strongholds were established 
on the outskirt of Kabul. When Nadir arrived in city of Jalalabad, “he sent his 
treasurer, Mirza Mohammad, as an ambassador to the Mughal court” (Floor 
2009, 80). Once again, Nadir did not get an official diplomatic response from 
the Mughal court in Delhi. The Mughals diplomatic negligence was understood 
as a signal of refuting his legitimacy as Shah of Persia. 
The diplomatic negligence confirmed Nadir Shah’s decision to launch a 
campaign against the Mughal Emperor. In 1738-39, his forces quickly defeated 
the Mughals at the Battles of Khyber and Karnal (Axworthy 2007). The Russian 
General Kishmishev called Nadir’s defeat of the Mughals in the rugged terrain 
of Khyber Pass as “a masterpiece in the History of War” (Axworthy 2007, 642). 
His fast victories over the Mughals were partly due to the use of gunpowder, 
mounted cannons and muskets on camels, zamburak. Nadir did not attempt to 
stay in Delhi for extended period of time, but “the khotbah was read and coins 
were minted in his name … gifts and taxes from far and near were pouring in 
… then rumors spread in Delhi that some mishap had befallen Nadir. Mobs 
began to attack parties of the Qizilbash” (Avery 1991, 40). Nadir responded in a 
heavy-handed manner.  
  Nadir ordered the punitive massacre and sacking of the jeweler quarters, 
which was responsible for spreading the false rumor. With all the war spoils, he 
then gave his army six months’ pay and exempted the provinces in Persia from 
taxes for the next three years. In addition, Nadir Shah “demanded the hand of 
                                                          
9 There are still neighborhoods and families in Kabul who call themselves Afshar and/or Nadiri (Afshar 2014). 
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the Emperor Aurangzeb’s great granddaughter for his son, Nasr-Allah” (Avery 
1991, 40). He returned to Kabul with lots of treasures, “including the fabled 
Peacock Throne and the Kuh-i Noor Diamond” (Tucker 1998, 207). Nadir’s war 
plunders were carried back on “1,700 elephants and … 30,000 camels” (Floor 
2009, 87). After Nadir’s Indian expedition, Indus River became the new agreed-
upon boundary. The Mughals forever lost control of trade routes that passed 
through Qandahar and Kabul.   
  Within the newly acquired cities and towns, the term Qizilbash was used 
in reference to the Persian or Iranian military contingents that were positioned 
in these locations (Adamec 2012, 359). This is sharp contrast vis-à-vis how the 
Ottomans and early Safavid sources had used the term. The Turkic origin and 
Sufi characteristic of what defined the early Qizilbash had become less visible 
by 1740.   
 
B. Central Asian Expedition 
  After sacking Delhi, Nadir Shah led another aggressive military campaign 
in Central Asia in 1740. The news of the Mughals’ crushing defeat had reached 
the Governor of Balkh, Abu’l Hasan Khan, who was ready to capitulate. Nadir’s 
forces defeated the Janid ruler of Bukhara, Abu’l Faiz Khan, whom he 
reinstated. He annexed Charju, with its river crossing, and all the land south of 
the Amu Darya (Avery 1991, 43). Later in 1740, Nadir directed his attention to 
the Khanate of Khiva and his old nemesis, Ilbars Khan. The Khivan oasis had 
descended into a land that sold slaves. Khivans regularly captured people who 
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practiced Shi’ism and confiscated their property. Ilbars pleaded for peace, but 
Nadir refused. He executed Ilbars Khan and twenty of his top commanders on 
the eve of seizing the Khanate of Khiva to send a strong message to those who 
encouraged anti-Shi’a sentiments. Nadir Shah released numerous Shi’a and 
Russian captives from Khiva (Avery 1991, 43). Similar to his previous action in 
Qandahar, he enlisted “the young Khwarizmi men into his service and returned 
to Persia” (Floor 2009, 89).  
  Soon after his Central Asian conquest, Nadir issued a farman, decree. 
His decree entailed that the “khotbah and in writing requests to him he should 
not be addressed as Vali Ne’mat anymore, but as King of Kings, the Command 
giver of Persia, Throne giver of Hindustan, Khwarazm, and the land of Uzbeks” 
(Floor 2009, 90). Nadir moved his capital to Mashhad in 1741. Mashhad was 
not only the home of his own Afshars, but also closer to the Qizilbash forts that 
he had left behind in what later became known as the countries of Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. Mashhad was near the formidable mountain fortress of Kalat-i 
Naderi, which provided a natural barrier in face of an onslaught, which Isfahan 
did not have.  
  Once in Mashhad, Nadir did not receive another reply from the Ottoman 
Sultan. Nadir ordered his troops to strike water wells in Baghdad and prepare 
80,000 mashks, large leather water sacks (Floor 2009, 90). Nadir and his chief 
Qizilbash generals finalized the military plans to go after the Ottoman Sultan in 
their own capital city of Constantinople for rejecting his Jafari Madh’hab deal. 
Nadir Shah’s main motivation was to expand the realm of Memleket-i Qizilbash, 
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Qizilbash Country, from the Indus River to the straits of Bosporus and from the 
Central Asian oasis to the western side of the Persian Gulf. This was proved to 
be a difficult mission that Timur or any of the Safavid Shahs were not able to 
accomplish.   
Map 3. Nadir Shah Afshar 
 
 
 
C. Ottoman Expedition 
  The news of Nadir Shah’s conquests in India and Central Asia reached 
Constantinople. Murad I, the Ottoman Sultan, initiated his groundwork for a 
defensive stand against Nadir’s enormous military. At its zenith, Nadir Shah’s 
army comprised of “60,000 Turkmen and Uzbeks; 70,000 Afghans and Indians; 
65,000 troops from Khorasan; 120,000 from western Persia (Kurdistan, Fars, 
Hamadan, Lorestan, and Khuzestan); 60,000 from Azerbaijan and  
69 
 
the Caucasus; and Persian javanmard from the country-side (Axworthy 2007, 
639-40, 42). In 1743, Nadir Shah declared war on the Ottoman Sultan under 
the pretext of rejecting his Jafari Madh’hab suggestion.  
  This round of Ottoman-Qizilbash War lasted from 1743-46. Below is a 
description of the army that Nadir had built in 1743 (Axworthy 2007, 635): 
The 375,000 strong Persian army of Nader Shah stood poised to invade 
Ottoman Iraq. It was the first in Persian history to be comprehensively 
equipped with up-to-date gunpowder weapons, for both cavalry and 
infantry, and included a powerful new artillery train of nearly 350 
cannon and siege mortars ... This large army was disciplined, well-
motivated, well-supplied, regularly paid and fed, and included veterans of 
Nader’s successful campaigns in India and Central Asia. It had beaten 
the Ottomans before and would do so again. It is no exaggeration to say 
that at this date, it was not only the most powerful single force in Asia, 
but possibly in the world. 
 
 In a deliberate act to undermine the Sultan’s authority, Nadir summoned 
Sunni and Shi’a jurisprudents from Persia, Baghdad, and Central Asia to Najaf. 
In the shrine city of Najaf, Nadir convened “a formal council to ratify the Jafari 
Madh’hab idea” (Tucker 1994, 171). At the Najaf Council, he told Abdullah al-
Suwaydi, Ottoman jurist, that “in my realm there are two areas, Afghanistan 
and Turkistan, in which they call the Iranians infidels. Infidelity is loathsome 
and it is not appropriate. There should not be in my domains one people who 
call others infidel. Now I make you my representative to go and remove all of 
the charges of infidelity” (Tucker 1994, 171). A half-hearted treaty was finally 
ratified to avoid any retribution between Nadir Shah and the Ottoman officials 
in 1746. The fruits of this treaty was not yet fully reaped when a tragedy befell 
on Memleket-i Qizilbash. 
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D. A Qizilbash Tragedy  
  In a period of about quarter of a century, Nadir Afshar, who arose from a 
modest Qizilbash origin, “built an empire across Iran, India, and Central Asia” 
(Tucker 1994, 163). Nadir weakened the Chinggisid Khanate System Khan-bazi, 
in Central Asia by disregarding the power of the tribal chieftains in what James 
L. Gelvin, a historian of the Middle East, calls the “military patronage-system” 
(Gelvin 2015). The decade-long presence of Qizilbash in Balkh was another key 
turning point. The Qizilbash brought with them the centralized Perso-Islamic 
model of governance that had at its core a well-oiled bureaucracy. Local amirs 
became incapable of forming any effective resistance, allowing the mullahs to 
inculcate anti-Shi’a attitudes. To abate the authority and influence of the local 
amirs and mullahs, and to minimize the likelihood of a revolt under the egis of 
heresy, Nadir conscripted local men to serve in his diverse army. For example, 
a contingent made up entirely of new Uzbek recruits crushed the Badakhshan 
Revolt 1746. Nadir Shah’s policy of continued reliance on locals enabled his 
expansion goals.  
  Domestically, Nadir Shah’s failure to institute legitimacy among the loyal 
Safavid clerics haunted with him until his assassination. The hefty taxes and 
enforcement of death penalty for those who did not pay caused much distress. 
The prominent pro-Safavid “Shi’ite clergy, which he had deprived of its material 
advantage, especially felt itself wronged. In the Shi’ite books, Nadir’s conducts 
are described as monstrous for erecting towers of skulls” (Minorsky 1955, 254).  
 Members of his inner circle killed Nadir Shah, 1747. If Nadir could have ruled 
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with the support of the pro-Safavid clerics, “the drive to pay for his successful 
army could have transformed the Persian state administration and economy,” 
along the lines of European mercantilism (Axworthy 2007, 642). Nadir’s policies 
of social diversity and religious tolerance could have transformed the Persian 
polity into the modern state era. A robust state might have stood firm against 
colonial interventions and economic domination that Persia underwent in the 
nineteen and parts of the twentieth century. Lastly, the fate of the Qizilbash 
officers and officials living in the eastern cities of the polity might have had a 
different trajectory.  
  Once the news of Nadir Shah’s demise reached Balkh and Bukhara, the 
Qizilbash officers withdrew because of rising political uncertainty and rupture 
in the military chain of command. Persia in 1747 witnessed a short-lived period 
of political vacuum. Balkh regained a degree of autonomy when the Ghilzai and 
Rahim Bi’s forces defected. Haji Bi Ming, amir of Maymana, took advantage of 
the interregnum by seizing control of Balkh. The Qizilbash retreat was seen by 
the amir of Maymana and Qunduz as a political opening to restore their realms 
and claim the titles of Khan and Wali-yi Balkh. The resurgence of tribalism or 
“tribal outbreak” ensued in the eastern frontier after Nadir’s death (Lee 1996, 
and Lockhart 1938). Balkh became a site of conflict between Mangit authorities 
in Bukhara and Ahmad Shah Abdali’s rising power in Qandahar.  
  After Nadir Shah’s assassination, large number of Qizilbash officers and 
officials merged forces with Ahmad Shah. The Qizilbash-Ahmad Shah alliance 
will be discussed fully in Chapter 3.  
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E. Primary Sources 
  In this section, my objective is to show how the word Qizilbash was used 
in leading primary sources that were compiled during or shortly after Nadir’s 
reign. How did the meaning of Qizilbash change after the fall of the Safavids in 
1722, or not? It is worth mentioning that there were no manuscripts that were 
commissioned during the Hotaki era, 1722-29, or when Nadir commanded the 
military under the shadow of the last Safavid Shah, Tahmasp II, 1729-36. With 
this fifteen-year gap in the Persian primary sources, our data and knowledge of 
the Qizilbash for the period (1722-36) until the rise of the Abdalis in 1747 and 
the rise of the Qajars in the late-18th  century derives from the following four 
sources:    
Table 4. Afsharid Primary Sources 
Timeline Sources Used 
1722-47: Source covers Muhammad Kazim Marvi, Alamara-ye Naderi [1788] Yes 
1733-59: Source covers Mirza Muhammad Mahdi Khan Astarabadi, Tarikh-i 
Jahangosha-ye Nadiri [1750s] 
Yes 
1759: death of 
Astarabadi 
Mirza Muhammad Mahdi Khan Astarabadi, Dorra-
ye Nadera [1759] 
Yes 
Witness to Nadir’s 
campaigns 
Abdul Karim Kashmiri, Bayan-i Waqi, also called, 
Tarikh-e Naderi or Nadernama [1784] 
? 
 
  Kazim Marvi’s (1788), Alamara-ye Naderi, is the most complete biography 
of Nadir Afshar. It is a rich three volume history of events that transpired from 
1722-47. The first part is about the rise and fall of the Hotakis, 1722-29. This 
volume informs us about the sociopolitcal miliue that existed in Khorasan until 
Nadir’s coronation in 1736. Marvi, however, does not defend Nadir right to rule 
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(Tucker 2012). The first volume is based on eyewitness accounts of those who 
were present or participated in what transpired while the last two volumes are 
larlgely based on Marvi’s firsthand observations. Interwoven throughout the 
ethnohistorical text are Marvi’s childhoold memories in the city of Merv as a 
Qizilbash youth, with a Tatar mother. The author is a descendent of the Qajar 
Qizilbash subtribe whose forefathers lived in Tabriz before they were resettled 
in Merv in 1631 as part of Shah Abbas’s relocation policies to divide and 
weaken the Qizilbash confedereacy (Astarabadi 1759, 131). Alamara-ye Naderi 
informs us about the anti-Shi’a attitudes and slavery that Tatars in Merv 
conducted in the early decades of the eighteenth century. The enslavement of 
Shi’as persisted until Nadir’s brother, Ibrahim Khan, relocated the Qizilbash 
back from the Merv oasis to Meshhad, including Marvi’s own family in 1727.  
  While living in Mashhad as a young man, Kazim Marvi, attended school 
when Zulfiqar Khan Abdali invaded the city in 1730 (Marvi 1788, 156). His 
family continued to live in that city until 1736. In 1736, Marvi and his father 
traveled to Tabriz where he joined Ibrahim Khan as a junior court official. Since 
then, Marvi recorded events such as, Nadir Afshar’s coronation in the Mughan 
plain and the ensuring triumphs and setbacks until his death in 1747. Marvi 
praises Nadir for saving Persia from foreign domination, “he believed that the 
execution of Shah Tahmasp II, along with his family, sealed Nadir’s fate 
(Tucker 2012). Without further discussion of Marvi’s career, let us turn to 
Alamara-ye Naderi, to observe how the word Qizilbash was used by the 
Qizilbash author himself.  
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   Marvi uses Qizilbash and its derivative in different contexts: Qizilbash 
(Marvi 1788, 356) Sepah Qizilbash and Ghazian Qizilbash (Marvi 1788, 1045), 
and Qizilbashi (Marvi 1788, 1048). The passage below is an example of the first 
usage, and its English translation is done by myself.   
 تکلمم هاگ رهمیرواین رب یمور راکهابت هفیاط نآ راگزور زا رامد ه ک ارچ .دشاب هیمور ریساو دشاب شابلزق ناجیابرذآ؟  
Whenever the Country of Azerbiajan is Qizilbash and remain captive to Rum 
[Ottoman Anatolia], why not take complete vengence on those hostile Rumis?  
 
In the above context, Marvi uses the word Qizilbash in reference to a Qizilbash 
territory, specifically country of Azerbiajan, which changed hands during the 
Ottoman-Safavid wars.  
 
دننک فرصت ار هعلق هتفر هک دراد ار نآ هدارا شابلزق هاپس دنتفگ 
 
 
They said, the Qizilbash Sepah, meaning corps, has the determination to move 
forward and seize the fort (Fazel 2015).  
 
In this context, Marvi uses the word Qizilbash in reference to a separate unit, 
Qizilbash Sepah, within Nadir Shah's army. 
 رفن راهچ نآشابلزق سابل دی ودرا لخادی کیناو   
Those four people entered the military camp in Qizilibashi uniforms (Fazel 
2015). 
 
In this sentence, Marvi reveals two insights. First, the Qizilbash cavalrymen or 
palace-guards had distinguishable uniforms. Second, not anyone was allowed 
to enter the guarded encampment where Nadir and his generals resided unless 
they were wearing the distinctive Qizilbash uniforms. 
                                                        *** 
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  Unlike Kazim Marvi, who writes in simple and direct language, Mirza 
Muhammad Mahdi Khan Astarabadi was an eminent court scholar of Nadir 
Shah who wrote under the penname Kawkab Star. Astarabadi was a trained 
bureaucrat who in his youth was appointed to the Safavid court in Isfahan 
(Perry 2011). In 1729, after Nadir Shah’s capture of Isfahan, he wrote him a 
congratulatory letter for retaking the capital from the Hotakis. For the next 
seventeen years Astarabadi served as Nadir Shah’s munshi al-mamalik, Head 
Secretariat. Astarabadi was personnally present in Nadir Shah’s discussions 
with the Mughal emperor and he also accompanied Nadir Shah’s embassy to 
Constantinople in 1747. After Nadir’s assasination, Astarabadi resigned from 
public service work to complete the historical and philological works he had 
been compiling for decades. Jahangosha-e Naderi was completed in 1750 three 
years after Nadir died. Astarabadi has several influential works. We will only 
examine his two history books that mention the word Qizilbash: the prosaic 
Jahangosha-e Naderi (1750s), and the ornate Dorra-e Nadera (1759). Below is a 
short passage from Jahangosha-e Naderi: 
ا زا لبق ناخ اضر دمحمین عت مور ترافس هبیین سر دوب هتشگید ا رب رعشمیهکن مینا لوا و وایای نامثع تلودی نچین رارق  
یهتفا مور هب سرا دور تمس نآ رد هعقاو کلامم هکی ا وین دشاب هتشاد قلعت شابلزق هب فرط  
 
Before Muhammad Reza Khan was designated as the Afsharid ambassador to 
Rum, an agreement was formed with the Ottoman government. Territories that 
are on the north banks of the Aras River belong to Ottomans and lands on the 
south side of the river belong to the Qizilbash (Fazel 2015). 
 
Astarabadi similar to Marvi uses the word Qizilbash in reference to land. In this 
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specific example from Jahangosha-e Naderi, lands located on the southern 
bank of the Aras River. On the other hand, In Dorra-e Nadera, Astarabadi uses 
a derivative of the word Qizilbash fortune شابلزق علاطیه  (Astarabadi 1759, 131). 
*** 
 
  Unlike Marvi and Astarabadi, Abdul Karim Kashmiri was not in Nadir 
Shah's company from the beginning. Kashmiri was living in Delhi until Nadir's 
entry in 1739 (Ahmad 2011). After sacking Delhi, Kashmiri joined Nadir’s court 
as a fiscal officer, motassadi, and accompanied the Qizilbash forces to Kabul, 
Central Asia and Persia (Levi and Sela 2009, 260). Abdul Karim Kashmiri wrote 
a book titled, Bayan-e Vaqe, in 1784, which is also known as, Tarikh-e Naderi 
or Nadernama. Kashmiri’s book deals with Nadir Shah’s expeditions and 
includes details of the cities and countries visited by the author in both central 
and south Asia in the middle of the 18th century (Levi and Sela 2009, 260). It is 
said to have rich geographical, social, and economic data that is divided into 
five chapters.10  
 
IV. Tribes  
  The elevated territory of the Iranian Plateau is part of the larger Eurasian 
landmass. The Iranian Plateau lies between the Zagros Mountains to the West, 
the Caspian Sea to the North, the Persian Gulf to the Southwest, and the Indus 
River to the East. This vast landmass not only contains some of the world’s 
                                                          
10 The actual manuscript is in School of Oriental and African Studies, London. MS., No. 18975. 
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most rugged mountain ranges, barren plains, parched salty deserts, and fresh-
water rivers, but is also home to a mosaic of ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
groups. This heterogeneous cultural archipelago covers what is now the 
modern states of Iran and Afghanistan. Its terms of peoples and cultural 
diversity, the Iranian Plateau is unsurpassed in the wider Middle East and 
Central Asia. It is home to roughly 40% of the Ithna Ashari Shi’a population 
(Pew 2009).   
  There are several reasons for the presence of the Shi’a denomination in 
the Iranian Plateau. The main reason goes back to the Mongol invasion when 
Baghdad fell to Hulagu, 1258. The era between the annihilation of the Abbasids 
until the start of the Shi’a Safavid State in 1501 can be summarized into three 
epochs: “the fairly stable period of Il-Khanids, the highly disordered period of 
post-Mongol successor states, and the attempted settlement of the Near East 
by Timur,” (Mazzaoui 1972, 79). Timur’s descendants unsuccessfully tried to 
retain a degree of control with their “decentralized” policy over western Persia. 
However, the Jalairid Sultanate, 1382-1410, and the Turkmen tribal coalitions 
of Qara-Qoyunlu (northwestern Persia) and Aq-Qoyunlu (parts of Persia) stayed 
autonomous. 
  The expansion of Shi’ism in the Iranian Plateau is tied with the Safavids. 
The Safavid Sufi Order founded in Ardabil, shortly after the Mongol conquest 
by Shaykh Safi al-Din, 1252-34. The Safavid Sufi Order was a “peaceful and 
contemplative order similar to countless Sufi orders which sprang up almost in 
every corner of the Muslim world” (Mazzaoui 1972, 82). The Mongol rulers of 
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Persia, Il-Khanids, placed the Sufi organization and its leaders of numerous 
followers under their protection. The city of Ardabil soon became an important 
center of religious pilgrimage for the murids, which brought economic benefit to 
the Safavid Sufis. Shaykh Sadr al-Din, 1334-93, expanded the activities of the 
Safavi Sufi Order. Khawaja Ali, 1393-29, extended the message, da’wa, of his 
order, tariqa, through the Sufi network into Syria (Sham) and Anatolia (Rum). 
Khawaja Ali got the freedom of some Turkmen captives from Timur after the 
Battle of Ankara, 1402. Khawaja Ali then sent the newly freed Turkmen back to 
their kin in areas of Rum and Sham to “preach the word” (Mazzaoui 1972, 83). 
In 1467, the Turkmen tribe of Aq-Qoyunlu defeated the Timurids. This marks 
an important event because the Safavi Order evolved from a “nonviolent” Sufi 
network into a “militant” sociopolitical movement. 
  Under leadership of Junayd, 1447-60, and Hayder, 1460-88, the, murids, 
followers of the Safavi Sufi order “became the ghuzat-i sufiyeh,” Sufi Warriors 
(Bayat 2000, 41). These ghazis participated in many military expeditions with 
their distinctive red headgears. In 1458, Uzan Hasan, chieftain of the Aq-
Qoyunlu, gave his sister in marriage to Junayd. A few years later, Junayd’s son 
and successor, Hayder, married Uzan Hasan’s daughter, who was the mother 
of Shah Ismael. These marriages solidified the kinship ties between the Sufi 
order and the Turkic tribal confederation. It also extended the reach of the 
Safavi da’wa. Although most of the Aq Qoyunlu had become murids, it was not 
until Shah Ismael’s reign that the central tribal structure of the Aq-Qoyunlu 
ceased to exist (Mazzaoui 1972, 89). Aside from the incorporation of the Aq-
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Qoyunlu, the Ottoman policies in Anatolia, “sought to control the tribes closely 
and subject them to regular taxation,” which prompted the various Anatolian 
tribes to move in Persia (Karakaya-Stump 2008, 17). Thus, Qara-Qoyunlu 
(Black Sheep) and Aq-Qoyunlu (While Sheep) then became the main recruiting 
ground for the expanding Safavi Sufi Warriors.   
  The Turkmen ghazis under the guidance of Junayd and Hayder received 
spiritual and military training. Before the rise of the Safavid State, they became 
devoted fighters known as the Qizilbash. With few military successes, Qizilbash 
expanded their movement into what is now the northern part of Syria, eastern 
Anatolia, southern Caucasus, and northwestern area of Persia. They were the 
leading reason for the rise of Shah Ismael to power and the establishment of 
the Safavid Dynasty in Persia, 1501-1722. Apart from the military support of 
the Qizilbash, four other reasons contributed to the continuation of the Safavid 
Empire: 1) Charismatic leadership, 2) Centralized bureaucracy, 3) Gunpowder 
technology, and 4) Institutionalization of Shi’ism. The early Safavids rewarded 
the Qizilbash ghazis with ample land grants. Thus, Turkmen acquired a degree 
of vested interest in the overall stakes of the empire. One question arises, who 
precisely were these tribal ghazis or “devotee-soldiers” who took part in the rise 
of the Safavids?   
  The main tribes, oymaqs (or tayifah), which helped the Safavids rise to 
power, belonged to Rumlu, Ustajlu, Shamlu, Dulgadir, Tekelu, and the Qajar. 
The lesser-cited oymaqs are the “Versaq, Turgudlu, Chapni, Baiburdlu, and 
Ispirlu” (Roemer 1990, 28). Within each oymaq there were leadership posts that 
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comprised the upper echelon of the tribal hierarchy. It is difficult to find in the 
early primary sources mention of Turkman, Afshar, and Bayat or mention of 
subtribes like Gunduzlu, Purnak, Warsak, Baharlu, and Ansarlu (a branch of 
Bayat). In fact, Shamlu, Ustajlu, Zulqadr and Turkmen are not one single tribe, 
but rather confederations. During Shah Ismael’s rule the Shamlus, under the 
headship of Husayn Khan Shamlu, was the most powerful entity in the 
Qizilbash confederation. Later, the Afshars, Bayats, and Qajars became the 
main supporters of the Safavid Shahs. The smaller tribes and subtribes were 
divided into two groups: 1.) One group formed the Shahsevan cadre, and 2.) the 
second group was relocated to southern parts of Persia. The latter was mixed 
with local Persians and some Arabs and a newer large coalition was formed 
known as the Qashqae (Nafisi 1955).   
  Iskandar Munshi, author of Tarikh-e Alam Arai-e Abbasi (1616), himself a 
Turkmen, names the tribes that comprised the Qizilbash Confederation in the 
early seventeenth century. Munshi lists the following tribal names: “Shamlu, 
Ustalju, Qajar, Afshar, Turkoman, Asirlu, Rumlu, Qara Daghlu, Bayat, Talash, 
Aalyaot, Jigarlo, Qazaqlu, and Baibadolo” (Munshi 1616). Tarikh-e Alam Arai-e 
Abbasi tells us that the last tribe that merged with the Qizilbash Confederation 
was the Persian tribe of Talash. Each main tribes had a territory on which a 
Beylerbeyi, Governor General, governed on behalf of the Safavid Shah. In terms 
of their geographic distribution, the Ustajlu were positioned in Herat. The Qajar 
were in Qarabagh and Shirvan. Zulqadr were in the Pars region, the Tekkelu in 
Syria and in northern Iraq, the Shamlu in Khorasan. The Afshar branch was in 
81 
 
Mazandaran (later relocated to Khorasan and Kerman). Karamanlu were mostly 
in Ardabil, and the Bayat were in Nishapur (Munshi 1616).  
  The Safavid revenue partly came from taxation of the agricultural goods 
in the Qizilbash autonomous areas. The overall Safavid economy revolved 
around agriculture, pastoralism, and the Persian rug industry, which Shah 
Tahmasp established in the sixteenth century.     
  The origin of some of the oymaqs is indicated in their tribal names. For 
example, the names Shamlu, Rumlu, Baharlu consist of a place-name with the 
addition of the possessive particle – lu. Others such as Afshar, Warsak, and 
Zulqadr are the old names of the various Oghuz subgroups. Shamlu, Rumlu 
and Karamanlu indicate places names in Syria, Anatolia, and Persia (Afshar 
2014). The term Qajar means “nomad” and Bayat means “Knight” or “Cavalier” 
(Afshar 2014). The meaning of clans such as, Ustajlu remains obscure.  The 
phrase Shahsevan means “adherents of the Shah” (Tapper 1974). Shahsevan 
are a heterogeneous group of Turkic and Persians, who were brought together 
in a coalition during the reign of Shah Abbas, 1587-1629. The Shahsevan was 
formed when some leading Persian bureaucrats married into Qizilbash families 
in order to counter the domestic court tensions that existed between the 
sedentary Persians and the nomadic Turkmen. Shahsevan were used to quell 
any domestic rebellions and the phrase “shah-i sevan kard” gained usage 
(Tapper 1974). Apart from marriage, loyalty between Persian viziers, senior 
officials, and Qizilbash amirs was acquired by ahd, vow, paymaan, oath, and 
bai'ah, allegiance (Mottahedeh 1980). The notion of living in the same locality 
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also provided the basis of social cohesion.  
 
A. Organization and Transformation 
  The leadership of the Safavi order was comprised of a Murshid-e Kamil, 
Supreme Spiritual Guide, and Khalifat al-Khulafa, Secretariat for Sufi Affairs 
(Savory 1965, 497). The Sufi organization intended to disseminate the Safavid 
message to their murids, followers. The Sufi order was controlled through the 
office of Khalifat al-Khulafa, who was also the Supreme Military Commander 
and nayib, Deputy of murshid-e kamil. The chain of knowledge transmission, 
shajara, “a document of deeds and family line,” was used to select the Khalifat 
al-Khulafa (Szuppe 1996, 80).  
  A Qizilbash filled the office of Khalifat al-Khulafa. He appointed his 
representatives, khalifas, in constituencies where the Sufi, da’wa, message, 
was active. The Khalifas, usually local tribal chiefs who had their subordinate 
pir, elder. His task was to train and successfully incorporate the new disciples 
into the Sufi order who were recruited by a naqib, missionary (Morton 1993, 
244). The Khalifa served as the overseer of justice to the ardent followers of the 
Safavi Sufi path who offered their devotion and compliance to Murshid-e Kamil. 
The Khalifas also provided the Murshid-e Kamil with a number of equipped 
tribal warriors in times of war. 
  In 1501, the Safavi Order with the help of the Qizilbash instituted the 
Safavid State. It was a very “carefully planned and cautious campaign run by 
wise old commanders” (Anooshahr 2014, 3). The Qizilbash commanders set up 
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the military institution. The Safavid government was divided vertically into the 
crown, khassa, and the provinces, mamalik. The bureaucracy was divided 
horizontally, along ethnic lines between the Qizilbash and the Persians (Savory 
1975, 168). The Qizilbash considered it suitable to fill the principal offices of 
the central government, military, and provincial governments. The strategic 
offices that the Qizilbash came to hold included wikalat, vizierate, amir al-
umara, chief army commander, and provincial Khalifas. The first Safavid 
vizierate was given to Husayn Beg Shamlu and other Qizilbash elites filled the 
military ranks. The army commanders were, savars, cavalrymen, who took 
pride in the red hat, “badge of honor” that were bestowed upon them. Thus, the 
Safavid State became synonymous with the expressions: kalamraw-i Qizilbash, 
Qizilbash Realm, and mamlikat-i Qizilbash, Qizilbash Country. At the same 
time, the person of Shah was not only the Murshid-e Kamil, but he was now 
also referred to as the Padishah-e Qizilbash, or the Qizilbash Shah (Munshi 
1616, 206).   
  The first Safavid Shah, Ismael, became both the supreme spiritual guide 
(religious) and the sovereign of the state (political). He transformed the murid-
pir relationship from an exclusively religio-military tie into a political one. Shah 
Ismael faced the dilemma of how to incorporate the Sufi order into the Persian 
bureaucracy (Haneda 1989, 57). The relations between the Shah “and their 
Anatolian followers” was still maintained and managed through the mediation 
of the Sufi convents (Karakaya-Stump 2008, iv). Shah Ismael superimposed the 
Perso-Islamic administrative model. The post of the vizierate, wakil, enabled 
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him a degree of control and persuasion over the decentralized Qizilbash. The 
expression Sufi probity sufigari, was used if one desired to become an officer in 
the state. Sufigari was coupled with sincere loyalty ikhlas, and unquestioned 
obedience itiqad, to the Shah as the head of the Sufis and the State. Being an 
upright Sufi was considered equal to being loyal to the Murshid-e Kamil and to 
the State. On the other hand, the term na-sufigari, failure to follow Sufi orders, 
was viewed as an act of a punishable crime against the state. This new and 
substantial change did not exist before Shah Ismael’s ascendency.  
  Under Shah Ismael the Safavid reach expanded in the Khorasan area. In 
1510, he geared up Herat as the second city of the empire, which became the 
seat of the heir-apparent. The prince was in charge of the Qizilbash Provincial 
Governor while the latter in his capacity as lala, tutor, was “responsible for the 
moral and physical safety of the heir-apparent and his ward” (Savory 1975, 
175). It was up to the lala to ensure the prince was wisely trained in hunting, 
horsemanship, and more notably statesmanship before he would assume the 
burden of the Shah. Safavid heir-apparent learned directly from the provincial 
governor about diplomacy and state affairs.  
  Shah Ismael’s western expansion to Anatolia came to a crushing defeat 
at the hands of the Ottomans (who had adopted the gunpowder technology) in 
the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514 (Lomazoff and Ralby 2013). After the Safavid 
defeat, Shah Ismael adopted the epithet sinner Khata’i. Below is a Shah Ismael 
poem ghazal, which was translated by Minorsky. In this poem, Ismael uses his 
adopted pseudonym. His poem displays some of the themes and symbolism we 
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have discussed thus far, the Safavid claim to power and their Qizilbash murids. 
Let us evaluate Ismael’s ghazal. For example, in the opening line he alludes to 
himself as “the leader of all these ghazis,” to legitimize his political position. In 
the next lines, he displays his ‘sacred family’ genealogy by referring to himself 
as Fatima and Ali’s descendant or “of Hayderian essence.” In doing so, Ismael 
masterfully sets himself, the founder of the Safavid State, as the guardian of 
truth haqq, over falsehood batil. He invoke the name of the second Umayyad 
Caliph, “Yazid,” whose army defeated the third Shi’a Imam, Husayn ibn Ali, in 
the Battle of Karbala. He similar to Husayn proclaims to follow the “path of the 
Muhammad Mustafa,” and not of the Yazid. It is not until the last stanza where 
he calls himself “Khata’i,” a servant of the Shi’as.” 
My name is Shah Ismael. I am God's mystery. I am the leader of all these 
ghazis 
My mother is Fatima, my father is Ali; and I am the Pir of the Twelve Imams 
 
I have recovered my father's blood from Yazid. Be sure that I am of Hayderian 
essence 
I am the living Khidr and Jesus, son of Mary. I am the Alexander of my 
contemporaries 
 
Look at you, Yazid, polytheist and the adept of the accursed one, I am free from 
the Ka'ba of hypocrites 
In me is Prophethood and the mystery of Holiness. I follow the path of 
Muhammad Mustafa 
 
 
I have conquered the world at the point of my sword. I am the Qanbar of 
Murtaza Ali 
My sire is Safi, my father Hayder. Truly, I am the Jafar of the audacious 
 
I am a Husaynid and have curses for Yazid 
 I am Khata’i, a servant of the Shi’as 
 
*** 
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  Shah Tahmasp succeeded his father, Ismael, in 1524. The Qizilbash took 
advantage of his youth and assumed total control of the state. Their pledge to 
the charismatic nature of Ismael, as their murshid-e kamil, had been shattered 
by the latter’s loss at the Battle of Childiran, 1514 (Mathee 2011). Under Shah 
Tahmasp, Qizilbash reverted to their traditional tribal loyalties. This led to a 
multiyear Civil War as the Qizilbash oymaqs fought one another for political 
supremacy. Between 1526 and 1533, either single tribes or bloc of tribes ruled 
the state without much input from the Persian bureaucrats. The Governor of 
Herat, Qazaq Khan, “acted independently of royal order, exercising oppression, 
zulm, and agreed to personal treaties with the Uzbeks” (Szuppe 1996, 83). State 
power became nominal in the peripheral cities while at the capital each of the 
competing Qizilbash tribes tried to outperform his rival(s) in order to acquire 
the privileged position in Tahmasp’s court. The main objective was to maximize 
their share of distributed land grants, tayyal. In 1530-31, the Tekelu tribe, in 
an unprecedented way, tried to capture the Shah Tahmasp, but other oymaqs 
and Muhammad Khan Tekelu (Tahmasp’s lala) rallied to Shah’s defense. 
(Szuppe 1996, 81).  
  After the Qizilbash Civil War, Shah Tahmasp reasserted his power and 
remained in control of the state affairs. There were two high-ranking offices 
whose functions were mainly military: amir al-umara and the qurchi-bashi. The 
amir al-umara office declined in importance. It was superseded by the new 
office of Qurchi-bashi (Matthee 2011, 112-13). The qurchis, praetorians, were 
not “allowed to marry without permission form the Shah (Morton 1993, 229). 
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Tahmasp took the first measure toward reducing the power and influence of 
the Qizilbash. He introduced a nontribal third force to the political scene. It 
was comprised of Armenians, Circassians, and Georgians, who formed a cadre 
of ghuleman-i khassa-yi sharifa, Servants of the Royal Household. These men 
were taken prisoner in Tahmasp’s battles in the Caucasus between 1540-41 
and 1553-54 or were offspring of women who were captured during the war 
(Savory 1995, 598). Moreover, after the first vizierate, which was offered to 
Husayn Beg Shamlu, the next five appointed wakils were Persians.  
  The exclusion of the Qizilbash from the vizierate and the royal household 
were calculated measures to curb their power in the face of imminent Ottoman 
and Uzbek threats. Tahmasp, and his immediate successors (Ismael II and 
Muhammad Khudabanda), however, were ineffective in resolving the triangular 
enmities between the Qizilbash tribes, the new cadre of ghulams, and the old 
Persian bureaucrats. 
  The Safavid state became relatively centralized in the latter years of 
Tahmasp. It was never able to overcome the political and ethnic fragmentation. 
Persia’s ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity formed a major impediment to 
central control. The bureaucrats wanted ‘real’ administrative power. The army 
officers never fully became subordinated to pens of urban scribes, bureaucrats. 
Qizilbash wanted the Persian officials to look after the diwan, court business, 
and not to interfere with troops in the field. This era was a period of confusion. 
The job description of state officials, arkan-e dawlat, remained ambiguous. 
There was extensive overlapping of power that caused tension and personal 
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animosities among the state officials. In 1555, after the Treaty of Amsaya with 
the Ottomans, the inflow of “orthodox” Shi’a clerics from Lebanon, Jabal Amal, 
was underway (Abisaab 1994, 104). The Shi’a scholars eventually became an 
integral part of the bureaucratic elite with opinions on state affairs. However, it 
was not until the rule of Shah Abbas I, who finalized Tahmasp’s centralization 
policies. Abbas transformed the decentralized and fragmented tribal society of 
the time into a patrimonial-bureaucratic empire (Matthee 2011, 36).   
  Despite the distraught times for Persia, Shah Abbas I (1571-1629), took 
command of Safavid politics and the army with the support of a Qizilbash amir, 
Quli Khan Ustajlu. Abbas was skeptical of the Sufis. He launched major top-
down reforms to expand the power of the state and to make the tax system 
more efficient. Abbas’s centralization policy included the replacement of the 
Qizilbash elements in the military, which operated on a “pattern of political and 
social promotion [and not] on the basis of personal merit” (Szuppe 1996, 95). 
Sufis were dismissed from their high-ranking posts and appointed as janitors 
and executioners. Abbas sought to appoint qualified administrators such as, 
the Persian “vizier of the Supreme Diwan, Hatim Beg, in command of the army” 
(Savory 1975, 169). Hatim Beg wanted to build a strong land-based army “with 
troops equipped with modern weapons” that could keep up to the formidable 
foreign threats: Ottomans and the Portuguese in Persian Gulf. With the counsel 
of Hatim Beg, Abbas formed a potent “gunpowder empire,” which comprised of 
ghulams. Ghulams were helpful in ending the Portuguese coastal invasion and 
had no indigenous loyalties in Persia except to the Shah (Haneda 1989, 59).  
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  The modern military of Shah Abbas included cavalry, savars, armed with 
muskets, tufangchis, and artillery, topchis (Haneda 1989, 58). Ghulams became 
the new military mainstay whereas the Qurchis represented the older cavalry. 
When “Turcoman tribes entered under the command of ghulam, the Qizilbash 
began to lose their identity and the qurchis alone represented the purely tribal 
elements” (Haneda 1989, 81). Nonetheless, Shah Abbas’s reign was a period of 
massive changes for the Qizilbash. 
  At the same time, under Shah Abbas, some children of the Qizilbash 
amirs “received their education principally at court (Savory 1975, 173). The 
young Qizilbash were admitted to the royal haram, where they were entrusted 
to the care of scholars in the royal library. They received a thorough education 
in statecraft, arts, and military training. Some even accompanied the Persian 
envoys in their diplomatic missions. The young cadre of Qizilbash bureaucrats 
were not only politically reliable, but were better educated than those who 
stayed with their tribal kin. As a result, these Qizilbash bureaucrats had the 
proper training and the ability to take on statecraft jobs at the Shah’s wish, in 
areas that hitherto had been exclusively preserved for the Persian. Shah 
Abbas’s new cadre of Qizilbash became known as muqarrab al-hadrat (Savory 
1975, 173). This class produced many noblemen mirzas, scribes katibs, and 
scriveners kitabdars, for the new bustling administration in Isfahan and for the 
frontier posts that were under the Safavid suzerainty. Abbas even appointed 
Salmon Khan Ustajlu, a Qizilbash bureaucrat, who quickly climbed the ranks 
and became the vizier of the empire. Salmon’s obligations included: 
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The head of the bureaucracy, in charge of the large staff of the 
daftarkhani-yi humayun, or Royal Secretariat. Although the technical 
business of preparing and auditing the budget, assessing the taxes was 
carried on by the Controller-in-Chief of Finance, hisab-dar, and his 
department, the vizier also had the overall responsibility of financial 
matters. 
 
  Shah Abbas hardened the loyalty and stability of the muqarrab al-hadrat.  
The Safavid Shah “aimed at forming marriage alliances with key members of 
the political circles at court and in the provinces” (Szuppe 1996, 79). Many of 
the Qizilbash officers became “tied even more closely to the Shah by marriage 
to member of the royal household” (Savory 1975, 174). The interethnic 
marriages between the Qizilbash “men of sword” and the Persian “men of pen” 
abated domestic friction. The practice of mixing politics with marriage is what 
the Safavid historian Rudi Mathee calls “sexual politics.” The importance of 
royal-in-laws and royal-cousins led to formation of a new aristocratic social 
class. The royal cousins from Safavid mothers were considered to be part of the 
dynastic family and, if men were given the right to use the esteemed title of 
Royal Prince Mirza (Szuppe 1996, 79). Matrilineal royal descent was also vital; 
however, paternal lineage took precedence. Under Abbas, loyalty to the Safavid 
household was no longer exclusively religious or political. For the Qizilbash, the 
preservation of the Safavid Empire was related to the preservation of their own 
heritage.  
  Shah Abbas’s profound reforms certainly curbed the power of the semi-
independent Qizilbash. It should not be said that he “crushed” them. They lost 
their dominant military position within the state. Abbas’s reforms required not 
91 
 
their destruction, but their continued existence in an urban environment that 
would not jeopardize the existence of the empire. The urbanization process of 
the Qizilbash actually began in the early part of the sixteenth century under 
Shah Ismael, but it accelerated over the course of seventeenth century. By the 
early eighteenth century, there were only few semi-nomad Qizilbash tribes. The 
Qizilbash had become sedentary. The powerful tribal amirs were scattered in 
“different parts of the country” through either land grants or relocation (Szuppe 
1996, 95). Some were moved “to border areas to provide a line of defense” while 
some settled in the capital city of Isfahan (Kondo 1999, 540-42).  The Qizilbash 
amirs who stayed “loyal to the Shah allowed the ruler greater control over the 
tribal society than before” (Haneda 1989, 81). The increased state interventions 
created a degree of internal rifts as the habitual role of the tribal chiefs waned. 
The changes in Qizilbash social organization took place not only because of the 
reforms, but also, also to a lesser degree, because of the muqarrab al-hadrat 
political contacts with the outside world. This transformation can been seen “in 
their engagement in artistic and literary activities” (Szuppe 1996, 95). Overall, 
Shah Abbas’s reforms effected the Qizilbash transformation from largely semi-
nomadism to sedentary participants. 
  The decrease in the political importance of the Qizilbash is also tied with 
the development of a more rigid Shi’a orthodoxy. Under Shah Abbas, orthodox 
Shi’ism was decisively established. The Safavid religious policy was carried out 
on four fronts: 1) eradication of millenarian extremism, Ghulu, 2) persecution of 
Sufism, 3) suppression of Sunnism, and 4) dissemination of Shi’ism. The 
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consequences of this became obvious when the title Sufi, could no longer be 
tolerated in the city of Isfahan and fell into disrepute (Savory 1965, 498). With 
the decline in the status of the Sufi masters and Sufi congregation halls, the 
sociopolitical power of the Khalifat al-Khulafa plunged. Sufi orders either died 
out or moved to northern regions of the Indian subcontinent under the intense 
pressure that came from the Shi’a orthodoxy. Sufis who stayed in Isfahan sank 
into being sweepers of the palace. Their public “rituals were maintained to the 
point that they continued to meet Thursday evenings for dhikr meetings” 
(Savory 1965, 502). Despite their unfathomable demotion, “food and lodging 
were provided for at the order of the Shah” (Mirjafari, 1979, 163-64). This 
gesture may have been a suggestion given to Shah Abbas by his Qizilbash 
vizier Salmon Khan Ustajlu. 
  The prestige of Sufis continued to decline amongst the people even after 
Shah Abbas’s long reign. The development of Shi’a rituals and remembrances 
gained social traction. In the early eighteenth century, about “two hundred 
years after Sufi fervor had brought the Safavids to power, it was possible for a 
mujtahid to denounce Sufism” (Savory 1965, 502). As the mujtahids continued 
to extend their influence in the court, the Sufi concept of the Unity of God and 
Man became sidelined. “Orthodox” Shi’a scholars, outright rejected the concept 
of Unity of God and Man. For Sufis the Unity of God and Man was “considered 
to be an emanation of God, displaying God’s attributes” (Mirjafari 1979, 158).  
  Under the reign of the last Safavid Shah, Sultan Husayn, 1694-1722, 
who was greatly swayed by the rigid mujtahids, Sufi orders “stopped holding 
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any sessions or gatherings in the Sufi circle, towhid khaneh, … all Sufi leaders 
were exiled from Isfahan” (Mirjafari 1979, 165). By the end of the Safavid era, 
most Qizilbash had become enthusiast Ithna Ashari Shi’as. A new military 
office, Sepahsalar-i Iran, Commander-in-Chief of Persia, which commanded all 
ethnic groups, had replaced the once powerful Qizilbash post of Khalifat al-
Khulafa (Savory 1995, 600-01).  
 
B. Culture 
  One characteristic that the Qizilbash people retained was their personal 
names. Qizilbash used the Turkic tribal names that commonly ended with Quli, 
slave of (Khan Jan 2014). Another Qizilbash naming convention was titles like 
tutors/guardians, lala, and qurchibashi. The titles preceded the first and tribal 
names. Shah Ismael’s tutor, for example, was Lala Husayn Khan Shamlu, and 
Abbas’s guardian was Lala Chah-Quli Sultan Yakan Ustajlu. Let us look at the 
first example a little closer: lala means tutor (Khan Jan 2014). Husayn is a 
common Arabic name that Shi’as mostly use to express their devotion to Imam 
Husayn. Khan is the tribe’s chief, and Shamlu is the tribal designation. In this 
example, Sham is also the historic word for Levant, which in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries included Anatolia.  
  In terms of language, the Qizilbash people were bilingual in Turkish and 
Persian. To a lesser extent, Kurdish and Luri dialects of western Persian were 
also used. At the time of their ascendency in 1501, the vernacular language of 
the military, court and administration was Turkish. Persian, however, stayed 
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as the official language of the empire, especially in terms of formal consular 
“correspondence, literature, and historiography” (Mazzaoui 2002, 86). Persian 
was the medium of communication with the Mughals and used in “diplomatic 
correspondence with Turkish speaking states, such as the Ottoman Empire 
and the Uzbek state” (Savory 1975, 169-70). Persian was inscribed on Safavid 
currency, pottery, tiles, and textiles. Arabic stayed the medium for scholastic 
religious works, but the translation of canonical religious literature into Persian 
picked up steam under Safavids. This is despite the fact that “Shi’a scholastic 
learning that had become the modus operandi [and the chief ideology] of the 
state” (Dabashi 2007, 36). In 1684-85, the travel diary of a German physician 
named Engelbert Kaempfer, tells us “the mother tongue of the Safavids is 
Turkish and this language is used at the court.” Dr. Kaemper writes, “Turkish 
language was propagated in the houses of top civils servant and important 
characters of the State and one must say if somebody wants to obtain the favor 
of the Shah, he must know this language” (Rahbar 1997, 56-70). Although, 
Shah Ismael made Persian the official language of the empire, but he himself 
composed poetry in Turkish and in the high Persian literary format.  
  Among the Qizilbash, the Quriltay, a grand political and military council 
of khans and chiefs that was founded by Genghis Khan and continued under 
Timur, was used. Quriltay was used as the starting point for army preparation, 
and as a method for consensus formation to give titles, and appoint leadership 
positions. The Qizilbash continued this Turco-Mongolian system, but added the 
coronation of the Safavid Shahs to it. Under Ismael, the Quriltay of Erzincan 
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was commenced in which the Qizilbash responded to Ismael’s summons and 
crowned the charismatic Sufi leader as their Shah (Erzincan is the name of a 
city in Anatolia, presently in Turkey). Similarly, the Quriltay of Mughan Plain 
(on the banks of Aras River in northwestern Persia), was initiated under Nadir 
Quli Beg, 1736, where prominent political and religious figures attended and 
crowned Nadir Quli Afshar as the Shah of Persia (Floor 2009, 1). 
  In the early decades of the Safavid era until Abbas’s military reforms, the 
Qizilbash carried a formidable arsenal of weapons such as bow, lance, sword, 
dagger, and battle-axe. The source of their fighting inspiration ilham, stemmed 
from their devotion to the Safavid message and keeping the Safavid household 
in power. Qizilbash warriors shaved their beards, had long mustaches, placed 
forelocks on their shaved heads, and wore the symbolic red wool headgear until 
the military modernization when the wool headgear was replaced with a metal 
helmet. 
Figure 10. Safavid Qizilbash Cavalryman 
Figure 11. Helmet 
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When the Qizilbash won a battle, the site would be named after the location 
where victory took place. That evening in the elaborate imperial tents, which 
were usually round in shape, a festivity would take place. A mystic troubadour 
called ashiq, would play music saz, and recite epic poems, accompanied the 
celebration. Poetry recitation played a key role in the spread of Persian 
language to new frontiers. The heroic poems that praised Qizilbash valor and 
chivalry javanmardi, inscribed under different sociohistorical settings than the 
Persian literate prose that were patronized by the Safavid court.    
  The Qizilbash have prided themselves in being part of the rich artistic 
culture that flourished under the Safavids. The Safavid artistic expressions are 
apparent in a variety of forms ranging from the intricate tilework inscriptions to 
elegant architecture, cities, bazaars, gardens, miniature painting, books, glass, 
rugs, and metalwork (Canby 2000). Safavid art reflects an underlying sense of 
symmetry, elegance, and intricacy. A manifestation of Safavid art is Maidan-e 
Naqsh-e Jahan in Isfahan. The most revered (high culture) art form was poetry. 
With Persian peotry's strict insistence on meter and rhyme, it remains more 
than mere expression of human emotions. Poems holds subjective truth and 
conveys wisdom from the past. Sometimes it also functions as a medium of 
sarcasm and social commentary on the theme of injustice zulm, by masterful 
use of metaphors and allegories (Afshar 2014).  
  As stated earlier, Shah Ismael was a classic ruler-poet, who composed 
odes and quatrains. Ismael composed a number of eulogies in praise of Ali and 
some graceful poems about music. Below is one of Shah Ismael’s well-known 
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quatrains where he sees music saz, as a positive human virtue:   
Today, I embraced my Saz 
My song is being echoed by heavens 
Four things are required for the life: 
Conscience, speech, respiration, and Saz 
 
  By the end of the 16th century, numerous Qizilbash amirs had become 
interested in artistic endeavors. A vivid case is Musayyib Khan Tekelu of Herat, 
a talented musician, composer, and calligrapher in nasta’liq (principal style in 
Persian). Nasta’liq calligraphy is still used by the Qizilbash in Kabul for writing 
poetry and as a form of visual art. Musayyib Khan’s father, “Muhammad Khan 
Tekelu, encouraged some cultural activities and was a patron of the historian 
Amir Mahmud B. Khwandamir and the painter Aqa Hasan. Musayyib is known 
to have surrounded himself with poets, and his own son, Mustafa Khan, was 
said to have equaled his father in all of the artistic skills, but that of music” 
(Szuppe 1996, 88). Music, poetry and calligraphy continue to play a big role in 
the lives of the Qizilbash (Ahang 2014). 
  Alexander H. Morton, on the other hand, draws attention to a Qizilbash 
ritual that is no longer practiced. In his article, “The Chub-i Tariq and Qizilbash 
Ritual in Safavid Persia,” Morton describes the rites of passage in which ritual 
beating with a wooden stick took place. The unusual nature of the practice are 
considered to stem from the thirteenth century Sufi tariqa, path or way of life. 
Evidence of this ceremony is “not very abundant in the Safavid period” (Morton 
1993, 226). The Chub-i Tariq rituals are not acts of self-flagellation like the 
Shi’a folkloric practices that takes place during Ashura. It is not a measure of 
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retribution or compulsion typically applied in schools and family. Chub-i Tariq 
is a “voluntary submission to the commands of a hierarchy and its leader, or, 
alternatively, to the more of a community … with the wiling confession of the 
person beaten” (Morton 1993, 226). In other words, it was part of the initiation 
rituals to join the Sufi fraternity. Morton offers an insightful summary:  
  The company gathered in a room, sitting in rows from one end to the  
  other. After praise of God and an hour of dhikr, remembrance, that was   
  chanted. It was followed by recitation of poems that praised the Safavid  
  Shahs and condemned the Ottoman Sultans. Those who were present in  
  the room were called individually by khalifa to make a monetary  
  contribution. Next was the beating. This was followed by dancing and a  
  meal, which brought the proceedings to a close (Morton 1993, 229). 
 
The Khalifa that applied the chub-i tariq stroke was known as the tariqchi. As 
for the qualification of the tariqchi, “he must be sound of spirit and without 
selfish motives, must respect the tariq and not act with levity” (Morton 1993, 
233). The beating was a single stroke of the stick called chub-i tariq, which is 
described as:  
The khalifa has a substantial wooden stick, and begins from the first to 
the last, one by one they all come for love of the Shah to the middle of 
the room and stretch themselves on the ground. And the Khalifa with the 
stick gives them a most mighty blow on the behind, and then the khalifa 
kisses the head and feet of the one he has given the blow, then he 
himself gets up and kisses the stick, and thus they all do, one by 
one…because Shah has ordered it so. 
   
  Apart from new murid’s receiving a single blow when joining the Sufi 
brotherhood or veteran Sufis committed of doing a na-sufigari action, the Chub-
i tariq practice remained in use at the Safavid court until their demise in 1722. 
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The late Safavid Shahs used it when appointment of certain category of officials 
took place. In an administrative manual, Dastur al-Muluk, written during the 
reign of Sultan Husayn, 1694-1722, the appointment of muqarrab al-hadrat is 
described by Morton in the following manner: 
After the Shah had bestowed the position on him, he used to make him 
lie down in Shah’s presence and, with the jeweled stick, daganak, which 
he held in his hand, strike him three times. After he got up, he would 
give him another stick, he would take that stick and kiss it, this meaning 
that he had been honored with the said position.  
     *** 
  With an overview of the Qizilbash origin, etymology, changing roles in the 
Safavid and Afsharid States, and their culture in Persia in this chapter, let us 
know turn to the question of what happens to the Qizilbash garrisons in Kabul 
after Nadir Shah’s assassination.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 A History of Qizilbash in Kabul, 1747-1880 
 
 
In Kabul, “history is replete with moral tales from which value can be gained” 
                                                           ~ David B. Edwards, Before Taliban, 2002  
 
                                                                    
 
“At the core of Kabul’s identity is a rich cultural landscape centered around 
places of deep historical significance” 
                                                           ~ Tyrell Mayfield, Kabul: A Different View, 2015 
                                                                                                                    
             
 
 
I. Aftermath of Nadir Shah’s Assassination 
  After eighteen years of multidirectional warfare within and outside of the 
Iranian Plateau, Nadir Shah became morose and uncertain. His unbearable tax 
policy to fund his army and navy depleted the Persian treasury and hampered 
the efficacy and reach of the bureaucracy. A number of insurgencies occurred 
in different regions of the empire including one directed by his nephew, Ali Quli 
Khan, in the impoverished province of Sistan. After Ali Quli’s rebellion, Nadir 
became suspicious of some elite courtiers (Lockhart 1938). To project authority 
and leadership, Nadir ordered the trusted Ahmad Khan Abdali to eliminate the 
alleged suspects, mostly Afsharid noblemen (more about Ahmad Khan later in 
this chapter).  
  Ahmad Khan promised to execute the cabal of prospective plotters. The 
order included prominent men like Muhammad Quli Khan, First Commander 
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of Palace Guards, and Salih Khan, Superintendent of the Royal Household. The 
conversation between Nadir and Ahmad, however, was “overheard by a spy who 
divulged it to Muhammad Quli Khan” (Singh 1977, 21). June 20, 1747, a small 
group of dissidents led by Quli Khan and Salih Khan set out for Nadir’s room 
(Tucker 2006, 103). Out of sheer panic, some plotters withdrew from the 
assassination plan of a man with Nadir Shah’s stature, known as the “Savior of 
Persia” (Axworthy 2010, 43). Of those men who stayed, Salih led the rush into 
Nadir’s room and with the sharp blade of his sword “cut off one of his hands, 
and before Nadir could return the attack, Muhammad Khan dealt him a deadly 
blow that cut his head off” (Astarabadi 1750, 461). With the assassination of 
arguably the world’s most powerful man of his time, the situation of Qizilbash 
garrisons in the eastern highlands and frontier cities took an irreversible turn.  
What happens next to Qizilbash in Kabul?  
 
II. Rise of Afghans 
  On June 21, 1747, during early morning hours, Ahmad Khan received 
the shocking news of Nadir Shah’s assassination from an Afghan harem wife, 
Bibi Sahiba (MacMunn 1929, 54). Ahmad rushed to the palace with the intent 
“to avenge the murder of their fallen master” (Singh 1977, 21). Despite the 
resistance of the assassins, Muhammad Quli Khan and Salih Khan Ahmad 
managed to pierce through the palace guards who were under the command of 
Salih. He then stood next to the decapitated corpse while confusion and chaos 
swirled in the imperial compound. The beheaded body of Nadir Shah remained 
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unattended while the plotters raided the treasury and showed hostility to the 
smaller force of Ahmad Khan. Ahmad was indeed outnumbered. He was able to 
remove “take possession of Koh-i Noor Diamond” (Singh 1977, 22). Ahmad left 
the capital city of Mashhad for Qandahar, adjacent to the tumultuous region of 
Sistan.  
  Ahmad Khan and his skilled cavalrymen, who were equipped with mobile 
zamburak guns, departed for his stronghold in Qandahar. When in Mashhad, 
Ahmad feared the Qizilbash elites would probably blame his smaller forces as a 
scapegoat (Dupree 1973, 639). Ahmad’s decision not to avenge Nadir’s death is 
explained in three different ways. First, the pro-Safavid Shi’a clerics would not 
have confirmed Ahmad Khan’s legitimacy since his genealogy (like Nadir’s) did 
not extend back to Muhammad. Second, it was unlikely that Ahmad would 
have revived Sultan Husayn’s “policy of appeasement” toward the Shi’a clerics 
at the expense of his own lineage and base of support. Third, the devastation of 
the Hotaki siege in Isfahan was still fresh in memories of Persian elites and 
ordinary residents. So attaining the throne in Mashhad would have faced stern 
opposition. With these matters in mind, the post-Nadir interregnum witnessed 
the rise of several short-lived polities (Balland 2011, 547).  
  The succession struggles between Nadir’s brother, grandson, and nephew 
compelled the Afsharid provincial governors to institute their own autonomous 
principalities. In Shiraz, Karim Khan Zand laid the basis for another pro-Shi’a 
administration. In Georgia, Heraclius II declared himself the de facto ruler. In 
Balkh, Haji Bi Ming, proclaimed himself as Wali-yi Balkh. Kabul’s Governor, 
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Nasir Khan, sided with the Mughal ruler since both sides had vested financial 
interest in the overland trade between India and Central Asia. In Qandahar, 
Ahmad Khan would soon declare his own autonomy.  
  Upon his arrival to the Qandahar oasis, Ahmad Khan shared the news of 
Nadir Shah’s assassination with the local chieftains. With the succession crisis 
in Mashhad, and the intensified fear of Maratha prominence near Kabul and a 
Baluch havoc in Sistan, security of Qandahar and its commercial trade roads 
became a high concern. The chieftains of Qandahar knew that without a legit 
military leader it would be very difficult, maybe impossible, to keep order and 
maintain the tax system in the eastern highlands and cities. At this juncture, a 
Mughal caravan “transporting Nadir Shah’s taxes back to Persia” reached one 
of Qandahar’s caravanserais (Rubin 2002, 45). The caravan consisted of “three 
hundred camels and elephants, which carried two Crores [20 Million] rupees in 
money, diamonds, and shawls” (Singh 1977, 29). Ahmad Khan’s public criers 
jarchis, publicized the news of Nadir’ assassination and the succession fight 
that had engulfed Isfahan. Ahmad seized the caravan imports from Mirza Taqi 
Khan, and offered him and his Qizilbash men positions in Qandahar. The cash 
and goods were distributed among his cavalrymen, and also used to lure in the 
allegiance bai’ah, of rival tribal chiefs in Qandahar. 
  On October 1747, four months after Nadir’s assassination, the question 
of political succession and future of Qandahar was resolved. The Afghan tribal 
council Jirga, ultimately reached an accord near the shrine of Shaykh Surkh. A 
highly venerated Sufi Pir, Sabir Khan Kabuli, from the Chishti Order, proposed 
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a solution. Sabir chose the twenty-four year old Ahmad Khan from the smaller 
Abdali clan as the new ruler. He placed some barley-shoots and tucked them 
into his turban. Sabir said, “may this serve as the aigrette of your crown” (Ali 
1958, 60). Ahmad acquired the admired title of Shah. The symbolic coronation 
legitimized his authority. From that point forward, Ahmad became known as 
Pearl of the Pearls Durr-i Durran (Gulistanah 1977, 74-5). The Abdali tribe of 
Qandahar became known as Durranis. The city of Qandahar was referred to as 
noblest of cities Ashraf al-belad, a honorary title which stayed in use until the 
dynastic Barakzai-Durrani political struggle of 1801 (Bosworth 2012).  
  Ahmad Shah’s sovereignty was symbolized by customary Perso-Islamic 
traditions. Silver and gold coins were minted to acknowledge his ascendency. 
The customary congregational Friday sermon in the mosques were attributed to 
him. Ahmad Shah’s official seal, used for decrees farman, had the image of the 
Peacock Throne, which was similar to the genealogical hallmark of the Mughal 
emperors and Nadir Shah (Gallop 2009). The diverse tribal council and Sabir 
Khan Kabuli formalized Ahmad’s rise to the throne. The question of how to 
consolidate and run daily affairs of the administration in Qandahar remained 
unanswered. 
   
A. Political and Military Consolidation  
  The eastern half of the Afshar territory, which included the area west of 
the Indus River, would soon fall under Ahmad’s suzerainty. Ahmad’s decade 
long of involvement and closeness to Nadir Shah had equipped him superb 
105 
 
leadership and military skills. Ahmad’s military success not only added to his 
charisma, but also was instrumental in his rise to the throne. Military victories 
and not a sacred ancestry to Prophet Muhammad or Chengis Khan provided 
him with political legitimacy, “a belief which he was to pass on to his 
successors” (Lee 1996, 80). Ahmad framed his administration on the Perso-
Islamic model that Safavids and Afsharids had used (Gommans 1995, 50). The 
sovereign or Shah, was regarded by his viziers, armed forces, sepah, and 
subjects, rayhat, as the God’s Shadow on Earth.  
  It was a government model that not only guarded against any internal 
rebellion, fitna, but also presented familiarity to the prominent chieftains of 
Qandahar and to the Qizilbash forts. He appointed Wali Khan as his Grand 
Vizier, Ashraf ul-Wuzara, and Jahan Khan, as the Supreme Commander of 
Troops, Sepah-Salar (Husayni 1753, 11-12). Similar to Shah Ismael and Nadir 
Shah’s Qurultais, there was also an advisory council, majlis, of chieftains and 
generals to strategize and analyze the campaigns. Kinship ties of the advisory 
council was paramount for the political consolidation and military alliances of 
Ahmad Shah’s burgeoning polity.  
  Unlike the Afsharids, Ahmad Shah’s administration faced the absence of 
an established bureaucracy, an established seat of power that could propagate 
the centralized policies to the various corners of the polity. The highlands of the 
Hindu Kush, including Qandahar, historically, were part of the bigger regional 
empires that had their administrative and cultural epicenter located in Persia, 
India or Central Asia (Barfield 2010, 66). Thus, this tripartite region was under 
106 
 
the influence of three various “cultural areas” (Kroeber 1963). Unification of the 
numerous independent minded tribes, local elites, and merchants to pay taxes 
and join the infantry in times of war was a significant impediment for Ahmad 
Shah.  
  To fill this void, Ahmad Shah chose to employ Qizilbash bureaucrats and 
cavalry who had no tribal kin in Qandahar, which in turn made them ‘loyal’ to 
him. The Qizilbash bureaucrats installed a patrimonial bureaucracy rather 
than a merit-based system. With the hire of the Qizilbash officials (mirzas, 
munshis, mostofis, and hesabdars), Persian stayed as the official language of 
the Afghan royal court. Both the administration affairs and the nonfiction 
books (history) were produced in Persian. Orientation toward the Persian 
language was also evident among the “noble Abdalis who not only preferred to 
speak in Persian,” but also sought to adopt the style of Afsharid military 
organization, tanzimat-e nezami (Tanner 2009, 114). Since Nadir’s military 
prowess in its glory days was thought of as unrivaled by Ahmad Shah.  
  To avoid a renewal of sectarianism that flourished in the late-Safavid era, 
Ahmad continued Nadir’s religious policy. Similarly, he “incorporated Shi’ism 
into the more universalistic mainstream of the Sunni tradition” (Gommon 
1995, 50). Ahmad not only showed tolerance for the Shi’as, but he conscripted 
Mirza Taqi Khan’s cavalry with his own forces. Taqi Khan, from an influential 
Shirazi household, then encouraged the Qizilbash strongholds of the eastern 
cities to join Ahmad’s cavalry. The Qizilbash units were experienced warriors, 
who were familiar with the commercial roads that connected Bukhara-Delhi-
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Qandahar. Qizilbash warriors during this period were the principle military 
power in the area, known as sahib-saif, men of sword (Noelle 1997, 241). Apart 
from the regular Qizilbash cavalry, asaker-e monazam, the various chieftains 
also provided Ahmad with an irregular infantry, senf-e peyada. The government 
in return paid each chieftain a fixed sum of the plunder based on the number 
of the allotted men, and give out land grants for their alliance if the campaign 
was successful. Many landless people joined Ahmad Shah’s irregular forces in 
hope of an income under the slogan of expanding the frontiers of Islam.  
  The size of Ahmad Shah’s forces reached “forty thousand men” before he 
and his Qizilbash cavalry looted the Marathas and the Mughals (Gulistaneh 
1977, 36). After the battlefield wins in the Indian subcontinent, Ahmad Shah 
collected the spoils and gifts, which provided the bulk of his administration’s 
revenue. Military triumphs allowed him to expand his rule and not to enact a 
regular system of taxation (except on caravans, revenues from customs), which 
later backfired when the Age of Conquest, futuhat, of the “gun powder empires” 
ended with the expansion of the British and Russian empires in Central Asia, 
Persian Gulf, India and the Caucasus (Hodgson 1974).    
  The Governor of Kabul, Nasir Khan, refused to recognize Ahmad Shah as 
the legitimate successor of Nadir Shah (Singh 1977, 36). He had formed close 
ties with the Mughal Emperor. Nasir did not want to lose the tax revenues that 
he collected from the lucrative horse, dried fruit, and spice trade, which passed 
through Kabul (Gupta 2012, 365). Ahmad was “able to work out agreements 
with the Safavid Qizilbash forces” (Champagne 1981, 29). The Tajik residents of 
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Kabul did not contest Ahmad Shah’s sizeable military. Nasir fled to Peshawar 
to put an army of primarily Hazara and Uzbek traders, who also had financial 
interest in the Delhi-Orenburg commerce.  
  The takeover of Kabul added an important geostrategic city to Ahmad’s 
polity. With the Russian and Manchu expansion in Central Asia, the east to 
west, meaning Kashgar-Constantinople trade enterprise shifted to a new north 
south, Orenburg-Delhi orientation. The newer commerce route passed through 
Kabul’s caravanserais, pasturelands and bazaars. Ahmad further enhanced the 
north-south transportation by encouraging the annual hajj pilgrims to travel to 
the Arabian Peninsula from the new port near the Indus River delta (Gommons 
1995, 37). The increased commercial and private travels brought new ideas and 
economic benefits to the Qizilbash and other residents of Kabul.   
  Ahmad Shah’s strategy was to control the key financial hubs directly. He 
incorporated them into his administration and left the areas that were regarded 
as unprofitable or of little geostrategic value to the locals (Barfield 2010, 68-
69). His annexation of Mashhad improved the overland trade from Astarabad to 
Multan, which passed through Qandahar. The silk trade between Mazandaran, 
Gilan and the Ottomans “stayed undisturbed and served as a source of wealth” 
production for Ahmad (Gommons 1995, 2). Ahmad decided that direct rule of 
contested areas such as Punjab and Peshawar was not necessary nor feasible 
with the expansion of the Marathas. Ahmad Shah, however, depended on their 
cooperation to avoid raids on the passing caravans. Therefore, it was easier to 
negotiate a mutual pact with local chiefs, who held position of authority and 
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considerable “social capital,” than to forcefully integrate them (Bourdieu 1984, 
114).  
  Similarly, Ahmad reached an agreement with the Governor of Balkh, Haji 
Bi Ming, who defected after Nadir Shah’s assassination to keep the warhorse, 
spice, and dried fruit business intact (Lee 1996, 83-85). Ahmad Shah retained 
his veneer of influence in all these commercial hubs neither through a system 
of provincial government nor a set of written laws that would last. The absence 
of permanent institutions and uniform laws, which homogenizes people as one 
nation, never crystalized in all the corners of his diverse polity. Ahmad Shah’s 
rule was created on a federal structure model, comprising essentially large and 
small independent federation of local rulers (Mousavi 1997).  
  Ahmad Shah’s decision not to directly integrate the peripheral areas into 
the Perso-Islamic structure proved costly. When the Durranids faced the issue 
of political succession, tribes in Punjab and Peshawar regularly switched their 
allegiances and sided with the British Army. Moreover, his administration 
barely interfered with the lifeways of the eastern Pashtuns who had a distinctly 
egalitarian structure communitas that centered on noble lineage and kinship 
(Turner 2011, 360). To preserve a degree of unity, Ahmad Shah, “used Islam to 
legitimate his power and relied on a feudal system,” which means that the day-
to-day authority fell in the hands of local ulema, who with the help of the local 
khans created an atmosphere that kept the status quo (Mousavi 1997, 3). With 
the absence of provincial government, the ulema wielded power through the 
patronage networks that regenerated the same sociocultural milieu. Khans 
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enhanced their influence by acting as a link between the local people and the 
ruling Perso-Islamic structure.  
  Ahmad’s government in reality was a superstructure that was laid on top 
of social groups. Each social group has its own different internal interworking. 
It was a centralized bureaucratic-military power that was governed by a thin 
layer of elites without the formation of a unified nation with a common national 
interest. This high autonomy model of the government led to the ruling class’s 
separation from the society’s daily needs and concerns. In other words, it was 
the creation of a system where the state was detached from the various social 
groups.  
 
B. Abdali-Qizilbash Ties: Ahmad Shah’s Early Years  
  Ahmad, the younger son of Zaman Khan Abdali and Zarghuna Alikozai 
was born in Multan, 1722 (Husayni 1753, 11). Zaman Khan was the appointed 
Safavid Governor of Herat who died a few months after Ahmad was born. To get 
protection for her children in the aftermath of the Safavid collapse, Zarghuna 
offered the hand of her daughter to a relative, Haji Ismael Khan Alikozai, who 
had become the new provincial governor in Herat (Morgan 1988, 149). Ismael 
Alikozai sent his brother-in-law south “towards Sabzawar and Farrah” (Singh, 
1977, 16). We do not hear about Ahmad’s childhood in the available primary 
sources until the defeat of his brother, Zulfiqar Khan, in Farrah by Mir Husayn 
Ghilzai, 1732. Mir Husayn, Governor of Qandahar, imprisoned both of Zaman 
Khan’s sons (Morgan 1988, 149-50). After a period of over six years behind 
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bars, the fate of the two Abdali brothers drastically changed with Nadir Shah’s 
siege and (re)annexation of Qandahar in 1738.  
  Prior to recapturing Qandahar, a number of noteworthy developments 
had taken place between the Abdalis and the Qizilbash. In 1588, Shah Abbas 
first brought the Abdalis into political prominence. The Abdali-Safavid relations 
continued throughout the Safavid reign. The traditional alliance of the Abdalis 
with the Persian court was renewed when Abdalis assisted Nadir Shah to defeat 
the army of Ashraf Hotaki at the Battle of Damghan, 1729. Apart from helping 
with the takeover of Isfahan, Abdalis also joined Nadir in the Daghistan Battle, 
1734-35. Nadir Shah held the Abdali nobles and troops in high regards. Nadir 
“promised to grant any boon that they asked of him” (Singh 1977, 16). With 
this in mind, the Abdali Chiefs (Allahyar Khan Sadozai and Abdul Ghani Khan) 
asked to have Qandahar under their control (Tucker 2006, 36-39). Abdalis over 
the years had lost control of Qandahar to the Ghilzais. In 1738, Nadir delivered 
on his promise. He sent off the beaten Mir Husayn Ghilzai and his affiliates as 
prisoners to Mazandaran while freeing the Abdali brothers (Astarabadi 1750s, 
324-9). Nadir Shah treated Ahmad and Zulfiqar sympathetically. Nadir also 
appointed Abdul Ghani Khan as the new Governor of Qandahar.   
Nadir Shah offered Zulfiqar an administrative post in Mazandaran. He 
appointed the sixteen years old Ahmad “on his personal staff as a, Yasawal, 
orderly officer” (Ali 1958, 59). As an inner member of Nadir’s team, Ahmad then 
joined and participated in the Nadirian Wars, Jangha-ye Naderi, which lasted 
until 1747. Ahmad Khan quickly “distinguished himself by his meritorious 
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services and was raised to the office of Khazanah Bashi, Chamberlain” by Nadir 
(Singh 1977, 18). Nadir openly praised Ahmad by often saying that “he had not 
met in Iran, Turan or Hindustan any man of such laudable talents as Ahmad 
Abdali possessed” (Singh 1977, 18). Over the course of time, Ahmad Khan 
became commander of his own cavalry. Nadir kept his trusted protégé, Ahmad, 
and his “four thousand brave and seasoned Abdali horsemen near the second 
tent of the Royal Palace” (Husayni 1753-54, 9).  
Ahmad showed fidelity towards Nadir’s descendants once he ascended 
the throne. He married the sister of Abbas Quli Khan, who was then moved to 
Kabul. To solidify his ties with the Qizilbash in Kabul, Ahmad’s daughter was 
married to Abbas Quli’s son. Some years later, Ahmad’s eldest son, Timur, who 
assisted Nadir’s grandson, Mirza Shahrukh, out of gratitude gave Timur the 
hand of his daughter. Thus, the first two Durranid rulers had Qizilbash wives 
(daughters of military men). The practice of “sexual politics” remained alive in 
the Durranid court. Kindly treatment of Nadir’s descendants in Mashhad, as 
well as toward the Qizilbash garrisons in the eastern highlands continued until 
the Durrani-Barakzai. In 1798, a Qizilbash Amir in Qandahar with supporters 
of Payinda Khan Barakzai unsuccessfully tried to dethrone Zaman Shah who 
was ready to invade India. Payinda’s sons retaliated by blinding and removing 
Zaman Shah from power. The Barakzai hostility enhanced the process of the 
dynasty’s breakup (1823), which set the ground for the British intervention. 
After Zaman’s removal from power, 1801, the Durrani-Barakzai rivalry was 
rekindled until the ascendency of Dost Muhammad Khan Barakzai in 1826. 
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The Barakzai-Qizilbash relationship, within the context of colonial encounter, 
will be discussed in upcoming section. Let us now turn to Timur’s relocation of 
the capital to Kabul with the assistance of the Qizilbash.  
 
C. Transfer of the Capital to Kabul: Role of the Qizilbash 
  A succession crisis between Wali Khan, Grand Vizier, and Ahmad eldest 
son, Timur erupted in 1772. This is despite the fact that Timur Khan was the 
designated heir apparent when Ahmad was alive. As soon as Ahmad died, Wali 
Khan, sought to position Sulaiman, his son-in-law, who was Ahmad’s youngest 
son, on the throne in place of Timur. When Timur and his Qizilbash cavalry 
arrived from Herat, he claimed the imperial seat regardless of the desire of 
some chieftains and nobles. Shah Wali provoked an uncle of the late Shah, 
Abdul Qadir Khan, to raise a revolt. The second son of Haji Jamal Khan 
Barakzai extinguished the riot (he had four sons: Rahimdad Khan, Payinda 
Khan, Haroun Khan, and Bahadur Khan). To distance himself from succession 
quarrels within the Pashtun tribal aristocracy and to consolidate his power in 
the thriving city of Kabul, Timur relocated the capital from Qandahar to Kabul 
in 1773-75. Timur Shah “made use of 12,000 non-Durrani Iranian Qizilbash 
cavalrymen, the descendants of those left on the eastern highlands at Nadir 
Shah’s death, for part of his army. His reliance on these Shi’a Iranians 
alienated his Durrani followers” (Champagne 1981, 33). Timur appointed the 
Qizilbash Amirs in high-ranking positions and distributed parcels of lands to 
them in Kabul (Mirza 1856-7, 47). A year later, with the help of the Qizilbash, 
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Timur chose Peshawar and not Qandahar as his winter capital that further 
alienated the Pashtun elites of Qandahar. 
  With the relocation of the capital to Kabul, Timur Shah not only lost his 
father’s social base, but also estranged some of the influential Pashtun tribal 
aristocrats. Moreover, he executed his father’s Grand Vizier, Wali Khan and 
exiled his uncle Abdul Qadir. Timur Shah found himself caught between the 
Qizilbash world of the sahib-saif and mirzas, who he needed to run his Perso-
Islamic government, and the elusive cooperation of the challenging chieftains. 
Timur increasingly “looked for support less from the Pashtun tribes and more 
from the urbanized Tajik and Qizilbash elements, whose influence was 
increasing in the army and administration” (Balland 1983, 548). After Timur’s 
died in 1793, the head of Afghan and Qizilbah such as, Fateh Khan, Sarfaraz 
Khan Barakzai, Amir Aslan Jawanshir and Jafar Khan, placed Zaman Khan on 
the throne (Mirza 1856-7, 52). An extended period of succession wars engulfed 
Kabul, which lasted until 1823. Accordingly, Herat became quasi-independent. 
Balkh and Kashmir were lost.  
  It was not until 1863, when Dost Muhammad Khan was able to re-claim 
Herat (Champagne 1981, 449). It was not until 1892, when another Barakzai 
ruler, Abdurrahman, was able to defeat the Uzbek army who were commanded 
by Muhammad Sharif Khan Ming to re-claim the region of Balkh (Lee 1996, 
213). The southern border emerged after Muhammad Yaqub Khan signed the 
Treaty of Gandomak with British-Raj in 1879. The modern state of Afghanistan 
with Kabul as its capital was born in the aftermath of the Second Anglo-Afghan 
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War, 1880. The process of nation-formation under the British-Raj protectorate, 
1818-1919, and then as a sovereign nation-state, 1919-1979 will be discussed 
in chapter 5. Below is a map of the Iranian Plateau from 1814. However, how 
do the primary sources written during the Durrani era depict the Qizilbash? 
Map 4. Persia 1814 
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D. Primary Sources  
Table 5: Durranid Primary Sources 
 
Timeline Sources Term 
Used 
1723-1773: Source 
covers 
Mahmud al-Husayni bin Ibrahim Jami, Tarikh-i 
Ahmad Shah-i [1770s] 
Yes 
1761: after the Battle 
of Panipat 
Ahmad Shah’s letter to Mustafa Salas Usmani, 
[1761-62?] 
Yes 
Diary/Journal Azizullah Bokhari, [1783] ? 
Travelogue The Memiors of Khoja Abdul Karim  [1788] ? 
1797: Source covers up 
to  
Imam ud-Din Husayni, Tarikh-i  Husayn Shah’i 
[1798] 
Yes 
Ahmad Shah’s removal 
of Safavid Dignitaries 
Muhammad Reza Bernabadi, Tazkera [1806-11] Yes 
Written in Tehran, 
post-1747 to First 
Anglo-Afghan War 
Ali Quli Mirza, Tarikh-i Waqa’i wa Sawanh-i 
Afghanistan [1856-57] 
Yes 
   
  One of the key primary sources of the eighteenth century is Mahmud al-
Husayni bin Ibrahim Jami’s, Tarikh-i Ahmad Shah-i, written sometime in early 
1770s. Mahmud Husayni, a student and collleague of Mirza Muhammad Mahdi 
Khan Astarabadi, entered Ahmad Shah’s imperial court as a munshi, secretary, 
after annexation of Mashhad, 1753-54. Husayni’s book is a chronological 
description of Ahmad’s power consolidation and conquests until his death in 
1772-73 (Husayni 1753-54). The introductry chapter predates the events of 
1747, which is crucial for understanding the Qizilbash-Abdali ties. It also 
discusses Ahmad’s family genealogy. Husayni draws heavily from his own first-
hand observations, news communicated to him by other court officials, and 
incorporates a wide range of documents.  
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  In terms of presentation style, Husayni’s book matches Astarabadi’s, 
Tarikh-i Jahangosha-ye Nadiri. This source is a rich combination of elegant 
prose that is sprinkled with Persian poetry and Arabic expressions. The word 
Qizilbash is used throughout Tarikh-i Ahmad Shah-i. Qizilbash appears twice in 
the introduction chapter alone. In the context of explaining the reasons behind 
Nadir’s assisination and Ahmad’s intent to avenge his murder (Husayni 1753-
54, 51). Husayni’s book is not a detailed study that centers on Qizilbash, but is 
very helpful in understanding the Qizilbash role in Ahmad’s campaigns and in 
his new Perso-Islamic administration.  
  The other canonical primary text of the late-eighteenth century is Imam 
ud-Din’s, Tarikh-i Husayn Shah’i, written in 1798. Tarikh-i Husayn Shah’i was 
originally intended to be a regnal account of Shah Zaman’s reign, 1793-1801. 
Its author joined Shah Zaman in Lahore in 1796-97. Imam ud-Din then 
accompanied Zaman to Peshawar, where he authored the history of the third 
Durrani ruler. Upon his return to Lucknow at the eve of the royal dualism in 
Kabul, he enlarged his initial account to include the reigns of Ahmad Shah, 
1747-1772, and his successor Timur Shah, 1772-93. This expansion was made 
possible on the basis of materials he recieved from his Sufi Pir, Khoja Husayn 
Chishti. The book is named after his Sufi master. Imam ud-Din traces Ahmad 
Shah’s ancestory, covers the major events in the Durrani realm until 1797. Of 
particular interest for my research are the sections discussing the relationship 
between Qizilbash and the first three Durrani rulers.  
  Prior to the publication of Tarikh-i Husayn Shah-i, Ahmad Shah sent a 
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letter to the Ottoman Sultan, Mustafa III, in 1762. The actual manuscript is 
preserved in the Imperial Archives at Istanbul, but a comprehesive commentry 
was authored by Ghulam Jailani Jalali and published by HsoA in 1967. In his 
commentary the word Qizilbash appears three times as Jalali contextualizes 
the letter (Jalali 1967, 78, 81, 82). Jalali’s work starts with the transformations 
of the late-Safavid era and ends with Ahmad Shah’s sixth campaign against the 
Mughals. Below is part of the letter that explains the process of transition from 
Nadir Shah to Afghans (Jalali 1967, 8-9). 
 
دقت هب انبیر قیمو دقی،ر با زا هاشردانیدرو ابرذآ و سراف و قارعو ناسارخ رورم هب و درک جورخ زج هرد وی،ناج مج لبیع 
سف تکلممیح ا تحسفلاینار مامت للا تسا هرجش و هتخاس رخسم ار ناتسکرت و ناتسودنه وی ا ناگدرکرس و نارسیتلا  و
ا تکلمم تماشحاینار سد هتخادنا رد اپ زا ارت دعتی ا رب روج ویل لجیل دروآروهظب طلست راثآ ،دومن زارد ناغفا  
  
According to the self-existent destiny, Nadir Shah rose from valley of Abivard 
[old city in northern Khorasan] and gradually conquered Khorsan, Iraq, Fars, 
Azerbiajan, as well as Iran, Hindustan and Turkistan; and ceased the self-
soverignty of elders and tribal leaders of Iran; his encourchment threatened the 
Afghan tribe and he controlled with force.   
 
 
  On the other hand, an insightful source that is accessible is Ali Quli 
Mirza’s, Tarikh-i Waqa’i wa Sawanh-i Afghanistan, which was written in 1856-
57. Ali Quli was one of Fath Ali Shah Qajar’s sons, who was influenced by the 
European intellectual and cultural movement, Renaissance. He served as the 
Chancellor of Persia’s Dar ul-Funon, the first modern Iranian university that 
was established in 1851. Tarikh-i Waqa’i wa Sawanh-i Afghanistan covers the 
events after Nadir Shah’s assassination from the perspective of a Qajar official 
until the events that unfolded in Afghanistan after the conclusion of the First 
Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42. Ali Quli Mirza’s books ends with a chapter on 
119 
 
British, and to a lesser extent French colonial cartographers, who were involved 
in drawing the maps of the region until 1850s. Ali Quli Mirza uses the terms 
Qizilbash in two way. First, in reference to a person’s surname. An example of 
a person’s surname is Jafar Qizilbash, who was an Ayshyk Agassi Bashi, Head 
of the interior court and royal harem, of the Grand Vizier, Fateh Khan. Jafar 
Qizilbash assassinated Shah Shuja near the Lahori Gate in Kabul (Mirza 1856-
7, 123). Second, the word Qizilbash is used in reference to collective unit. The 
words Qizilbash and Qizilbashia are used interchangeable in terms of a distinct 
social group. For example, Afghans, Ubzeks, and Turkmen were hostile toward 
Qizilbashia (Mirza 1856-7, 34).  
 
III. Colonial Encounter 
 The hostility between the Pashtun monarchs and the Qajars over Herat 
territory began in 1801 and continued until 1863. It had a detrimental effect on 
the Qizilbash living in the eastern side of the border. Mahmud Shah Durrani 
was unable to respond to the Qajar ambition in Khorasan because of his own 
weak position in Kabul. His Grand Vizier, Fateh Khan, was tangled in a power 
struggle with Mahmud’s political rivals. Fateh Khan relied on the Qizilbash to 
subdue the uproars. He stressed defending the Qizilbash despite of the riots 
that flared up against the Qizilbash in Kabul. 
   The Kabul Conflict of 1803-04 erupted for two significant reasons. First, 
the Qizilbash cavalry was protecting Mahmud Shah from his enemies. Second, 
the Qizilbash were regarded as sympathizers of the Shi’a Qajars. Fateh Khan 
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adamantly argued that persecution of Qizilbash cavalry would not only weaken 
Mahmud’s most capable fighters, but would endanger the allegiance of other 
Shi’as who lived in the polity. Fateh’s steadfast support for Qizilbash led to his 
own demise as the Qajar-Durranid enmity over political boundary spun into 
another Shi’a-Sunni war (Champagne 1981, 63). In 1807, an Uzbek mullah in 
the vicinity of Herat, named Sufi Islam, along with the Head of the ulema of 
Herat, Haji Mullah Musa, declared a Holy War against the heretic Shi’a Qajars. 
Under the heretic ploy, enslavement and trade of the Shi’as continued in 
Khorasan. The British-backed Shah Shuja (first reign 1803-09, second reign, 
1839-42) did not denounce the enslavement of Shi’as or the anti-Shi’a decree of 
1807. Shah Shuja tolerance negatively affected the Qizilbash of Kabul.  
  In midst of the so-called sectarian war, Napoleon Bonaparte, the French 
general emperor, sends the embassy of General Gardanne to Qajar court, 1808. 
Napoleon intends to end the monopoly of the British East India Company with 
the collaboration of Qajars. To protect its monopoly, military garrisons, and the 
lucrative opium trade in South Asia, the British quickly reacted to create a 
zone of influence in Kabul, embassy. Mountsturat Elphinstone was dispatched 
to go and see Shah Shuja in Peshawar later in 1808. Shuja signed the Treaty of 
Eternal Friendship, which marks the entry of Kabul into modern western 
politics – the international state system. 
  A valuable result of Mountsturat Elphinstone envoy was the production 
of a book. Elphinstone’s (1815) text, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, and 
its Dependencies in Persia Tartary, and India: Comprising a View of the Afghaun 
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Nation, and a History of the Dooraunee Monarchy” was published in London. He 
refers to different ethnic groups as “nations,” with the following population size 
(Elphinstone 1815, 80). It remains unclear if Elphinstone placed the Qizilbash 
population with the Persian or the Tatar population. Elphinstone, the Scottish 
political leader and historian, estimated the population of Kabul Province (not 
city of Kabul) at fourteen Million. 
Table 6: Population of Kabul 1815 
Ethnic Groups Population Size 
Afghan 4,300,000 
Baloch 1,000,000 
Tatars of all descriptions 1,200,000 
Persians (including Tajiks) 1,500,000 
Indians (Cashmeres, Juts, 
and Others) 
5,700,000 
Miscellaneous Tribes 300,000 
TOTAL 14,000,000 
   
 Mountsturat Elphinstone begins his description of Qizilbash as “members of 
that colony of Turks which now predominates in Persia. I call them by this 
name, which is usually given to them at Kabul” (Elphinstone 1815, 320). He 
further writes (Elphinstone 1815, 321-2): 
The Kuzzilbauches generally inhabit towns, except about Heraut, where 
they are also to be found in the villages. There are said to be ten or 
twelve thousands of them in the town of Caubul, who settled there in the 
times of Naudir and Ahmed, and who are still in many respect a people 
entirely distinct from those around them. They speak Persian, and 
among themselves Toorkee. They are all violent Sheeahs, and their zeal is 
kept up by the necessity of a certain degree of concealment, and by their 
religious animosities with the Soonness, among whom they live. 
The Kuzzilbauches in Afghaunistan partake of the character of their 
countrymen in Persia; they are lively, ingenious, and even elegant and 
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refined; but false, designing, and cruel; rapacious, but profuse, 
voluptuous, and fond of show; at once insolent and servile; destitute of 
all moderation in prosperity, and of all pride in adversity; brave at one 
time and cowardly at another, but always fond of glory; full of prejudice, 
but affecting to be liberal and enlightened; admirable for a mere 
acquaintance (if one can bear with their vanity), but dangerous for a 
close connection.* (I speak from what I have seen of the Kuzzilbauches of 
Caubul, and of a good many Persians whom I have known in India. The 
character, however, is chiefly applicable to the inhabitants of the towns; 
the country people are not so bad, and the Eliaut, or shepherd tribes, are 
something like the Afghauns). 
 
The Kuzzilbacuhes at Heraut follow all trades and pursuits; the rest are 
mostly soldiers; some are merchants, and these are the best of the class; 
and many are tradesmen and servants; the Umlah, or bodies of armed 
men who attend the great, are generally formed of them. 
 
Most of the secretaries, accountants, and other inferior ministers, are 
Kuzzilbauches, and almost every man of rank has a Meerza, secretary, a 
Nazir, steward, and perhaps a Dewaun, master of the household, of this 
description of people. Most of the King’s Peeshkhedmats, and other 
servants immediately about his person are also Kuzzilbauches. Some of 
these are persons of high rank and office, and some of the military chiefs 
of the Kuzzilbauches are also men of consequence, though always 
subordinate to the Dooraunee officers. Some of the Kizzilbauches 
particularly those in the Gholaums, or King’s Guards, have estates, and 
even castles, granted by the crown or purchased; but, except about 
Heraut, they generally live in towns, and let out their lands to Afghaun or 
Taujik tenants.  
 
Besides the seven Terehs, or tribes, into which all the Kuzzilbauches are 
divided, those of Caubul have other peculiar divisions, as the 
Chendawuls or Jewaunsheers (the first of which names means the 
vanguard, and the second is a title), Moraud Khaunees, so called from 
the Dooraunee lord who first commanded them.     
 
 
  Mountsturat Elphinstone’s chapter five describes the “religions, sects, 
mullahs, superstition, and etcetera.” He writes, “the unlearned part of the 
Afghan nation certainly considers a Shi’a as more an infidel than a Hindu, and 
have a greater aversion to the Persians for their religion” (Elphinstone 1815, 
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200). In the same chapter, he writes, “The Shi’as are more discountenanced 
than any other religious sect; yet, all the numerous Persians in the country are 
Shi’as and many of them hold high offices in the state and household. Their 
religion allows them, and even enjoins them to dissemble, when in heretic or 
infidel countries; and consequently, they are put to no inconvenience by the 
restrictions imposed on them. Those restrictions prevent their praying in the 
attitude peculiar to their sect” (Elphinstone 1815, 206).  
  On the other hand, the ethnographies in Journal of the Ethnological 
Society of London, an academic society that was established in 1843 and lasted 
until 1870s, does not offer data on the Qizilbash of Kabul. For example, Major 
V. C. Roseberry (1869) article “On some of the Mountain Tribes of the N. W. 
Frontier of India” does not discuss the Qizilbash.11  
 
A. Anglo-Afghan Wars, 1839-41 and 1878-80 
 
  The British engagement in Kabul from the Treaty of Eternal Friendship in 
1809, until the conclusion of the War of Independence in 1919 could be divided 
into three overlapping phases: 1) Encounter and retreat, 2) Direct involvement, 
1839-80, and 3) Protectorate state, 1880-1919. With this periodization in mind, 
the question arises of how the period of direct British involvement transformed 
the dynamics of Qizilbash-to-Barakazai ties in Kabul.  
  The Afghan political rivalry, known as “royal dualism,” drove the downfall 
of the Durranids in 1823 (Saikal 2012). With the collapse of the Durranids, the 
                                                          
11 Appendix 3 is a chronological list of 19th century British sources. 
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sociopolitical situation for the Qizilbash minority worsened in the three years of 
interregnum, 1823-26. To help establish a level of stability, the Qizilbash 
cavalry facilitated Dost Muhammad Khan’s rise to power in 1826-39 and 1845-
63. It is important to note that Dost’s mother, Zainab Begum, came from the 
prominent Qizilbash family of Jawanshir. Dost then married a Qizilbash wife 
(Afzal Khan and Azam Khan’s mother) to expand and strengthen his kinship 
bonds and to alleviate the anti-Shi’a sentiments that had emerged after the 
riots of 1803-04. By forming closer ties with the influential Qizilbash families, 
Dost also sent an indirect message to his political rivals (Noelle 1997).    
   Dost wanted to form a European style army to lessen his reliance on the 
tribes who supplied him with irregular infantry in times of war. In addition, the 
conflict with Qajars in Herat, and the struggle with Ranjit Singh in Peshawar, 
demanded the use of a standing army. Dost preferred a modern army to regain 
the Durranid lands that had been lost. At the same time, the British policy was 
to abate his territorial ambitions by increasing the Pashtun tribal politics near 
Khyber Pass. British aid to the independent tribal chieftains was intended to 
buy influence and create a “buffer zone” that would stand to Russian imperial 
desires. Now that the prior Franco-Qajar threat vanished, and the Napoleonic 
Wars had ended in 1815, Dost faced the spread of autonomous tribal politics in 
his domain, which blocked the type of center-periphery relations necessary to 
restore the glory of the early Durranids (Noelle 1997).     
  Unable to recover Peshawar from the Sikhs on his own, Dost Muhammad 
Khan allied himself with Russia. In 1837, Dost’s son, Wazir Akbar Khan, and 
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his forces retook Khyber Pass from Ranjit Singh (Noelle 1997). The British 
Governor-General Lord Auckland repudiated this attempt. In 1838, Auckland 
sent the troops to overthrow Dost from his throne in a preventive attempt to 
ward off any further Russian expansion. In this instance, “groups of Qizilbash 
and others who opposed any [Barakzai] Afghan government in power supported 
the British” (Dupree 1984).12 In the late-1830s the Qizilbash of Kabul were split 
into two camps: those supporting Dost, and those supporting Shah Shuja. Map 
below is Kabul Province before the first Anglo-Afghan War, 1838. 
Map 5. Bukhara, Kabul, Baluchistan 1838  
 
 
                                                          
12 The 600 cavalry who supported the British interference, left with the British army after the war. They settled in 
British India and became influential in the army, bureaucracy and commerce both before and after the 1947 partition 
(Dupree 1984). 
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B. Anti-British Uprising in Kabul 
  The British regime-change undertaking led to the reinstatement of Shah 
Shuja, 1839-42. War subsequently erupted in Kabul. Dost’s army battled Shah 
Shuja. Muhammad Sharif Qizilbash rallied his men against the British forces. 
Wazir Akbar Khan fought with the British garrison in Kabul. The British forces 
aimed to weaken and disperse the residents of Kabul by relying on sectarian 
tactics (Mohibbi 2011, 381-2). Sectarian schemes did not succeed. Qizilbash 
forces were able to retake the stockpile azoqa facility, Shah Bagh, and Qala-e 
Muhammad Sharif. At the same time, the British burnt residential areas where 
Tajiks lived. Tajiks had no place to stay, took shelter in Qala-e Mahmud Khan 
Bayat. Anti Shah Shuja sentiments gained more momentum. Before the end of 
the fourth day, McNaughton, Elphinstone, and Shelton observed that Qizilbash 
were wearing body armor, helmets, and reciting epic poems.  
   After two months of battle, the British forces lost the First Anglo-Afghan 
War of 1838-42. A man named Jafar Qizilbash assassinated Shuja. Dost’s son, 
Wazir Akbar Khan, governed for nearly three years, 1842-45. Dost Muhammad 
Khan’ second reign lasted from 1845-63. Thirteen years after the conclusion of 
the First Anglo-Afghan War, Dost signed the Treaty of Peshawar in 1855. The 
British Governor-General referred to him as the Governor or “Walee of Cabool 
and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession” and provided him 
with steady subsidies (Noelle 1997). In return, Dost gave up on his territorial 
claims to Peshawar and he did not interfere in the Indian Mutiny of 1857. This 
was a key shift in Dost’s policy, from reliance on Russians to receiving aid from 
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British. With the aid of British subsidies, he was able to bring about a level of 
compromise with the eastern Pashtun tribes and annex Herat on the western 
frontier in 1863.  
  Dost’s reign was followed by his third son, Amir Shir Ali, 1863-79 (except 
1866-68). Shir Ali was influenced by Sayed Jamal ud-Din Afghani, who stayed 
in Kabul, 1866. Shir Ali initiated the modernization of government institutions. 
He laid the foundation of the modern centralized government with a ministerial 
cabinet, a consultative council, and provincial administrations. To pay for the 
standing army, Shir Ali funded light industrial complexes machine khana, in 
Kabul. Young men, including Qizilbash, were sent abroad to India for technical 
education and vocational training (Sarwary 2014). Shir Ali also setup a modern 
postal service system, the first public school, and newspaper Shams Al Nahar 
(Gregorian 1969, 87). In 1863-66, he launched the Shirpur Project to expand 
and modernize the capital city, Kabul, with the aid of the Qizilbash. To pay for 
his modernization initiatives he enacted a tax system that was not received well 
by the autonomous eastern tribes.  
  Dost’s eldest son, Afzal Khan, made claim to the Kabul throne based on 
seniority. In-house conflict, “royal dualism,” continued for two years until Shir 
Ali was finally able to reclaim his power. This episode of royal dualism depleted 
the already weak treasury. The polity’s overall economy, which had not entirely 
recovered from the famine of 1870-71, was further devastated. It put Shir Ali in 
a tough spot, known as the “weak government syndrome” (Raofi 2007). Shir Ali 
could not defend the territorial integrity of his domain in the face of the second 
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British invasion.  
  In 1875, with the rise of Tories in London, British colonial policy known 
as the “Forward Policy” was adopted. Proponent of the Forward Policy wanted a 
permanent establishment in Kabul rather than a subsidiary, but the residents 
of Kabul perceived this as another preemptive British aggression. The “Forward 
Policy” led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 1878-80. Despite the vast British 
military might, one of Shir Ali’s sons, Ayub Khan, defeated the British forces at 
the Battle of Maiwand. Kabul, however, paid a heavy price for it: its key bazaar 
Char Chata was scorched, the Shirpur Project was left without a new building 
standing. Shir Ali’s other son, Yaqub Khan, signed the Treaty of Gandomak in 
1879. It ended the Second Anglo-Afghan War. However, Yaqub relinquished the 
country’s foreign policy to British-Raj for an insubstantial amount of subsidies 
(Gregorian 1969). Yet again, residents of Kabul rallied under Ayub Khan and 
abdicated Yaqub’s reign. Yaqub took refuge with the British-Raj. While in India, 
he told the British Viceroy, “I would rather work as your servant, cut grass, 
and tend your garden than be the ruler of Afghanistan” (Raofi 2007).  
  In 1880, Liberals regained power in London. This meant the British-Raj 
adopted a new policy toward Kabul, indirect rule. The protectorate state lasted 
in Kabul from 1880 until 1919, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
C. Primary Sources 
  Two primary sources that were authored during the Barakzai period have 
not been studied fully in relation to the Qizilbash transformations. One is Shah 
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Shuja’s 1842 autobiography, Waqehat Shah Shuja, which covers the chain of 
events from 1801-39. The second book is Mirza Yaqub Ali Khafi’s, Padshahhan 
Mutakhir-i Afghanistan. The first book has been overlooked because Shuja in 
the recent history of Afghanistan is percieved as the epitome of a servile Shah, 
a power hungry prince who sided with the British Governor General in India, 
Lord Auckland, to ascend the throne. Shuja is remembered by the Qizilbash 
residents of Kabul as the person who entered the city with the military aid of 
Elphinstone and Macnaughten. The second source is often neglected because 
of the author’s use of vernacular langague. It does not have the ornate prose 
that regnal histories are known for. The second reason on why Khafi’s book is 
overlooked has to do with the author’s reliance on controversial oral narratives 
after he was exiled. 
Table 7: Barakzaid Primary Sources  
Timeline Sources Used 
Forced exiled, 1826-1901 Mirza Yaqub Ali Khafi, Padshahhan Mutakhir-i 
Afghanistan 
Yes 
1842 Shah Shuja, Waqehat Shah Shuja Yes 
? Mirza Ata Muhammad Khan Shekarpuri, Nawa-e 
Maharak 
? 
 
  In Waqehat Shah Shuja, the word Qizilbash is used frequently within the 
context of events that transpired in 1801-39. It is used both on individual basis 
(as a surname) and on collective basis. Collectively it refers to the cadre of tax 
collectors, bureaucrats, cavalrymen, and communities. For example, Shuja 
uses the term Qizilbash within the context of Ghulam-khana Qizilbash Shi’a, 
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the Shi’a Royal Palace Guards (Shuja 1842, 14). Mahmud Shah in 1803-04 
deployed the powerful Qizilbash cavalry to subdue the disorder in Kabul. His 
rivals then channeled the anti-Mahmud views into anti-Shi’a attitudes in order 
to mobilize the Sunni inhabitants against the Qizilbash Palace Guards (Shuja 
1842, 14). Sadly, ordinary Qizilbash, rather than the Palace guards, payed the 
price with their lives and properties in the Kabul Conflict of 1803-04. In 
another section, Shuja uses the word Qizilbash in relation to the fidelity and 
bravery of the mirzas, bureaucrats and savars cavalry, toward the descendants 
of Ahmad Shah (Shuja 1842, 230).    
  While Waqehat Shah Shuja was authored by a Shah Shuja, Padshahhan 
Mutakhir-i Afghanistan, was written by a mid-level Qizilbash bureuacract who 
was exiled to Samarqand once Abdurrahman Khan ascended the throne, 1880. 
The book was authored by Mirza Yaqub Ali Khafi sometime between 1901-04. It 
covers the events from end of Shah Shuja’s reign in 1842-1901. Apart from his 
own personal experiences and participation in many key events, he draws from 
a rich palette of letters, oral accounts, and peppers them with Persian poems. 
His father, Ahmad Ali Khafi, served as a munshi, to Dost’s son-in-law, Abdul 
Ghani. His father then became a tutor lala, to Abdul Ghani’s son, Abdul Aziz. 
When Abdul Aziz reached the age of nineteen, his father joined the services of 
an old Qizilbash friend, Shirdil Khan, in Afghan Turkistan. When Dost died, 
Amir Shir Ali succeeded him in 1863. During Shir Ali’s reign, Ahmad Ali Khafi 
and Yaqub Ali Khafi were appointed as court officials mamoor pesh-khana, in 
Kabul. Yaqub Ali served as an officer before the Anglo-Afghan War, 1878-80. 
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Yaqub Ali actually participated at the Battle of Shash Gow, when Abdurrahman 
manipulated and made false promises to the Qizilbash cavalry, after vowing to 
the Qur’an, who were under the command of Shirdil Khan (Shahgaci 2014).  
  In Padshahhan Mutakhir-i Afghanistan, Khafi raises a complex question 
in the introduction: Why his homeland watan, has seen with so much calamity 
and misfortune. He speaks highly of the relative progress, inclusiveness, and 
light industrialization that were made during Amir Shir Ali’s time (Khafi 1901-
04, 15). For Khafi, elite factionalism or fratricide, nifaq, padar kushi, baradar 
kushi, coupled with absence of a clear succession mechanism jadal janesheen, 
are the dominant reasons behind all the distress in Kabul and in Afghanistan. 
He sees the issue of social divisiveness and the lack of progress as byproducts 
of failed leadership by self interested rulers who were detached from the needs 
of the people and the country. Khafi’s book also has rich insights about: 1) The 
royal court, services and disservices of the courtiers. 2) Personal character and 
behavior of the Shahs, Princess, Amirs, Hakims, and other dignitaries. 3) Court 
letters, decrees, fatahnama, and titles that were in use, 1842-1901. Lastly 4) 
Information on industrialization and commerce in Kabul during the same time 
period (Khafi 1901-04).   
  Of interest for my study is the word Qizilbash. In Padshahhan Mutakhir-i 
Afghanistan, Khafi uses it only once in the context of tribe qawm, in reference 
to Shir Ali’s attempt to retake Kabul from his older brother Azam Khan, 1868. 
(Khafi 1901-04, 366). He names two Qizilbash of some influence, Habibullah 
and Muhammd, sons of Shirin Khan - the Amir of Qizilbash, who defected and 
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joined Shir Ali’s forces. The history of Qizilbash will be continued in chapter 5. 
The following chapter, however, turns to the history of Qizilbash migration to 
Kabul and their neighborhoods and lifeways in Kabul.    
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Qizilbash Migration to Kabul, 1504-1880 
 
 
“What did these migrant have to offer, though, that made them so welcome in a 
variety of environments?” 
  ~ Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Iranians Abroad: Intra-Asian Elite Migration and Early  
Modern State Formation, 1992 
 
“Historians and Social Scientists alike have been faced with the difficulty of 
imputing motives and interests to people who undertake religious, political or 
economic migration” 
   ~ Rula Abisaab, The Ulema of Jabal Amil in Safavid Iran, 1501-1736: 
Marginality, Migration and Social Change, 1994 
 
 
 
I. Kabul 
  Kabul is the largest city in Central Asia. It is a leading financial center in 
in all of Central Asia, and the fifth fastest developing metropolitan in the world 
(Blackburn-Dwyer 2016). It is home to mausoleum of rulers, shrines of saints, 
and warriors who are long gone, but their legacies continue to shape current 
politics (Lee 2009). Kabul has a distinct mix of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ areas. 
The historical districts mahalla, are home to families who have lived there for 
many generations. The historical zones are places filled with amazing stories 
and rich subcultures, which are often omitted from non-urban ethnographies 
and state sponsored parochial histories. Two of Kabul’s historical districts are 
Chindawol and Murad Khani, ancestral Qizilbash neighborhoods.   
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  To situate Chindawol and Murad Khani mahallas within broader trends, 
this part focuses on three different aspects of the Qizilbash migration to Kabul. 
The first aspect is the timing, extent, and the “push” and “pull” factors behind 
their migration to Chindawol and Murad Khani (Lee 1966). The second aspect 
is what could be learned about the Qizilbash from micro-histories in Chindawol 
and Murad Khani. Third, what cultural practices did the Qizilbash retain after 
their migration from Persia to Kabul? Apart from the above-mentioned themes, 
what bearing did this eastward Qizilbash movement have on state-formation in 
Afghanistan?  
 
II. Migration: Push and Pull Factors  
  The migration of Qizilbash to Kabul is linked with the rise and expansion 
of the Safavids and the Mughals in the early sixteenth century (Puzhohish 
2005, 36). The Qizilbash relocation is separated into three distinct, and yet 
related, waves: 1) The post-Babur era, 1504, 2) The Nadir reign, 1739, and 3) 
The post-Ahmad Shah era, 1747. Although the reasons behind the Qizilbash 
movement to Kabul changed over the decades, one thing stayed constant as 
Sanjay Subrahmanyam, a historian of early modern India, points out, “From 
Basra to Bangkok and even beyond, migrant Iranians were men of substance 
in the early modern period. In the court-chronicles, they appear to us as 
administrators and state-builders” (Subrahmanyam 1992, 350). In the trading 
records “as ship-owners and fierce competitors of Europeans” (Subrahmanyam 
1992, 350). Trade, security of commercial routes, and politics were inseparable 
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for the early Qizilbash migrants. With this fact in mind, the question becomes 
when and how did the city of Kabul become a node of commercial activities in 
the early modern era? 
  Before the destruction of pasturelands and underground water channels 
by the Mongols in 1219-21, Kabul had been the base of a frontier garrison and 
army assembly point known as the “Gate to India” for the Ghaznavid Dynasty, 
977-1186. After the Mongol conquest, Kabul was depopulated and turned into 
an insignificant peripheral town until Babur, founder of the Mughal Dynasty, 
transformed it to his capital city in 1504 (before going to Delhi in 1526). Under 
the first six Mughal emperors (1504-1707), Kabul developed into a noticeable 
agricultural area with a thriving overland trade between the prosperous polities 
of India, Central Asia, and Persia (Subrahmanyam 1992, 340). Toward the end 
of Babur’s reign in 1530, Kabul had become a vital overland port. Kabul basin’s 
prosperity combined with its pleasant weather, fertile agricultural lands, and 
formidable natural barriers made it into a desired “alternate center of political 
power, drawing the Mughal center of gravity away from Hindustan” (Alam and 
Subrahmanyam 2012, 22).  
  The flora, fauna, and people who lived in Kabul’s fertile basin during the 
first three decades of the sixteenth century are described in Babur’s memoir, 
Baburnama (he called it tarikh, history, which was translated from Chagatai to 
Persian under Akbar, 1590). Baburnama is not just a diary of an emperor, but 
it can also be studied as an ethnographic account since it is based on Babur’s 
direct participation in many events. In terms of people, Babur acknowledges 
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and carefully describes the ethnic and linguistic cleavages that resided in this 
fertile basin. Below is an example (Babur 2009, 41). 
In the country of Kabul, there are many and various tribes … in the city 
the population consists of Tajiks. The villages and districts are occupied 
by - Pashais, Parachis, Tajiks, Berekis, and Afghans. In the hill-country 
to the west, reside the Hazaras and Nukderis ... There are eleven or 
twelve different languages spoken in Kabul: Arabic, Persian Turki, 
Mughali, Hindi, Afghani, Pashai, Parachi, Geberi, Bereki, and Laghmani 
...  
  Baburnama also reveals information to us about the Safavid-Uzbek wars 
over Khorasan. To weaken the Uzbeks, Shah Ismael provided troops sepah-e 
imdadi Safavi, to Babur in his efforts to gain control of Central Asia (Puzhohish 
2005, 36, Mohebbi 2011, 298). Babur was unsuccessful in his attempts. After 
his decisive defeat at the Battle of Gizhduvan in 1512, Babur and his Safavid 
aids, who were from the Beharlu tribe of the Qizilbash, withdrew to Qizil Qala 
in Badakhshan (later renamed Bandar-e Shir Khan) before moving further 
south to the Kabul valley. For Babur and his Qizilbash supporters, Kabul was 
important because of its distinct geographical location. The mighty Hindu Kush 
Mountains (east-to-west) served as a formidable barrier between the landmass 
of southern Eurasia and the Indian Subcontinent (continental divide). Kabul is 
located on the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush. Its soaring snowcapped 
peaks have only two travel passes - Shibir and Salang (Palka 2004, 70). Kabul 
River provided another barrier of natural security from threats emanating from 
Babur’s northern nemesis.  
  The Kabul River has cut a deep valley between two mountain ridges in 
Kabul: Koh-e Asmai and Koh-e Shir Darwaza. It was between these two ridges 
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that Babur initially setup the bedrock of his empire, which also became home 
to future Qizilbash communities.   
A. First Wave: Post-Babur, 1504 
  The question then becomes on when does the Qizilbash migration to the 
city of Kabul (and not to the amorphous Kabulistan region) actually begin. We 
have already pointed to the Ismael-Babur alliance, in which, the Baharlu tribe 
of the Qizilbash (Bayram Khan’s father and grandfather who were key figures 
in the Mughal court) assisted Babur (Thackston 1996, 169).  
  After the eventful reign of Babur, Shir Shah Suri exiled Babur’s son, 
Humayun, the second Mughal emperor, from Delhi in 1544. Humayun took 
refuge in Persia. Once again, his Safavid allies responded by providing military 
and bureaucratic help to Humayun so he could regain his throne, 1555 (Ansari 
1989; Dale 2012). On Humayun’s return from Persia, about three hundred 
Qizilbash families stayed in Kabul (Mahmud 2011, 144). Twenty-one of fifty-
seven important dignitaries in Humayun’s court were Persian Iranis, including 
the high-ranking positions of mir bakhshi, mir munshi, diwan, and mir saman 
(Subrahmanyam 1992, 345). Tahmasp’s help to Humayun had several lasting 
consequences for the Qizilbash: 1) The essence of the high culture in Mughal 
court permanently changed from Chagatai to an Indo-Persian style. 2) Political 
marriages influenced the trajectory of future political and commercial hires in 
Kabul. 3) Shah Tahmasp weakened the power of the Qizilbash in Persia, but 
expanded the extent and influence of the Safavid murids in the east.  
  The service of Persian dignitaries continued under Akbar, third Mughal 
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emperor, 1556-1605. Eleven out of Akbar’s 40 Provincial Governors, subadars, 
were Iranis, Iranians, which included the positions of wazir and mir bakhshi 
(Subrahmanyam 1992, 345). It must be noted that the word Irani, refers to the 
place of origin, Iranian. It comprises both the Qizilbash and non-Qizilbash 
elements in the Mughal court. During Akbar’s reign, however, families of the 
Mughal dignitaries were relocated from Kabul to the Delhi court once the 
foundations of the empire solidified in India. Excessive power and authority 
were given to the Iranian bureaucrats and cavalry under Jahangir, 1605-27.  
  Apart from the bureaucratic skills and warfare abilities that the Persians 
possessed, the Mughal emperors did not trust in their own relatives. Most of 
Jahangir’s leading officials were Iranians including all three of his wakils, six of 
his diwans, all his mir bakhshi, and mir samans (Subrahmanyam 1992, 345). 
Jahangir’s wife, Nur Jahan, was Persian. Her grandfather, Khwaja Muhammad 
Sharif Tehrani, had been an important fiscal officer under Shah Tahmasp. Nur 
Jahan’s first husband, Ali Quli, was from the Ustajlu Qizilbash tribe. 
Jahangir’s son, Shah Jahan, 1628-58, continued with appointing Iranians to 
high-ranking administrative and financial posts.  
  Another episode of Qizilbash arrival to Kabul occurred when Shah Jahan 
appointed Ali Mardan Khan as the new Governor of Kabul, 1641-52. During Ali 
Mardan’s time in office that the bazaar of Char Chata, as well as the Bagh-e Ali 
Mardan, and Shahrarah were constructed. Char Chata improved Kabul’s status 
as a key overland port in the Silk Road commercial enterprise (Mahajan 2011, 
144). In the mid-seventeenth century, there were “7,000 zat and 7,000 savar” 
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in Kabul under the command of Ali Mardan Khan (Richards 2011, 144). Shah 
Jahan extensively used the garrison that Ali Mardan’s forces built in Kabul in 
his quest to annex Qandahar during the Safavid-Mughal Wars of 1648-53. 
  In the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century, the sixth Mughal 
ruler, Aurangzeb, 1658-1707, noted for his pro-Sunni beliefs, did not in any 
significant way displace the Iranian element. On the contrary, he was receptive 
to the exiled Sufis from Persia. The expulsion of Sufis from Isfahan, which took 
place toward the end of the Safavid period, 1694-1722, led to another Qizilbash 
movement. Tension within the Safavid religious hierarchy created a hostile and 
tense atmosphere in Isfahan. To avoid state persecution, which was headed by 
the rigid-minded Shaykh ul-Islam, a religious exodus ensued. Reports of Sufi 
gatherings that were established in Kabul that lasted until 1890s by the exiled 
Sufis of Isfahan and Kerman still resonate in the communal memory (Hashim 
2014). People in general venerate the learned Sufi Pirs and hold the mystical or 
Sufi genre of Persian poetry adabyat irfani or ashaar irfani, in very high regards 
(Langary 2014).13  
  There are no formal Sufi tariqas or Sufi khanaqas in today’s Qizilbash 
neighborhoods (Nastrati). The lack of tariqas is explained by the previous state 
actions. Abdurrahman’s attempts in 1890s “to convert forcibly the Qizilbash to 
Sunnism. Those who refused were forced to wear red turbans. Partly because 
of the blatant discrimination, many Qizilbash outwardly accepted Sunnism but 
                                                          
13 Three non-Shi’a Sufi orders are prominent in Afghanistan: Naqshbandi, Qadiri, and the Cheshti. Among the 
Naqshbani, there is a Khanaqa in Shor Bazar district of Kabul. Many Naqshbandi are linked with the Mujaddedi 
family. 
140 
 
practiced taqiyya (secretly remained Shi’a)” (Dupree 1984). His policies forced 
the Qizilbash to observe their rituals in secret at their houses. However, similar 
to a Sufi Khanaqa, Qizilbash today gather in elaborate ritual halls or modest 
houses Takia-Khana (Arabic Imambarah; Persian Tekyeh; Turkish Tekke; Urdu 
Tazia-Khana) that are decorated with banners to commemorate the martyrdom 
of Husayn. The Ashura observances start on the first day of Muharram (Islamic 
calendar, first moth) and lasts until Arba’een that correspond with 20th of Safar 
(second month). Apart from the Ashura ceremonies where partakers beat their 
chests in a rhythmic motion for piety, people gather in takia-khanas (houses of 
piety), for prayers, religious holidays, funerals, and education (Afshar 2014). 
Another regular ritual that is held at takia-khanas are the recitation of elegiac 
poems manqabat khani, which often entail themes of worldly injustice (Afshar 
2014).   
  It was within the secret confines of Takia-Khana that Qizilbash were able 
to produce so many skilled bureaucrats and warriors in the era prior to the rise 
of the public education system. John F. Richards, a Mughal historian, explains 
this subject by focusing on the primacy of the family, or the institution of 
khanawada (Richards 2011, 148-50): 
Jahangir often employed the term khanazadgi, meaning devoted, familial, 
hereditary service in his memoirs. Khanazads, born to the house, formed 
a large component of the nobility, if not quite a majority. All viewed 
Mughal service and preference within that service as their prerogative. 
Khanazadgi retained the central values of discipleship: loyalty, devotion, 
and sacrifice in the emperor’s service, but lacked its intensely emotional 
aspect. From boyhood each khanazad was imbued with a code of 
aristocratic and military honor. The honor of the warrior was compatible 
with dignified subordination to the emperor.  
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Khanazads were fully assimilated to the polish and sophistication of 
Indo-Persian courtly culture in its elaborate Mughal version. The ideal 
khanazad was dignified, courteous, and  well-mannered. He understood 
the intricate rules for comportment in all social encounters – from the 
most informal gathering of friends engaged in drinking wine to the most 
rigid of grand public ceremonies at court. He valued and often quoted 
Persian poetry, and appreciated Hindustani music, painting, and other 
arts nurtured at court.  
 
Punctuating the life and career of each khanazad were moments of 
personal attention by the emperor… the emperor nurtured and rewarded 
khanazadgi. Nobles, on the birth of a son, sent a gift to the emperor with 
a request that he name the child. The emperor was informed of and gave 
his approval for the marriage of the children of his nobles. At maturity all 
sons of an amir were enrolled as mansabdars in the emperor’s service.  
 
Richard’s explanation of Khanawada applies to the Qizilbash conditions until 
the end of Shir Amir Ali Khan’s era. The Qizilbash situation alters drastically 
with the rise of the modern nation-state in 1880 – a topic to be discussed in 
chapter 5.  
 
B. Second Wave: Nadir Shah’s Reign, 1729-47  
  The transfer of Qizilbash in the eastern cities ensued with Nadir Afshar’s 
rapid expansion into the eastern Iranian Plateau (Dupree 1975, 388). Over the 
course of Nadir Shah’s campaigns in India and Central Asia, sizeable groups of 
Qizilbash were placed at Qandahar, Ghazni, and Kabul to protect the supply 
routes, maintain order, and collect taxes. Qizilbash forces were also positioned 
to quell uprisings within the Afsharid Empire to avoid repetition of what arose 
in the 1720s. The second wave of Qizilbash’s migration to Kabul happened in 
1738-9. Nadir’s Throne Takht-e Nadir, was constructed in Afshar mahalla of 
Kabul. Takht-e Nadir was Nadir’s political base. The walls of Nadir’s citadel are 
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still standing, but most of it is now part of the complex that houses the Afghan 
National Police (Afshar 2014).  
Figure 12. Nadir Afshar Citadel 
 
 
 
While Nadir’s military contingents (bureaucrats and warriors) were based in the 
mahalla of Chindawol and a nearby area that in 1772-75 becomes known as 
Murad Khani. The Afshar mahalla was comprised mostly of his own Afshari 
relatives and a place where I spent a considerable amount of my fieldwork time 
(Afshar 2014). Chindawol was a varied mix, settled according to the Qizilbash 
tribal divisions and places of origin back in Persia. The Qizilbash contingents 
who were ordered to stay in Kabul were tasked to oversee the state affairs in 
this former winter capital of the Mughals. 
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  The following is an excerpt from Faiz Muhammad Katib’s (1912) Siraj al-
Tawrikh. Katib, an ethnic Hazara, served as a court historian, calligrapher, and 
scholar during Habibullah’s era, 1901-19. Robert D. McChesney, a historian of 
Afghanistan, and Mehdi Khorrami translated Katib’s monumental history, Siraj 
al-Tawrikh, into a six volume English set in 2012. Katib informs us about the 
number and Qizilbash tribe composition that accompanied Nadir Shah during 
his Indian campaign. He writes (Katib 1912): 
ب هاش ردانیتس وجگنج زارفن رازهینا وجشاخرپینا ایتلا شناوج و دنوسهاشیر تخب ویرای ب و درک ویتا ر ویاک لاها  وی 
شیزار ارب هحلسا و هلئاع اب ار فاوخ وی بنت و تکلمم تسارحیه دهت وید درمتمین ا زا ناغفاینار  و تاره رد  ،هداد لمح
نزغ و راهد نقین س تظافح و تماقا رما لباکودحر دومرف تکلمم روغث و  
 
Nadir Shah Afshar relocated twenty thousand warriors and combatants 
from the tribes of Shahsevand, Jawanshir, Bakhtiari, Kurd, Bayat, Reka, 
and residents of Shiraz and Khawf with their families and weapons for 
custody of the country from the threats of Afghans to Herat, Qandahar, 
Ghazni, and Kabul and ordered them to stay and protect the borders and 
frontiers.  
 
The above passage, translated by Solaiman Fazel, tells us about number of key 
changes. First, the obvious absence of the word Qizilbash. Katib is a court 
historian for Habibullah, son of Abdurrahman Khan. He is aware of the anti-
Shi’a state measures that Abdurrahman had issued. He is also aware of the 
retaliatory Qizilbash stance of 1893 where the Qizilbash “refugees in Mashhad 
declared a holy war on Abdurrahman” (Dupree 1984). It is because of these 
prior events that Katib refrains from using the word Qizilbash but mentions the 
names of major branches. Second, the slight variation from the original Safavid 
Shahsevan to Shahsevand. Whether it was intentional or not remains unclear. 
However, Shahsevan are now vernacularly referred to as Shahsamand (Shagaci 
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2014). Lastly, the Bakhtiaris is now added to the list of those who accompanied 
Nadir to Kabul in 1739.     
  As Katib tells us, the vast majority of the Qizilbash who arrived to Kabul 
in the second wave, possessed military and administrative skills. Apart from 
being archers, cavalrymen, and tax collectors, many also had entrepreneurial 
skills. The Qizilbash warriors blurred the sphere of commerce tujjarat and 
politics siyasat in their new environment (Bakhtiari 2014). Those who migrated 
to Kabul likely continued to maintain close links with Persia. Through kinship 
ties, the military men encouraged the relocation of artisans like the Bakhtiaris 
and those fleeing the Safavid persecution. The eastward flow of talent expanded 
and transformed Kabul into a center of Persian culture that was not under the 
scrutiny of the dogmatic pro-Safavid jurists.  
  This raises another interesting question, were the first and second waves 
of Qizilbash connected in any way? In the course of my interviews with elders 
in Murad Khani, I was reminded that the first and second waves of Qizilbash 
migrant were connected in several ways. First, Qizilbash who had established 
themselves and became prosperous in Kabul, remitted money and commodities 
(indigo, nile, myrobalan, halela, and Kashmiri shawl, pashmina) to their kin in  
Persia. Second, personal visits were made continually to families and relatives 
back in Persia when the few Qizilbash made pilgrimage to shrines in Mashhad, 
Najaf, or Karbala. Third, Qizilbash sent their annual khums, 1/5 or 20% tax in 
person to the endowment waqf that officially represented them since there were 
no reputable institutions in Kabul at that time. Finally, Qizilbash men travelled 
145 
 
to parts of Persia to seek a spouse since most Sunni families did not want their 
daughter to be married to an emigre Shi’a (Adil 2014).      
 
C. Third Wave: Post-Ahmad Shah, 1747  
  There is little or no disagreement among scholars that the formation of 
the Durranid Dynasty bore the stamp of the Perso-Islamic influence. A Sufi Pir 
crowned Ahmad Shah, with the consensus of the Durrani tribal chiefs and the 
Qizilbash commanders in Qandahar. Ahmad’s administration relied on his 
close contacts with the Qizilbash units in the eastern cities to expand the base 
of his power. For example, Mirza Hadi Khan was his rais daral-neshai, Head 
Secretary. Mirza Ali Reza Khan became his Mostofi, State Accountant (who also 
served under Timur Shah.14 Taqi Khan Shirazi enlisted close to three thousand 
Qizilbash in Ahmad Shah’s new army, who partook in the peaceful Conquest of 
Kabul, 1747. Once in Kabul, Ahmad Shah designated Wali Muhammad Khan 
Jawanshir (son of Lutf Ali Beg Jawanshir) as the Chindawol Bashi (succeeded 
by his son, Gul Muhammad Khan Jawanshir). Before Ahmad ’s first campaign 
to India, there were fourteen thousand paid Qizilbash cavalrymen in his army 
who were distinguished by their body armor and headgear known as savar 
zara posh (Mohebbi 2011, 249, 307). The Qizilbash unit of Kabul was explicitly 
known as Chindawolan (Husayni 1753-54, 470).  
  The prolific court historian, Katib, writes the following in his Seraj-al 
Tawarikh, about Ahmad Shah and Qizilbash alliance (Katib 1912, 143-44). 
                                                          
14 The street Kocha, Ali Reza Khan, near Shor Bazaar is named after him. 
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ن ویز  ناغفا هاشدمحاازودسیی  زاینلاواس اورنامرف ماقم و هبتر هب هک هاشردان باکریی سری،هد ا زا ار ناتسناغفاینار زجمی 
کشت ویل د لها  فارشا زا هدع ،درک هناگادج تنطسلیناو هک ا ابیناش حا رد و تشاد تفلا و تفرعمینا  هب دوخ تمزلا
م داد و تبحم مه ا ب هاشردان تمدخی ندرپس،د ش و ناسارخ و ناهفصاو راوزبس زایزار غ ویهر  هناززعم ناتسناغفا رد
لاها  و اه ناغفا هک ار  تموکح تارادا قتف و قتر و تلمروما قسن و مظن و تکلمم ماه م مامز ،هدومن توعدی من ناتسناغفای 
ا هب ،دتسنادیناش اذگاو ضوفمدومرف ر  
 
And also Ahmad Shah Afghan Sadozai, a Yasawal of Nadir Shah, who 
reached the ranks of a commander, detached Afghanistan from Iran and 
formed an independent monarchy. Some of Nadirs upper class courtiers, 
which he had good relations with and served in Nadir’s court together, 
who lived in Sabzavar, Isfahan, Khorasan, Shiraz and other places were 
invited to Afghanistan. The affairs of the country, organization, 
bureaucracy that Afghans and others residents of Afghanistan did not 
know about were specified to them as their responsibility.  
 
 
Katib once again does not use the explicit term Qizilbash in this passage. He 
uses the phrase “upper class courtiers,” whom Ahmad Shah had come to forge 
close ties from his decade long service in the Afsharid State. Perhaps, Katib in 
this passage is referring to influential men such as Mirza Hadi Khan, Mirza Ali 
Reza Khan, Taqi Khan Shirazi, Lutf Ali Beg Jawanshir, and Wali Muhammad 
Khan Jawanshir. The latter two served as the Chindawol Bashi in Kabul.  
  When Ahmad Shah arrived to Kabul in 1747, Kabul had three residential 
quarters: Chindawol, Bala Hesar, and Payin Bala Hesar. Ahmad Shah erected a 
defensive wall that encircled all districts from any unforeseen attacks (Mahmud 
2011, 136). In the eastern side of the city, the well-known fortress of bala hisar, 
stood on Shir Darwaza Mountain. Below the massive fortress, there were many 
structures, barracks, arsenals, shops, stables, and a prison. The southern part 
of Kabul was known as bala hisar-e payin (Ahang 2008). The Qizilbash mahalla 
was situated on the western side of the city.   
  In 1772, Gul Muhammad Khan, Amir of Chindawol ulus, is the person 
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who received Timur Shah’s letter as he ascended the throne in Qandahar. The 
third episode of Qizilbash settlements in Kabul took place after Ahmad’s death. 
Kabul was given a new life when Timur with the aid of the Qandahari Qizilbash 
cavalrymen transformed it into the new capital of the Durrani Dynasty, 1773-
75 (Dupree 1980). The Qizilbash palacegaurds became an indispensable part of 
Timur’s imperial power. Apart from the Ottomans, “the Durrani Empire was the 
greatest Muslim state of the second half of the eighteenth century” (Dupree 
1984). The Qizilbash cavalry benefitted from the royal favors Timur bestowed 
upon them because of their loyalty. Mirza Ali Reza Khan was appointed Mostofi 
Diwan, who received and disbursed the annual revenue for the empire. Timur 
married the daughter of Sharbat Ali Khan Jawanshir (Shahzada Sultan Ali is 
their offspring). As we learn from Maria Eva Subtelny article, “The practice of 
polygamy served to augment the ranks of potential contenders by maximizing 
the number of male offspring” (Subtelny 1989). Timur’s Qizilbash forces were 
granted land to settle in Kabul. The Rekas settled in the vicinity of Bala Hisar 
(Puzhohish 2005, 33). Others settled in the underpopulated section of the city 
that became Murad Khani (named after Sardar Murad Khan Popalzai).  
  The third Qizilbash migration to Kabul was a result of the fact that Timur 
presented better socioeconomic opportunities than those available in Qandahar 
or Mashhad. In addition, both the Qizilbash of Qandahar and Kabul had given 
their allegiance to his father, Ahmad Shah. Timur is believed to have been born 
and raised in Mashhad. With the eastward flows of knowledge, art, culture, and 
institutions, Timur Shah’s court in Kabul was under the Persian bureaucratic 
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and cultural influence. Political relations were further reinforced by this official 
language commonality. The Qizilbash helped lend the city a more vivid Persian 
cultural tone. As Qizilbash continued to fill the civil and military posts, a sharp 
cleave developed between the Qizilbash migrants, the Kabuli natives, and the 
Pashtun chieftains of Qandahar who found themselves mostly shut out of the 
high-ranking social and political positions (Puzhohish 2005). 
  For the Qizilbash there was no tangible differentiation between “civil” and 
“military” employment. All officials provided service to the polity. However, each 
officer did have a definite rank and ordinarily maintained a reliant cavalry for 
times of need. Officers received their rewards in cash payment or in the form of 
land grants teal (zaman). Officers made their own arrangement to cultivate 
their land. In addition, this reciprocal blend of wealth and rank enabled the 
Qizilbash to build businesses and houses to support their kin and to maintain 
their rituals. Some of the older takia-khanas were either attached to the 
nobility’s houses or were modest self-standing buildings (Khan Jan 2014). 
Successful officers commanded a cluster of dependents. They were sons, 
nephews, uncles, and other relatives. Other, non-kin, patron-client ties linked 
the officers with those without much sociopolitical influence. Social bonds 
made the state and the society function.  
  The relocation of the capital led to another population increase in Kabul. 
Kabul continued to grow. New structures were built to house the bureaucrats 
and troops. Kabul expanded into a center of consumption, for which the supply 
networks to Persia, India, and Russia saw extra trade activities. The Qizilbash 
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arrival was a sporadic stream from Persia, who came unaccompanied or with 
families to seek their fortune in the prospering capital. Kabul was bustling and 
industrious. A small-scale metal industry developed. Iron, smelted from local 
mines and molded into shovels, horseshoes, swords, axes, daggers, and other 
articles of war (Gregorian 1969, 55). Trade, more than court service and land 
grants, formed the basis of prosperity for the new migrants. On the outskirts of 
the residential areas in Murad Khani, artisans set up guilds, such as copper 
quarter bazaar misgara-ha, shoemakers quarter rasta-e kafash, and ironsmiths 
quarter rasta-e ahangara. Trade and the free exchange of commodities bound 
people together as this new community formed its identity (Adil 2014).  
  In Zaman Shah’s reign, more than 10,000 Qizilbash families from the 
Afshar, Bayat and Kurd tribes were relocated to Herat, Qandahar, Ghazni, and 
Kabul. The Bayat tribe mostly remained in Ghazni. Other Qizilbash settled in 
the districts of Afshar, Chindawol, Bala Hissar, Qala-e Mahmud Khan, Wazir- 
abad, and Zinda Banan (Mohebbi 2011, 311-12). The Qizilbash also had a vivid 
presence in Zaman’s army. Katib in, Seraj-al Tawarikh, estimates the Qizilbash 
cavalry at 12,000 men (Mohebbi 2011, 310). This number does not include the 
number of irregular cavalrymen.  
  During Mahmud Shah’s reign, the regularly paid Qizilbash cavalry in the 
army stayed at about 12,000 (Puzhohish 2005, 53). In 1815, Mahmud decided 
to build a silk industry in Kabul once the Durranids lost control of Nishapur to 
the Qajars in neighboring Persia. Again, the Qizilbash kinship ties were key in 
attracting weavers from Herat and Mashhad to Kabul who could hand dye the 
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silk. The silk industry shawl bafs, turned into a profit making initiative, which 
produced quality turbans lungi, in the Chindawol area. By the late 1830s, there 
were a few dozens of active looms in Kabul (Khan Jan 2014). The artisans also 
tried to develop glass, but its quality was poor.  
  The Qizilbash population of Kabul reached 18,000-20,000 in 1830s. In 
Kabul, their households made up “more than half of the population” (Masson 
1844, 260). The residents of this diverse city were on relatively peaceful terms 
with each other during Dost Muhammad Khan’s first term, 1826-1839, except 
the faction who wanted the continuation of the Durrani dynasty. During this 
period, outside travelers stressed the general atmosphere of religious tolerance 
“to a degree that was rarely seen in a Muslim country” (Lal 1846, 74). Before 
the First Anglo-Afghan War 1839-42, Kabul left on visitors an impression of 
cordial cosmopolitanism where the mixed population of Tajiks, Pashtuns, Jews, 
Hindus, Armenians, as well as Qizilbash coexisted, not necessarily living in the 
same districts (Lal 1846). The exact population size of each ethnic groups is not 
available (Kabul Municipality 2014).  
  By the late-1830s, luxury commodities from Great Britain (via East India 
Company in Bombay) and ceramics objects from China were sold in bazaars of 
Kabul. Kabul merchants themselves had agents and negotiators in places like 
India, Persia, and Central Asia. The destruction of the Kabul’s coveted bazaar, 
Chat Chatah, was a key financial blow during the First Anglo-Afghan War. After 
the war, Kabul merchants experienced a long period of economic stagnation, 
which lasted until the conclusion of the Second Afghan-Anglo War, 1878-1880. 
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Despite the economic sluggishness, the city’s population increased to a little 
over 140,000 people according to the 1876 census, which was carried during 
Amir Shir Ali’s reign before the start of the Shirpur Project (Kabul Municipality 
2014). 
  To alleviate overcrowding Shir Ali Khan decided to expand and construct 
a new administrative city on the north bank of Kabul River - Shirpur Project. 
Shirpur was intended to be the locus of where all the government tasks were to 
be implemented. Shir Ali, according to the Qizilbash historian, Sayyid Qasem 
Reshtia, embraced Sayyid Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani’s reform plans (Gregorian 
1969, 86). Part of the reforms were to build a new military camp at the foothills 
of Tapa Bimarhu. Kabul, however, was trapped in the geopolitical rivalry of its 
two powerful neighbors: the Russo-British “Great Game.” The Shirpur Project 
was not completed, but then demolished when the Second Anglo-Afghan War 
erupted. After the war, Kabul’s economy was near collapse.  
  The Qizilbash maintained a strong influence in the Afghan court until the 
end of Amir Shir Ali’s reign. After the demarcation of the modern nation-state 
of Afghanistan 1880, the Qizilbash have not always been in agreement with the 
state-builders. There are two main reasons. First, due to the explicit anti-Shi’a 
decrees. The Qizilbash were “accused of supporting the Shi’a Hazaras” (Dupree 
1984). Second, the implicit state discrimination or “structural violence” (Farmer 
2004). Congregation halls, Takia-Khanas, became spaces for outright protest 
against oppressive rulers when the notions of social justice adl, and fairness 
insaf, were severely neglected. Amir Abdurrahman Khan ordered the demolition 
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of the congregation halls, which he labelled the “idol sanctuary of the Shi’as” 
(Afshar 2014). Abdurrahman Khan replaced the Qizilbash royal guards with a 
newly formed cadre, ghulam bachas (Dupree 1984). Their military dominance 
waned with the creation of a new standing army. The Qizilbash then turned to 
other occupations and careers maslaks. Some populated the mid-to-low level 
state institutions as scribes and functionaries while most became involved in 
commerce, education, and technical fields (Dupree 1984, 641).   
  In 1893, Sayd Mahdi Farrokh, a Qajar emissary and historian who was 
in Kabul, writes the following passage in Afghanistan’s Political History, about 
the situation of the Qizilbash in Kabul (Farrokh 1893, 80): 
این اطیهف ح شرازگ قبط ربیتا  هنس رد ،ناخ۱۲۷۱ رامش رسی ب ،هدشیتس نزغ و تاره رد  هناخ رازهین  و لباک و
تموکح روما مامت و هتشاد تنوکس رواشبپی فوتسم اصوصخم وی رلاس  بساحم وی ا تسد رد جاوفاین اطیهف  .تسا هدوب
لوی تخس و راشف هطساو هب ناخ نامحرلادبع نامز زای زیدا به اس ناسارخ و سور ناتسکرتیر رارف دلای راوتم وی  ،هدش
لا رازه هد زا  ناتسناغفا مامت رد لا فی ز شابلزق هناخ رازه هدز اودیرتدا نیتس  
 
 
This tribe according to census reports of Hayat Khan in the year 1893 were 
twenty thousand household who lived in Herat, Ghazni, Kabul and Peshawar. 
All the government matters, especially Mostafi, state accountant, Mohaseb, 
chief accountant, and Afwaj (plural of fowj) military regiments, were in the 
hand of this clan, but since Abdurrahman Khan’s time with the instrument of 
coercion and hardship many fled to Russian Turkestan, Khorasan and other 
unknown destinations. Currently, in all of Afghanistan there are no more than 
ten to twelve thousand Qizilbash households. 
 
 
 
The assessment of the Qajar emissary tells us about the forced relocation of the 
Qizilbash from Afghanistan to surrounding places and their relegation from the 
state affairs during Abdurrahman Khan’s reign. However, it remains uncertain 
from Farrokh’s observation how the local Qizilbash neighborhoods in Kabul 
were impacted. Let us now turn to the subject of Qizilbash neighborhoods. 
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III. Qizilbash Neighborhoods 
   Prior to the rapid urbanization and expansion of city of Kabul in the mid-
twentieth century, the Qizilbash people lived in a few specific communities. The 
Qizilbash ancestral districts mahallas, in Chindawol and Murad Khani are two 
places with a rich cultural landscape that anchors the Qizilbash to their past, 
and also provides a unique vantage point to the key sociopolitical developments 
that swept through Kabul. The Qizilbash neighborhoods give us a sense of the 
endless realignments among the various Afghan royal family contenders for 
supreme power, which according to the political scientist, Amin Saikal, became 
the character of the country’s pre-modern and modern political culture (Saikal 
2012). The royal dualism came at the expense of lessons of history and limiting 
the society’s growth potential. The weak and often unstable crosscutting ties 
created a complex network of loyalties to charismatic individuals rather than 
constructive ideals.15  
 
A. Chindawol  
  The historic neighborhoods of Kabul Kabul-e Qadim, are going through a 
rapid phase of renovation and reconstruction. Residences that were demolished 
or severely damaged in the destructive Civil War, 1994-2001. As indicated in 
the introduction, it is imperative for families who have lived in Chindawol for 
                                                          
15 Apart from Chindawol and Murad Khani mahallas, Qizilbash people continue to live in the following 
communities: Afshar Nanakchi, Afshar Tepa, Bila Hissar (mix), Gozar-e Ali Reza Khan, Gozar-e Reka-khana 
(Sunni Qizilbash), Qala-e Ali Mardan, Qala-e Fatullah, Qala-e Hayder Khan, Qala-e Qazi (Sunni Qizilbash), Qala-e 
Nobirjha, Qala-e Shuhada, Wazirabad, and Zinda Banan. 
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many generations now to keep its history and culture alive (Khan Jan 2014). 
There is a collective belief if this historic mahalla loses its culture then its 
residents may lose their identity in the dustpan of history (Hayder 2014). To get 
a good sense of the residents’ attachment to their neighborhood, below is a 
rhythmic ghazal poem that was published in Chindawol’s local newspaper 
Sokhan-e Jadid, New Talk, back in 2013.  
 
لوادنچ نامرهق 
 و لوادنچ اشوخلوادنچینا   
نانابزکاپ ،نانمرهق نیمز 
؟دناوخ شلوادنچ ارچ ینادیمن 
ناعاجش یاج ،نییعت دش لوا زک 
تسد رتشگنا دوش لباک رگا 
 شنیگننازیزع دبیز لوادنچ  
تسادق دراد لوادنچ نیمز 
نارادب رس دوخ رد ه رورپ وا هک 
شکاپ کاخ رد یبش هدییاپن 
ناشورف نهیم زا هدوب وکنآ ره  
قشاع نازابرس نوخ میمش 
نارای دیوج لوادنچ کاخ ز 
 
 
 
Legendary Chindawol 
 
Blessed is Chindawol and Chindawolis 
Land of legends, forthright 
Don’t you know what it is called Chindawolish? 
From the start, it was the land of the brave 
If Kabul becomes a ring 
Its beautiful stone is Chindawol, oh Dears 
Chindawol land is blessed 
It has an embedded culture of happiness 
Hasn’t slept a night in its blessed land 
Anyone who has sold the fatherland 
Scent of the devoted troops [refers to Qizilbash] 
Are to be found by the lovers in Chindawol 
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The ghazal expresses the pain of lost glory. Chindawol in its peak was a place 
where the dignitaries, cavalrymen, and entrepreneurial personalities of the time 
lived. The ghazal also remind us of Chindawol’s history by positing a rhetorical 
question on the third line. Let us resume with Chindawol’s history and culture 
as its inhabitants remember it. 
  The Qizilbash military units settled in Kabul and formed the Chindawol 
area in 1738-39. It was a fortified area. Chindawol was and remains a visible 
Shi’a neighborhood. It had its own bazaar, mosques, congregation halls, baths, 
workshops (silk, wool, shoemakers), stables, shrines, gardens, and walkways 
(Khan Jan 2014). Chindawol is a Turkish military word that means rearguard 
(Hayder 2014). It refers to the army units that traveled behind the main pillar, 
afwaj, of the cavalrymen (Hayder 2014). The Qizilbash units who accompanied 
Nadir Afshar settled in Chindawol according to their tribal division or place of 
origin in Persia. For example, Chindawol’s smaller districts are named, Sepah 
Mansur-ha, Shah Samand-ha, Shah Aghasi-ha, Bakhtiari-ha, Kibri-ha, Lur-ha, 
Qurt-ha (Hayder 2014). It is believed that the first settlers of Chindawol were 
from the Jawanshir Qizilbash sub-branch, which was made up of the Qajarlu, 
Mahmudlu, and Kangarlu families. The other main family was the Shahsevan 
(vernacularly referred to as the Shah Samand). Amir Aslan Khan and Jafar 
Khan are remembered as the first leaders of Chindawol.  
  The location of Qizilbash settlement in Chindawol depended on three key 
factors. 1) Closeness to water, 2) arable land, and 3) the existence of a natural 
barrier. Chindawol Mahalla is between the foot of Shir Darwaza Mountain and 
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Kabul River. Chindawol was divided into two parts - the outer and inner space. 
A defensive wall encircled the outer space. Its eight entrances that were always 
guarded (Hayder 2014). The northern wall had three doors, the southern wall 
had three more doors, and the eastern wall also had two doors. Shir Darwaza 
Mountain, situated on its western side, provided a natural line of defense. The 
outer limits of Chindawol was adjacent to Gozar-gah on one side, and mahalla 
Ali Reza Khan on the other. Its western side extended to Demah-zang, which 
included Bagh-e Alam Ganj (Garden of Alam Ganj) and Jow-e Shir (name of a 
creek with fresh water).  
  The residents and the cavalrymen regularly used the outer gateways. The 
main northern door known as, darwaze cudkhuda-ha, aldermen entrance, was 
directly across the street from the Mosque of Shah-e Do Shamshira. Once you 
exit from the main northern door, on your right are the walls of Baqir Khan’s 
fort Qala-e Baqir Khan, and after two blocks, Qala-e Hayder Khan is on your 
right. Other doors led to Jada-e Maiwand (The Maiwand Road, named after the 
British defeat), Chub Foroshi (Wood Sellers), and Ashiqan wa Arifan (Mystics 
and Sufis). The southern doors led to the foot of Shir Darwaza Mountain were a 
military watchtower burj deedbani, once stood to survey the surrounding areas, 
including a better view of the battlefield in times of war (Khan Jan 2014).  
  Outer Chindawol, home to hundreds of Qizilbash families, vanished with 
the 1950s urban expansion. The Masturat Hospital and Soviet Union Embassy 
were built where Mostafi Muhammad Husayn Khan’s house once stood. Other 
Qizilbash dignitaries who lost their houses due to the urban expansion project 
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included the renowned physician Safar Ali, Dabir Muhammad Hasan, and Haji 
Saleh Muhammad, who was a Qizilbash community elder.  
  Inner Chindawol had its own entrance doors and layout. It has two main 
roads. The first road connected the main northern door darwaze cudkhuda-ha, 
to main south entrance (Khan Jan 2014). A smaller east-to-west road crossed 
the main road, which led to the Say Dokan entrance. The other main road 
started from Qala-e Hazara, intersected the north-south road at Sar-e Chahar 
Suq, and ended at the eastern door (Khan Jan 2014). The two main roads split 
the inner Chindawol into four units of a larger rectangle. Each area then had a 
number of smaller streets kochas. Similar to outer Chindawol, the inner space 
had its own water stream, Jow-e Asia. The Jow-e Asia creek was used to water 
the flowers, yards, and used for bathing. This stream split into two at Sar-e 
Chahar Suq. One provided water to Jawanshir-ha and Khafi-ha. The other 
passed through Qal-e Baqir Khan and Bagh-e Khan Shirin Khan and then it 
flowed into Kabul River. In inner Chindawol about 1,500-2,000 households 
lived in smaller areas ghozar, and forts qalas, which were named after different 
Qizilbash subtribe taifa/yel.16 
  Both outer and inner Chindawol had numerous stores and shops. There 
was a series of stores on both sides of the road from darwaze cudkhuda-ha to 
Say Dokan. Stores in Chindawol included the tailors, weavers (Ustad Barat Ali 
                                                          
16 Here is a complete list of the different ghozars:  Khafi-ha, Jawanshir-ha, Sepah Mansur-ha (Char suq), Shamlu-ha, 
Shahsamand-ha (Shahsevan-ha), Qurt-ha (Kurd-ha), Kibri-ha (Kablu-ha), Kalar-ha (kula khud-ha), Kocharlu-ha, 
Kashmiri-ha, Qazi Shuhab, Sar-e dokan, and Shahenchi-ha. The qalas comprised of Qala-e Shirazi-ha, Qala-e 
Hazara-ha, and Qala-e Baqir Khan.  
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Khan workshop known for fine silk turbans), saddlers, gunsmith, goldsmiths, 
coppersmith, blacksmith, locksmith, construction supplies, engravers, tile-
makers, charcoal store, drapery carpentry, grocery, dairy, bakery, and butcher 
shops. The Say Dokan bakery was known for its tasty cookies (Kulcha, kulcha 
birinji, and root) and sweets, shir-pira, and qanadi. There were places that sold 
delicacies such as, porridge haleem-pazi, ice-cream faloda-pazi or melahi-pazi, 
lamb-head kala-pazi, fish and Jilabi mahi-o-jilabi foroshi (Hayder 2014). 
 
B. Murad Khani 
  Murad Khani is another significant Qizilbash neighborhood. The Kabul 
River, Bazaar Kah-Foroshi (Straw Sellers), and Pul-Kishti separate Chindawol 
and Murad Khani. The history of Murad Khani starts when Timur Shah moved 
the capital from Qandahar to Kabul in 1772-75.17 Once Timur settled in Kabul, 
the unused lands that were close to the Bala Hisar Palace were given as gifts to 
the Qizilbash dignitaries, cavalry, and royal guards. Murad Khani was given as 
a gift to one of his elite commanders, Murad Khan Popalzai, son of Hanza Khan 
Popalzai. Murad Khan then gave his Qizilbash cavalry smaller parcels of land 
to build their barracks and residential compounds (Malakzada 2015). Murad 
Khani is where Kabul’s custom Ghomrog, kettledrum negara-khana, firefighting 
aatash neshani, and the grand kotawali structure were constructed.18 After the 
                                                          
17 Before Timur Shah’s transfer, this area is known to have been home to about three hundred Jalaru households who 
lived in the vacinity. The Jalaru family was one of Nadir Afshar’s chosen deputies to oversee Kabul. 
18 kettledrum negara-khana, in mornings and in the evenings the city drum would sound, based on the late eighteenth 
century tradition in Kabul. 
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death of Murad Khan, the Qizilbash nominated Mehr Ali Khan and Qurban Ali 
Khan Qizilbash as their new leader.  
  Recent wars, negligence, and urban expansions has altered the size and 
appearance of Murad Khani. Currently, 65 houses and structures are standing. 
Turquoise Mountain Foundation is renovating the historical houses (Malakzada 
2015). Despite all of the prior mishaps and calamities, Murad Khani is home to 
the popular shrines of Ziarat Abul-Fazl and Ziarat Panj Tan. According to the 
guardian of Ziarat Abul-Fazl, it is named after Abbas ibn Ali, Imam Husayn’s 
half-brother, who is remembered by Muslims for his loyalty to the Household of 
the Prophet and for his bravery during the Battle of Karbala. Ziarat Panj Tan, 
on the other hand, is an Islamic term that according to the shrine-keeper and 
community elders, it literally means the People of the Cloak Aal al-aba. It refers 
to the five venerated figures from the formative years of Islam: the Prophet, Ali, 
Fatima, and their two sons Imams Hasan and Husayn. These five people are 
given special consideration by virtue of the Surah al-Azhaab in Qur’an (33:44) 
and some Hadiths. According to the shrine-keepers, today over 5,000 women 
visit these sites on Wednesdays for pilgrimage, and about 10,000 men visit 
these shrines on Thursdays and Fridays.  
  Murad Khani’s commercial district still has a number of the older style 
public baths, teahouses, and small specialty shops. Historically, Murad Khani 
stores were the shopping destination for the Afghan royal family, where court 
executives and the harem women purchased exquisite jewelry, luxury fabrics, 
leather shoes, and visited the city’s finest tailors (Adil 2014).  
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  According to the locals, when the British shattered the Palace of Bala 
Hisar, during the Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-80, Abdurrahman Khan built 
a new Royal Palace Arg, close to the northern edge of Murad Khani. The 
construction of the Arg had an irreversible effect on the communal organization 
of Qizilbash. In 1895, Amir Abdurrahman exiled a number of the Qizilbash 
households to Mashhad, and a year later, Pashtuns of Kohistan region were 
moved in. His son and successor, Habibullah Khan, ordered the construction 
of new government buildings close to the Arg, but the Third Anglo-Afghan War 
in 1919, the Civil War of 1929, the economic sluggishness of the early-1930s, 
and the Second World War 1939-45, slowed the pace of urbanization near the 
Arg.19  
  It was not until the Premiership of Daud Khan, 1953-63, that another 
vigorous urbanization project was launched, which heavily affected Murad 
Khani. It was during Daud’s Premiership that Kabul’s iconic city square, Jad-e 
Maiwand and Nadir Pashtun Boulevard were constructed. The latter bisected 
Murad Khani into two halves: northern and southern. In 1958, the northern 
part of Murad Khani was demolished to build the Ministries of Justice, adlia, 
Finance Mallia and Mines, Mahdan. The National Back bank melli, Bureau of 
Communication and Intelligence riyast mokhaberat, Khyber Restaurant, and 
Cinema Aryana were built in the northern Murad Khani. In 1959, hundreds of 
residential and commercial buildings that existed in the southern Murad Khani 
(identified as lab-e darya-e Murad Khani) were demolished as part of the Kabul 
                                                          
19 The creation of a new administrative center in the 1920s took place in Dar ul-Aman area and not in Murad Khani. 
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River Construction Project. The Kabul River Construction Project entailed the 
addition of stonework walls on both banks of the river to hinder flooding. It also 
reduced to width of the natural river, which added the height of the water flow 
for aesthetic purposes.  
  Germans initially designed Kabul’s urban master plan in 1920s as part 
of their geopolitical rivalry with the British. It restarted in 1950s-70s under a 
new partnership between Afghans, East Germans, and Soviets. The new urban 
planners destroyed multiple shrines and cemeteries that were in or adjacent to 
the outskirts of Murad Khani. Many dervishes, small jewelers, and shopkeepers 
were not only displaced, but also lost their livelihoods without any reparation. 
Some of the Qizilbash houses that were in Murad Khan since Timur Shah’s era 
were demolished. The natives Qizilbash people interpreted this form of urban 
expansion as deliberate anti-Shi’a actions. 
  When Daud Khan regained power in 1973-78, he decided to leave Murad 
Khani alone because of the Shi’a uproar his previous urbanization had caused. 
In 1977, however, Municipality of Kabul Sharwali Shar Kabul, replaced the old 
public baths hamams, with modern apartment buildings. The modern buildings 
were not all finished when the Marxist inspired coup erupted in 1978. Kabul’s 
entire master plan was placed on hold during the Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-88. 
 After the Soviet withdrawal, the western side of Murad Khan was destroyed in 
the Mujahidin Civil War of the 1990s. In 1994, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e 
Islami was relentlessly attacking from the Bala Hisar region, and Ahmad Shah 
Massoud’s Jamiat was launching constant rockets from the Wazir Akbar Khan 
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neighborhood. In 1994-2001, the Taliban made a street that separated Murad 
Khani’s historic music bazaar where more artisans and shop owners lost their 
livelihood.    
  In 1990s, Mujahedeen commanders removed the beautiful handmade 
fretwork doors and window frames moshaba-kari, to burn and keep warm in 
the bitter winter cold of Kabul.  
Figure 13. Fretwork Door Kabul Museum 
       
         *** 
  Historically, inbound and outbound caravans would pass through the 
famed Pul-Kishti Bridge prior to stopping at Murad Khani’s customs ghomrog, 
to pay taxes on their cargos. The custom officials and the military officers 
sepah, received their education and training here. Murad Khani also had a 
number of homeschools where aspiring bureaucrats learned the art of 
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penmanship and calligraphy before they could be employed by the state. At the 
zor-khana, house of strength, lalas, mentors, trained young boys in fencing, 
horsemanship, spear throwing teer andazi, target shooting with muskets 
nishan zani, wrestling, and how to use a wooden baton. The military’s horses 
were kept and shoed at these stables.  
  According the local residents, Murad Khani’s residential area had flat-
roofed houses. The fancier and elegant houses were made out of baked brick, 
concrete, stonework, fretwork doors and windows. Ordinary mud and straw 
kahgel, were used in humbler houses. The houses had unusually small short 
doors where an average person could not walk in without bending their knees 
and head. The small short doors were designed to safeguard the dignitaries and 
warfare equipment from unexpected raids by horse riders. A network of 
underground tunnels connected some of the commanders’ houses where a 
cache of arms, food, water, and supplies were stored. The supplies could last 
for weeks. Normally, Qizilbash elders protected these areas when men were 
away (Adil 2014).   
  The narrow winding streets kochas, had dark tunnels where horsemen 
could not freely ride. On top of the tunnels were small rooms called sara-cha, 
where armed neighborhood guards resided. Some wider kochas had doors on 
each side, which could be locked in case of a sudden crisis. High walls built 
around the inner courtyard where private life was hidden from Kochas. Sharp 
wall dividers teqh, separated the houses between neighbors and streets. There 
were hardly any windows under the eye level in both the fancier and humbler 
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houses.    
  Once you enter the compound of a Qizilbash notable through the elegant 
fretwork door, right on top of the main entrance was the servant’s nazer, room. 
The servant typically lived there with his family. On each side of the courtyard 
there were one or two story buildings called aftab rukh, facing the sun, and its 
opposite sahe rukh. The main courtyard had four rectangular flower gardens 
with a decorative water fountain placed at the intersection. When you passed 
the courtyard, and went through another door, where mayman khana, guest 
room was situated. The guestroom was slightly raised for formality. It is in this 
room where guests are greeted. Guestrooms are usually furnished with quality 
rugs. Floor mats doshak, and pillows with decorative gold and silver popak, are 
always there to rest your back or place your elbow on.  
  The ceilings and interior windows are elegantly patterned. Built-in wall 
shelves taqcha, are filled with books. The Qur’an, tales of the prophets, Qasis 
al-Anbiya, and some Persian classics such as, Diwan-e Hafiz, Sadi’s Golistan 
and Bostan, Ferdwosi’s Shahnamah, and Rumi’s Masnavi. There are also some 
decorative accessories, faghfur, janan, and yishm. A vase of flowers or a bowl of 
quince were normally kept inside because of their nice fragrance. There were a 
number of other rooms called family room nishiman, back room pas-khana, 
storage room sandoq-khana, and kitchen ashpaz-khana. During hot summer 
nights, people eat outside on the courtyard sowfas, elevated terrace. Sowfas 
usually faced the greenhouse gul-khana, where flowers, plants, and singing 
birds like canary, nightingale, and pigeons were kept. 
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  Houses of the dignitaries also had their own bath hamam. Interior walls 
of the hamam were covered with stones and ceramic tiles. While most ordinary 
people used the public baths, which were comprised of three sections. First is 
the section where clothes and personal items are kept. It is a locker room, but 
a number system nishani, is used rather locks and keys. Second, is the haircut 
stations and places to receive a message. This section is warmer. The barbers 
and the message therapists wear the traditional lung. Third section is the big 
interior room, which is steamy hot and used for body washing. After leaving the 
hamam, street vendors sell different types of hot soups and fresh fruits. One of 
the distinctive bath foods is Shol-e sar-e hamam, usually served to a groom by 
his closest friends on his wedding day (Azami 2014).  
 
IV. Culture  
  The Qizilbash notables are cognizant of and like to reflect on their Perso-
Turkic heritage. It is important for them since their Perso-Turkic past displays 
their culture. Several aspects of the Qizilbash society have remained the same, 
other dimensions have undergone profound changes as they transitioned from 
a traditional setting to a modern context. It must be stated that Qizilbash share 
the same ceremonies, customs, and rituals as other inhabitants in Kabul. The 
only visible difference, to an outside anthropologist, is in their Shi’a religious 
observances, to be discussed in chapter 5. The rest of this chapter discusses 
the different aspects of the Qizilbash culture – family, food, leisure activities, 
and education that I gathering as part of my fieldwork.  
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A. Family 
  Family khanawada, is the fundamental social and economic unit for the 
Qizilbash. Traditionally, nuclear families combined into extended families that 
consisted of the man’s parents, unmarried sons, and married sons with their 
families. Each unit of the extended family occupied an independent quarter of a 
house facing the courtyard.  
  Choosing a spouse is seldom a matter concerning only two individuals. 
Marriages often involves the groom and the bride kin whose approval must be 
given to avoid social isolation and not be cut off from inheritance. Compatibility 
is normally judged based on prior affiliation, conducts, and class. In spite of 
the recent trend amongst the urban educated to avoid cross-cousin marriages, 
there is general preference among the older generation for marrying paternal or 
maternal cousins. Matrilineal cross-cousin marriage integrates more firmly the 
loose socio-political structure, and binds families. Outside of the usual practice 
of endogamy, political marriages between different elite families also take place 
to cement an alliance or to end a cyclical stalemate. Although family pedigree is 
traced through the father’s bloodline, the social eminence of maternal uncles 
and grandfather is also given heavy consideration.  
  Qizilbash families are commonly patriarchal. The wife conforms to her 
husband in front of the children and in the public sphere, but in private she 
musters ample decision-making authority. Commonly, the father is the main 
disciplinarian and guide while the mother is the emotional bedrock. The wife is 
a mediator between her children and husband, and between her husband and 
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her own family in case of an incongruity. In the father’s absence, the eldest son 
assumes the role of the guide of the family. Sons are taught and expected to be 
polite, ba adab, and chivalrous dilayr. They are the de facto vanguards and the 
guardians of family prestige hayzat, the nexus of which are lineages, humility, 
and social reputation. 
  Other important family values are generosity and hospitality. Generosity 
jawanmardi, is expected from those who have the financial means. Being frugal 
and socially isolated is considered pathetic. The influence of a knowledgeable 
relative kalan, over a younger khord, is such that the youth (presumably less 
experienced) must consult mashwara, with elders in matters of personal and 
commercial initiatives. In addition, the elders resolve disputes within the family 
or in the neighborhood by use of rationale and power of persuasion, but could 
not streamline their authority into permanent coercion over others or create 
institutionalized power that could be passed on. Within this family structure 
model, the youngest children rarely take responsibility or blame if the family 
somehow miscarries aberu-reezi. Below is a statement from my fieldwork that 
displays the type of values a father wishes to pass on.  
اب عاجش ار دوخ نادنزرف مصتیم راب اشوک و  دنوادخ .دشاب یم نم ثاریم نایاونیب تمدخ زاب تسد و تعاجش .مروآ یم
دنک یزور یدرمناوج و نامیا ار ناشیا 
 
 
I am raising my children to be brave, resolute, and industrious. Nobility and 
caring for the destitute are my inheritance to them. May God grant them faith 
and chivalry.     
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B. Food 
  In pre-modern era Qizilbash cavalrymen maintained a simple diet while 
travelling. A full breakfast and dinner was normally served so it did not disturb 
the movement of the cavalry. Breakfast was typically comprised of bread nan, 
tea chai, prepared with cheese panir or butter maska. Dinner was usually more 
substantial. Soup ash, might be prepared, which is a noodles made with dried 
salty yogurt quroot, lentil or red beans, dried mint, garlic with oil, and ground 
meat. Other simple travel dishes were shorba and qurooti. If a warhorse was 
injured, it would be slaughtered and roasted on fire as kabob. Sheep meat was 
normally dried ghosht qagh, for travelling. After dinner, dried raisins and nuts 
such as, almonds, pine nuts, pistachios, and walnuts would be consumed with 
hot tea. Occasionally, dried mulberries with ground walnuts and sugar were 
mixed into a blend talkhan. Between the morning and evening meals, Qizilbash 
troops ate a popular dried fruit called sinjed, and various types of cookies root 
and kulcha, which are usually made from flour, butter, and sugar. 
  Today, the Qizilbash no longer practices the long journeys for purposes 
of conquest and migration. Thus, most of the caravanserais in Kabul have been 
replaced with contemporary structures. The one exception is the newly repaired 
caravanserai at Babur’s Garden, part of a public museum that is open to the 
public. One of the old-style institutions that has survived into the present-day 
is the teahouse chai-khana. Elders sometimes spend time there for socialization 
and leisure purposes rather than to really drink tea with sugar almonds nuqol, 
or rock candy nabat. With the development of social stratification in the second 
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half of the twentieth century, most urban educated Qizilash shied away from 
chai-khanas and zur-khanas (traditional gyms, house of strength). These two 
places became sites where the lower social strata - meaning the unemployed 
and the uneducated, would spent a lot of time. 
   
C. Leisure Activities   
  The once favorite hobbies of wrestling, horsemanship, and hunting have 
faded away. One of the favorite pastimes that has survived the powerful forces 
of modernity are family gatherings during the holidays. During winter nights, 
close families in every district gather in an elder’s house for food, dialogue, and 
entertainment. After dinner, poetry recitation usually takes place, by those 
with a nice voice. Children also engage in poetry recitation or in chess 
competition. Classic, couplets, ghazels, and popular odes were narrated. Poems 
from Sufi and epic literary masterpieces such as, Rumi’s Masnavi and Diwan-e 
Shams, Shahnamah, Diwan-e Hafiz, and Sa’di’s Bostan and Gulistan are 
recited. Poems were then discussed and analyzed in family circles in the 
presence of women, elders, and children. Almost every extended family and 
Mahalla had well-known Shahnamah reciters, who read the poems in an epic 
chant called razmi. The Shahnamah characters, battles, and stories of heroism 
was revered and memorized by the Qizilbash youth. Some would essentially 
accept them as the history of their ancestors. These family gatherings also 
inspired eloquence and composition of their own poetry collection.  
  Outside of private homes, well-known reciters would read portions of the 
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aforementioned poems in a congregation hall for the public. Reciters were often 
joined by one or two erudite elder men, who sat at the foot of the pulpit minbar, 
to offer nuanced commentary and clarify the more difficult concepts, allegories, 
and historical details for the audience. Both the mystical and epic poems were 
closely listened to, and often memorized by, members of the audience. It is not 
unusual to repeat parts of, or the entire poem, in appropriate times during a 
conversation. Poetry was and remains part of the Qizilbash high culture.  
Figure 14. Munbar Takia-Khana Afshar 
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  Apart from the mystical and epic poetry recitation, another popular form 
of public recitation was the religiously inclined chants and praise lyrics called 
manqabat khwani. People would listen carefully to stories of the bravery of Ali, 
the valor of Husayn, or devotion of Abul-Fazl. One of the most popular Shi’a 
heroic odes qasida, is Hamla-y Hayderi, or Ali’s Conquest, amassed by Mirza 
Rafi Khan Basil, son of Mirza Muhammad. Hamlay Hayderi is recited in razmi 
chant. It starts with praise naht, of the Prophet and other Shi’a Imams, but it 
actually focuses on the virtues and sacrifices Imam Ali made for Islam until his 
assassination in 661. By the time the reciter ends Hamlay Hayderi, the public 
in the congregation hall have reached a state of communal ecstasy. The heroic 
poem underpins how the family of the Prophet or the Shi’as of Ali in general 
were mistreated in the formative years of Islam. 
 
D. Education 
  Before the establishment of the public education system in Afghanistan, 
tutelage of children was a high priority for the Qizilbash bureaucrats, troops 
and officials.20 Qizilbash districts had madrasas in mosques, congregation 
halls, but most children were homeschooled. Madrasas were opened to both 
genders and students were enrolled between the ages of 5-7. A monthly fee was 
paid to the instructor and before the Eids and the Persian New Year holidays; a 
bonus installment was paid to the head teacher. The madrasas taught students 
                                                          
20 Habibiah High School founded, 1903. The German-funded Amani High School, French-funded Lycee Esteqlal, 
Agency for French Education Abroad, in 1920s, and Kabul University in 1932. 
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basic mathematic, literature, calligraphy, medicine, and the religious canons. 
Students first learned the Perso-Arabic alphabet in qahayday Baghdadi before 
they would be able to recite the Qur’an. Persian poetry was steadily introduced 
to advanced students. Madrasa hours lasted from 8-12 in the morning for boys 
and 12-1 in the afternoon for girls. After the lunch hour, students spent time 
on their homework and practiced their penmanship. There were no new lessons 
taught on Thursdays. Thursday was review of the week’s materials and day of 
the weekly exam. Tactics of humiliation and physical punishment were seldom 
used on students who did not keep up.        
  Unlike the modern educational system, madrasas did not have numerous 
equipped classrooms with certified instructors. Student sat on the floor in a 
semicircle facing the teacher. Each student, based on his or her ability, was at 
a different level. Advanced students learned directly from the head teacher 
while the newer students learned from advanced students. Working families 
would stop sending their children to school once the student had learned how 
to read and write in Persian and could recite the Qur’an properly. If the head 
teacher had poor penmanship, then a calligrapher master would teach the art 
of how to sharpen a reed pen and make ink before mastering the advanced 
styles of nastaliq, shekast, and naskh.  
  To conclude, some of the Qizilbash court secretaries, calligraphers, and 
officials of the eighteenth and nineteenth century were products of the above 
education system. Below is a list of their names, occupational title, and when 
their work was published. This older education system ended with the rise of 
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public education system that flourished in Kabul in 1920s. According to elders, 
some of the best teachers in the public schools came from the Qizilbash areas. 
Table 8: Qizilbash Notables 
Author Title of Work or Occupation When 
Shah Abdulhakim 
Khorasani 
Tazkira Mardum-Deda Timur Shah 
Aisha, daughter of Yaqub 
Ali Khan (Aisha Durrani) 
Poetry Diwan Dost Muhammad 
Khan, published in 
1880-1901 
Shah Shuja Waqehat Shah Shuja Shah Shuja 
Hasan Ali Habib ul-Qulub Dost Muhammad 
Khan 
Mirza Muhammad Sadiq Qanon Askari; Treatise for 
Refutation of the Wahhabi Creed  
Amir Shir Ali Khan 
Safdar Ali Calligrapher Amir Shir Ali Khan 
Yaqub Ali Khawfi Padshahhan-e Mutakhir-e 
Afghanistan (exile) 
Amir Abdurrahman 
Khan 
Mir Husayn Husayni Calligrapher – student of Safdar 
Ali 
Amir Abdurrahman 
Khan 
Muhammad Ali Attar Calligrapher (moved to Herat, 
died in Mashhad) 
Amir Abdurrahman 
Khan 
Zubaida, daughter of M. 
Amin Khan Munshi 
(Mastura Afghan) 
Poet – no known published work, 
but known for her patriotic 
poems 
Habibullah Khan 
Shaykh M. Reza 
Khorasani 
Reyaz-e Illalwah Habibullah Khan 
Mirza M. Jafar 
Qandahari 
Calligrapher Habibullah Khan 
Mirza M. Jafar 
Qandahari 
Editor Amanullah Khan 
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CHAPTER 5 
State and the Shi’a Question, 1880-1978 
 
“States and their futures matter because, at the outset of the 21st century, they 
remain, by far, the most significant repositories of power and resources in the 
world” 
                                                              ~ Richard Lachmann, States and Power, 2010 
                                                  
 
 “The history of Afghan reforms and the study of the development and 
intellectual genesis of the Afghan modernist movement, as well as of the process 
of social change in Afghanistan, have not received the attention they merit from 
American and West European sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, 
Islamists and historians” 
                                     ~ Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, 1969 
 
 
 
I. Revival of Identity Politics in Afghanistan 
  Despite the expansion of transnationalism and globalization in the post-
Cold War world, nation-formation and identity politics remain at the center of 
political discourse in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Representation of ethnic and 
sectarian identity has resurfaced as an important political subject based in the 
shared experiences of injustice. These debates strive to redefine the rights and 
histories of minorities. At the same time, identity politics challenges the model 
and legacy of twentieth century state-formation and ethno-nationalism with the 
goal of greater self-determination.  
  The previous dynastic elites, 1880-1978, used the state apparatus and 
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bureaucracy as a vehicle for production of authority and spreading its cultural 
policies over rest of the society (Feldman 2008). Afghan state elites claimed to 
be the nation, the sole proprietor and defender of the country, and the source 
who decided on inculcation and “construction of other” (Said 1994). Afghan 
nationalism was articulated in the political-cultural ethos of the dynastic elites, 
often masked under the rubric of modernity. State elites used the material and 
ideological apparatus of the state, and often relied on a clerical and Loya Jirga 
rubber-stamp to attain the legal basis for proposed state activities (Althusser 
1988). Apart from the aspirations of modernization, nation-formation was also 
achieved through the creation of an “imagined” primordial identity (Anderson 
2006). Selective historicism by the state-sponsored cadre of writers was at the 
core of the Afghan ‘national’ culture edifice. 
  The merger of the modern state with nation has a long complex history in 
Afghanistan. The unification of the state with the nation as one ethno-cultural 
ethos began in 1901, when Mahmud Tarzi returned from Turkey. Tarzi formed 
the Young Afghan coalition and founded the state publication, Seraj al-Akhbar 
weekly. The homogenization of Afghanistan’s ethnicities occurred under a 
blend   of coercive policies, and to a lesser degree, volunteer assimilation. The 
Afghan state was the largest employer and offered upward socioeconomic 
opportunity for the newly educated professionals and neo-urbanites. The 
change of identity transformation, mainly for socioeconomic motives, is what 
John L. and Jean Comaroff call “ethnicity incorporated” (Comaroff 2009). 
Minorities were enticed to bring their skills in the state institutions at the cost 
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of discounting their own identity.  
  This chapter looks into the Qizilbash question in Afghanistan by focusing 
on the relationship between state policies and the Shi’a minority. Specifically, it 
explores how state elites embraced the idea of constitutionalism to consolidate 
their power and then homogenize their ethno-cultural strategies. This chapter 
closes with how remembrance and shrine visitation were used by Qizilbash not 
only to preserve their religio-cultural identity, but to resist the homogenization 
process. How did this paradoxical process of assimilation and resistance affect 
the Qizilbash social cohesion and identity? Before we answer the Shi’a question 
vis-à-vis the Afghan state, let us begin with a concise overview of the European 
state model and its arrival in Afghanistan.  
 
II. European Nation-State Model and Minorities 
  The subfield of political anthropology is the study of policies, institutions, 
and organizations from within or bottom-up (Das 2003). Political anthropology 
studies political themes, practices, and processes within and outside of state 
institutions (Aretxaga 2003). The state is where “transformation of all the major 
forces happens within a territory” (Tilly 2004). The concept of the nation-state 
is a rather new creation that has come to govern the world (Lachmann 2010). 
Over the course of twentieth century, virtually every habitable place on earth 
became an independent modern state, which replaced the previous models of 
polities, empires, city-states, tribal confederations, and theocracies that ruled 
over human societies for generations (Lachmann 2010).  
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  The nation-state model expanded across the globe either by voluntarily 
duplication or through use of military force during the pinnacle of European 
colonialism, 1800s-1945. Colonial powers considered it an effective and a safer 
system for social transformation of the peripheral lands toward modernity. In a 
Weberian perspective, feudalism and patrimonialism in the peripheral regions 
were “chronic conditions,” which hindered progress, and were fundamentally 
incapable of being transformed through their own internal dynamics. The state 
model further expanded in the period of de-colonization, 1945-60s, once the 
native elites unquestionably embraced the notion of linear history and rational 
choice theory. The elites sided with the “rule of experts” without much regard 
to the domestic subtleties of their own society (Mitchell 2002). Therefore, the 
European state model was accepted as a successful political system that could 
supplant the outdated patrimonial bureaucracies in the global south. But, how 
did this sociopolitical evolution originate in the European heartland?  
  The inception of the European nation-state model extends back to the 
Peace of Westphalia, 1648 (Wolf 1982). The Westphalia treaties formed the 
foundation for self-determination by ending the ambiguity of the nation (a large 
community of people) and its relation to the state (a sovereign political territory, 
known as a country). State power gradually increased with the dual practices 
of mercantilism and the rise of bureaucratic rationality. State bureaucracies, 
became efficient in collecting taxes, rallying the forces, and governing the lands 
of the state. States recognized the national identity of their people in a political-
territorial way. The European state-model initially ignored the ethno-religious 
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and the ethno-linguistic claims of minorities living within its defined contours.  
  The state systems created the belief in a territorial being that Thomas 
Hobbes, in Leviathan, declared a practical paradigm that is capable of saving 
human societies from destroying one another. Years later, the enlightenment 
thinker Jean Jacques Rousseau, popularized the theory of “social contract.” 
Rousseau called on rational individuals to submit their natural rights for the 
protection and privileges offered by the monarchical state. The advent of the 
American Revolution (1765-1783) and the French Revolution (1789-99) mark 
two other momentous breakthroughs in the evolution of the state system. The 
U.S. Constitution formed a check and balance mechanism for an equitable 
distribution of power between the central administration, provinces, and the 
people. The French Revolution resulted into common people supplanting the 
hereditary aristocratic elites that paved the path for the inevitable creation of 
republics and democracies around the globe.   
  After the Peace of Westphalia, major ethno-linguistic groups/nations in 
Europe claimed territories for themselves. Each nation established its political 
institution with a shared goal. It was for and on behalf of each nation that the 
state was expected to function and legitimize its rule (Sheth 1999). Each state 
began to solidify and defend the nation’s interest internationally vis-à-vis other 
ambitious states and domestically by subduing dissenters. State authority and 
national ideology were used in conjunction to homogenize the societies into 
cohesive units. State-builders shrouded their actions in the mask of national 
defense and “under the guise of public interest” (Abram 1988, 400). In the 
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process, the nation became synonymous with the notion of the state. When a 
population became ethno-linguistically uniform, the state did not discriminate 
among its inhabitants. People came to be treated with dignity as citizens. The 
state acknowledged the existence of the un-homogenized groups (religiously, 
racially, linguistically) within its defined contours and declared them to be as 
non-nationals. This dichotomy, at times, led to conflict or social unrest among 
the “major” versus the “minor” groups.  
  After the conclusion of the Second World War and the ratification of the 
Universal Declaration of the Human Rights in 1948, minorities could coexist as 
distinct demographic groups within the nation-state model. In the second half 
of the twentieth century, European states tried to accommodate the rights of 
the minorities as part of their inalienable rights. Which meant that minorities 
could preserve their culture, tradition, and organize their own political parties 
or support their desired political party. Minorities, however, could not live by a 
different set of laws that would undermine the written laws of the nation or 
engage in activities that would pose an imminent threat to the state. Since the 
inception of the state-model in 1648, it has successfully grown into a political 
system where minorities’ rights are protected. Minorities are treated as equal 
citizens and are an integral part of the rationale state, in what Foucault calls 
“governmentality” (Foucault 1990).21 Let us see how the state model turned out 
in Afghanistan. 
 
                                                          
21 Governmentality, governance through willing participation rather than the disciplinarian form of power.  
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III. The Nation-State Model in Afghanistan 
  The nation-state model has functioned quite differently in the newer and 
much weaker states of the global south, such as Afghanistan. The state model 
was implemented under different sociocultural and historical conditions, which 
were strikingly different from those that gave rise to the early industrial states 
in Western Europe. The early twentieth century anticolonial demands of Afghan 
nationalists for self-rule harped insistently on the present as the temporal 
horizon of action. The post-protectorate state, which started in 1919, was weak 
from the onset. The state in Afghanistan became an arm of the dominant ruling 
ethnic group (culturally and religiously), the Barakzai Pashtuns. The principles 
put forward by the Barakzai state elites were assimilation and construction of a 
national identity.  
  The state attained a majoritarian-cultural ethos that sustained itself by 
overpowering minorities. Nation formation led to actions where minority groups 
found themselves detached from the processes. Minority groups were pacified, 
controlled, and transformed via the dominant state culture endorsed by elites, 
which were articulated through “hegemonic” tactics (Gramsci 1971). Minority 
rights and representation were perceived as divisive thoughts that would abate 
national determinations or lead to the disintegration of the state. The top-down 
policies created a turbulent ethno-sectarian strife that triggered a sequence of 
regime changes, exiles, and assassinations that last from 1901-78.22 According 
                                                          
22 Habibullah 1901-19 assassinated, Amanullah 1919-29 exiled, Habibullah II 1929 assassinated, Nadir Khan 1929-
33 assassinated, Zahir Shah 1933-73 exiled, and Daud Khan 1973-78 assassinated. 
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to Robert Canfield, an anthropologist of Afghanistan, the paradox of peoples 
versus the state was never really settled, only interrupted by the Soviet War, 
1979-89, and ensuing Civil Wars, 1989-2001.   
  By studying processes of nation-formation, we can now see why people in 
Afghanistan have become so susceptible to conflict and distrustful of the state. 
Dynastic elites due to their control over the press and education system had an 
impact disproportionate to their numbers. State elites (aristocrats, courtiers, 
provincial dignitaries, intellectuals, and emerging bourgeoisies) were the main 
advocates of nationalism. State funded intellectuals were also vital in molding 
the national identities and cultures for which the state elicited loyalty.  
  Two policies that the state deployed for its assimilation goals according to 
my interlocutors were: 1) Obligatory Military Conscription, more than any other 
policy, indoctrinated men to see themselves as part of the fatherland nation. 2) 
Official Language, the medium for instruction in public schools, armed forces, 
and employment. People had to know the official language in order to obtain a 
state issued identification card tazkira. The Qizilbash were often discriminated 
against based on their personal names and language. Shi’as are usually named 
after members of the Ahl al-Bayt. Names such as Ali, Fatima, Zaynab, Abbas, 
Hussein, Hasan, Mukhtar, Jafar among others are prevalent (Afshar 2014).  
  In addition, the official language was used for the development of 
national anthem, literature, and international correspondences, which upheld 
the claims of Afghan nationhood. Language, in addition to fostering a national 
identity, helped fabricate image of the primordial past. Histories of minorities 
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and archeological evidences fell under the influence and censorship of the new 
primordial narrative. State-approved interpretation of the past, in what Duara 
calls “Rescuing History from the Nation,” was in full practice by the elite state-
builders in Afghanistan (Duara 1997).  
  Unlike the European nation-states, where most emerged with a dominant 
ethnic group, Afghanistan is a country of minorities. There is no overwhelming 
majority. The dynastic elites were themselves in fact a linguistic minority. The 
pre-modern Durrani polity was a Perso-Islamic superstructure laid on top of a 
diverse population. Each ethnic region had its own internal organization and a 
unique subculture. Pre-modern monarchs retained their power neither through 
institutional bureaucracy nor through Weberian notion of monopoly of physical 
force, but by their ability to balance the groups beneath them. It was often in 
the best interest of the Shahs and Amirs to have a heterogeneous population.  
  Pre-modern Afghanistan was a pluralistic society rather than a uniform 
nation. The Durrani polity was a collection of autonomous locales held together 
by dynastic kinship and patronage bonds under the flag of Islam. Each local 
ruler was a de facto head of a smaller polity who paid tribute to the Shah. The 
person of the Shah deferred much of his nominal regions to local rulers, with 
whom he shared revenues and authority. In other words, tribal chiefs were 
allowed to self-direct their areas, and were paid protection money khifarah, for 
their compliance. Local customs thrived in the absence of an overarching code 
of law. In the sedentary regions, elites held positions of considerable strength. 
Governance of the cities was in the hands of wealthy landowners, traders, and 
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state-backed clerics who often reminded people that men are better off under 
the worst government than in anarchy, the concept of fitna. The aristocrats 
wielded power through family patronage networks and served as intermediaries 
between the locals awamm, and the head of the pre-modern polity.   
 
A. Protectorate State, 1880-1919 
  The issue of minority rights has a long, complex history in Afghanistan. 
The central motif of the modern state was assimilation. This meant the cultural 
marginalization of minority communities within the state. A careful effort was 
not made to preserve the heterogeneity of cultures and histories that defines 
Afghanistan. Identification of a person as a minority decreased in importance 
while membership in a larger social unit increased. It is important to mention 
that minorities in Afghanistan are not new immigrant populations who needed 
state accommodations. The minority communities, however, began to perceive 
themselves as a lesser group when they felt deprived in the context of the new 
state, especially when equal opportunity and access to decision making were 
not within reach. Peoples’ demands for constitutional equality were therefore 
reinforced as more cases of discrimination were convincingly made against the 
totalitarian state. There are several episodes when Shi’a rituals were outlawed.  
  After the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878-80, the pre-modern Barakzai 
polity was transformed into a new territorial state, first as a protectorate state 
through indirect colonial rule (1880-1919), and then as a sovereign state after 
the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. Amir Abdurrahman Khan returned from 
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Tashkent to Kabul when his rival Amir Shir Ali Khan left Kabul at the onset of 
the British invasion. Abdurrahman was a self-interested monarch, who gained 
territory and power with the help of British firearms and money. He used the 
British aid to intimidate and defeat his rivals. His régime relied on his kinsmen 
for military purposes, while the civil and financial administration remained in 
the hands of the old Persian-speaking bureaucrats. Despite his enthusiasm for 
a new state, his acceptance was partial. Often a display was made of imitating 
institutions in order to impress the British Viceroy that the Afghan polity was 
transforming into a modern state. It was a transformation without attention to 
minority rights.  
  Apart from impressing the British subsidizers with his “iron fist” policies, 
Abdurrahman Khan’s other domestic motivation was to advance the interest of 
the ruling class at the expense of minorities. This meant appeasing the Sunni 
orthodoxy at the expense of Shi’as. Shi’a intellectuals argue that the ethnic and 
sectarian character of the state placed them at a dire detriment with enduring 
consequences. Abdurrahman Khan did not acknowledge Shi’a jurisprudence; it 
marginalized the Qizilbash Shi’as in public affairs, and devalued their Qizilbash 
identity. The two-decade long reign of Abdurrahman Khan, 1880-1901, was the 
darkest period for the Shi’a people in Kabul and beyond. Hojat, a Shi’a scholar 
from Chindawol and a Qizilbash from his mother side, writes, “Abdurrahman 
intensified the ethnic and sectarian difference and pitted one ethnic group 
against another” (Hojat 2003, 19).  
  In Kabul, Shi’as who fought the British were first demilitarized and then 
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marginalized. Prominent Shi’a Hajis, Karbalais, and Zawars, such as, Mullah 
Agha Baba and Sayyid Ali Ghowar Agha, to name a few, were imprisoned and 
tortured in the notorious underground prisons Sia Chah (Hojat 2003, 70). Shi’a 
religious commemorations were banned. People observed them secretly, in their 
homes and basements in the middle of the night. The Qizilbash community in 
Kabul was on the verge of extinction. The Shi’a elders, however, slowly started 
an anti-state campaign, after their repeated requests for equality were ignored 
by the state.  
  After the peaceful coronation of Habibullah in 1901, the Shi’a situation 
slightly improved. But, they were still banned from running their congregation 
halls takia-khana. Shi’a congregation halls were seen as spaces for outright 
disturbance against the state. Congregation custodians like Hematyari Khan of 
Chindawol was killed and his takia-khana was turned into a state-run mosque 
(Hojat 2003, 71). Shi’as could not have their own prayer call or commemorate 
religious holidays. Habibullah appointed Sunni Imams to give the sermons and 
to lead the prayer in the Shi’a takia-khanas. Shi’a people did not attend the 
Sunni led prayers because when Shi’as pray, they place their forehead onto a 
piece of clay tablet from the soil of Karbala mohr, the place where Husayn was 
martyred, instead of directly onto a prayer rug, which the Sunni state imam 
outlawed. Sometimes Shi’as perform their prayers back to back, (1-2-2, fajr on 
its own, Zuhr with Asr, and Maghrib with Isha') instead of praying five times a 
day with a break in between the prayers. Shias, like the followers of the Sunni 
Maliki School, hold their hands at their sides during prayer and do not cross 
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their arms - right over left. Consequently, Shi’as were accused of not praying 
and being irreligious, which lead to a renewal of social stigmatization.  
  Habibullah deployed Shia’s units (Qizilbash of Ghazni and Hazaras) to 
quite the Pashtun revolt of the Mangal and Solomon Khel tribes in the eastern 
provinces. This strategy turned to be a major miscalculation that widened the 
sectarian strife. To escape from the strident social realities, approximately 600 
Shi’a households (Qizilbash and Hazara) wanted to flee to Persia, but they were 
stopped at the border in 1914. Influential Shi’a families of Kabul became under 
close surveillance to avoid travels outside the country. Domestic pressure from 
the progressive faction Junbish-i Mashrutyat or The Constitutionalist Movement 
led to amnesty. Habibullah returned the confiscated Shi’a lands. Shi’a people 
returned to their customary life and paid their taxes to the state without having 
any direct influence. My interlocutor in general belief that the old Qizilbash and 
Hazara bureaucrat represented the state’s interest rather than advocating for 
equality.  
 
B. Constitutional Monarchy, 1919-46 
  In the aftermath of the Great War, Kabul’s political ambiance was divided 
between Junbish-i Mashrutyat, modernizing forces who favored the principles of 
secular nationalism similar to those of Ataturk, and conservatives who desired 
a continuation of the status quo. The status quo meant continued dependence 
on the British-Raj, who relied on the subservient Habibullah in Kabul to keep 
the influence of Russian revolutionaries (1917) on the north side of Amu River. 
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The mounting political tension between the two sides ended with Habibullah’s 
assassination on February 20, 1919. A Shi’a killed Habibullah when it became 
clear for modernizing forces that Afghanistan’s “hopes for independence would 
not be realized” (Roberts 2003, 39).  
  The assassination brought to the throne “an advocate of the modernist 
faction” (Vogelsang 2002, 276). The new leader, Amanullah, had a nationalistic 
outlook, who sought to unite the diverse country under the banner of progress 
and nationalism. Amanullah promised to transform Afghanistan from a “tribal, 
authoritarian, patrilineal and patriarchal country” to an accountable country 
(Dupree 1973, 464). Members of the intelligentsia, who rose to power in 1919, 
noticed that Afghan society was in need of accountable institutions that would 
respond in a non-discriminatory way to the needs of all the people.  
  Mahmud Tarzi brought the model of secular nationalism to Afghanistan. 
Tarzi, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Amanullah’s father-in-law. Tarzi, 
who had spent a substantial time in Turkey and had become a firm supporter 
of the modernizing ideas advocated by the Young Turks. With Tarzi’s guidance, 
Amanullah was able to engineer policies that covered a wide range of political, 
social, and economic issues. The rapid political reforms of Amanullah included 
unprecedented transformation that alienated the non-urban masses and social 
conservatives. One of the major changes was the ratification of a Constitution 
Nezam Name-i Asasi, in 1923, which addressed sociopolitical issues outside the 
scope of the Qur’an.   
  Most of the social conservatives’ delegates were alarmed by the reforms 
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that were proposed in the Constitution 1923. The new codes decreased their 
socioeconomic power, which negatively affected their feudalistic lifestyle that 
was partially tied to the British-Raj subsidies. Moreover, the abolition of Shi’a 
slavery, bribery, polygamy, forced labor, begging, and honorary titles generated 
an uproar among the social conservatives. Ending servitude helped the Shi’a 
population. Basic rights were extended to people who were previously sidelined. 
Shi’as were permitted to travel, observe, and practice their religious traditions 
freely. To further tilt the political balance in favor of the modernizers, the new 
constitution gave voice and influence to women. It promoted equal inheritance, 
eliminated gender segregation, outlawed mandatory veiling, and the practice of 
underage marriage. The new laws enforced taxes on polygamous marriages and 
condemned the ill-treatment of women by their male counterparts (Poullada 
1973). The new laws mandated that the parliamentarians wear European-style 
suits. The objective was to symbolically alter and modernize the image of the 
country’s professionals.  
  In 1928, with the opening of social space, Shi’a scholar, Ayatollah Hojat, 
returned to Kabul from Najaf. Although the Shi’a jurisprudence was still not 
recognized by the State. Shi’as were still in poor economic positions because of 
the prior policies, 1880-1919. Hojat delivered his first sermon in Murad Khani 
at Sayyid Mir Jan’s house. He was not a revolutionary. Hojat pursued a mild 
method to engage the state and the Sunni ulema in hopes of achieving a better 
socioeconomic status for the Qizilbash Shi’a people of Kabul and beyond. 
  Afghanistan’s social conservatives construed Amanullah’s rapid reforms 
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otherwise. They argued that secular nationalism would soon be followed by 
“immorality” and “uncontrollable freedom,” which would diminish the role and 
teaching of the Qur’an. Amanullah’s reforms became the center of controversies 
that eventually led to his forced exile. His decision to modernize the country by 
decreasing the social and economic influence of the conservatives caused great 
resistance. The anti-Amanullah factions received assistance from British. They 
directed a propaganda “campaign condemning the personal life and his 
modernization programs as anti-Islamic” (Dupree 1980, 450). Shortly after, the 
social conservatives initiated a series of uprisings. In 1928, the Shinwari tribe 
burnt down Amanullah’s winter palace in Jalalabad. Another insurrection took 
place in Koh Daman (north of Kabul) under the command of a former army 
deserter, Habibullah Kalakani. Kalakani entered the Arg in Kabul and “claimed 
the throne of the Amirate of Afghanistan” (McChesney 1999, 1). He restored the 
old posture of traditionalism in 1929.  
  In the wake of the 1929 international financial crisis, Kalakani’s regime 
crippled the already weak Afghan economy. Kalakani’s nine-month rule was 
dominated by “anarchy, pillage, and terror” (Roberts 2003, 99). The “bandit” 
leader built a religious movement composed mostly of Sunni clergy, relatives, 
and friends. The advisors he employed demonstrated no aptitude for economics 
or governance of a state. His religiously oriented cabinet reversed Amanullah 
Khan’s progressive reforms. Kalakani’s regime closed the women public schools 
and recalled all the students studying abroad. Museums and public libraries, 
fruits of modernization, were plundered. The country’s educational and judicial 
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institutions “were again run by clerics” (Vogelsang 2002, 282). His conservative 
measures faced a degree of internal opposition.  
  The modernist and nationalist groups wanted a civil society without the 
enactment of absolute religious laws. Pashtuns did not think that Kalakani, a 
Tajik, would champion the cause of an autonomous Pashtunistan. The Shi’a 
people, who enjoyed a relative degree of freedom under Amanullah Khan, also 
opposed the reinstitution of discriminatory laws.  
  Without any foreign aid and little means of raising funds domestically, 
Kalakani reverted to “extortion and plunder” (Vogelsang 2002, 99). The trade 
caravans between Kabul and Delhi were interrupted by looting in the eastern 
provinces. Kabul merchants endured a sharp decline in their import-export 
transactions. The non-existent custom levies plunged the country into scarcity 
and unmanageable inflation. Kalakani’s policies put Afghanistan onto a path of 
financial dependency and traditionalism that was contrary to his predecessor’s 
plan. 
  Kalakani’s intrusive policies in Central Asia brought Afghanistan to the 
brink of a full invasion by Soviet forces in 1929. Ramsey MacDonald’s cabinet 
in London recognized the possibility of a Soviet military invasion on a weak and 
impoverished Afghanistan. One proven method of curtailing any Soviet invasion 
was to establish another pro-British zone of influence in Kabul, a government 
that would refrain from provoking anti-British sentiments in the autonomous 
Pashtunistan, and refrain from supporting the Uzbek separatist, Ibrahim Beg, 
in Central Asia. The British Viceroy and Governor General of India, Lord Irwin 
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(Edward Fredrick Lindley Wood) were involved in reinstating a non-interfering 
“buffer-state.” British officers did not want to see a powerful Afghan state that 
would pose dangers to the stability of the wider region. The idea of a weak state 
stemmed from the lessons learned from the prior Anglo-Afghan confrontations. 
Previous experiences made the notion of direct British interference and having 
a permanent base in Kabul impractical. Lord Irwin instead preferred indirect 
influence. The challenge of this arrangement for the British was in locating a 
trustworthy person who would abide by their mandates.  
  Recognizing the gravity of the situation, the British formed alliances with 
exiled Afghan officials in France. Sir Francis Humphry, British Minister in 
Kabul, recommended Muhammad Nadir Khan. Nadir Khan’s contacts with the 
British officials had grown closer during his long stay in Paris. Both parties 
shared a mutual frustration for Kalakani. British officials held Nadir Khan in 
high regards. He was considered the best prospect for their interest in Kabul 
and Afghanistan. Nadir, who was Amanullah’s head of the armed forces, and 
his two brothers Hashim Khan and Shah Wali, were issued visas to travel to 
Peshawar “in spite of objections from Kalakani’s government” (Rahimzai 2014). 
With the aid of the British, the Musahiban Brothers sailed from France to 
Bombay and then to Peshawar.  
  In Peshawar, the Musahiban Brothers circulated an anti-Kalakani 
newspaper Islah, Reformation. Sir Richard Maconachie, the subsequent British 
Minister to Afghanistan, met the Musahiban s in Peshawar before giving them 
permission to enter Afghanistan. The brothers entered the Afghan province of 
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Khost with the “sums collected from friends in India” where they joined Shah 
Mahmud, a fourth brother, who had defected from the Kalakani regime (Fraser-
Tytler 1967, 226). The British officials paid “funds to key frontier leaders and 
rewarded hose who helped Nadir Khan take the throne” (Roberts 2002, 57). To 
find military support for an advance on Kabul, Nadir Khan promised booty and 
authority to the Pashtun tribesmen from eastern Afghanistan who formed the 
backbone of his army.  
  On October 10, 1929, Nadir Khan and his three brothers, with the help  
of the Pashtun tribes, seized Kabul. Nadir Khan waited in silence while peoples’ 
houses, presidential palace, and other official buildings were stripped of every 
article of value (Fraser-Tytler 1967, 226). To avoid further chaos and damage, 
the residents of Kabul “was willing to submit to any ruler” (Adil 2014). Nadir 
Khan Muhammadzai thus became the first Shah of the Musahiban Dynasty, 
1929-1978. Nadir’s earlier promise of restoring Amanullah Khan back to power 
turned out to be a ploy to rally the modernists and nationalists factions behind 
him. The failure to bring back Amanaullah earned him the notorious title of 
Nadir the Treacherous Nadir Ghadar. 
  Why did Nadir Khan eliminate the important figures from Amanullah’s 
regime? Nadir established an absolutist regime that depended on an alliance 
with the old conservatives and the new Pashtun tribes who helped him. His 
reliance on Pashtun tribes over other ethnic and religious groups reinstated the 
antagonistic ethno-sectarian rift. At the same time, Nadir Khan instigated the 
dual regressive position of global isolationism and selective modernization. The 
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monarch’s isolationist attitude barred the entry of enlightenment philosophies 
from abroad that were essential for formation of civil society and more. Nadir’s 
‘closed door’ stance meant the isolation of the society from the outside world.  
  Nadir Khan installed a multipronged domestic policy. It encompassed the 
forced relocation naqilin, of eastern tribal Pashtuns into strategic non-Pashtun 
lands, execution of Amanullah’s followers, and the incarceration of outspoken 
reformers. Sultan Muhammad Khan of Murad Khani was imprisoned without a 
trial for speaking against Nadir’s treachery. Nadir upheld order through heavy-
handed measures. Rosita Forbes, an English traveler, who visited Kabul in the 
early-1930s, said, “The Afghan government is an autocracy vested in the hands 
of one family, ruthless with regard to its political opponents” (Forbes 2001). 
The exclusion of political opponents in Nadir’s régime deepened the ethno-
sectarian undercurrent within the country.  
  Nadir Khan’s rise presented a political opportunity to formulate a state 
apparatus that would embody all the ethnic and religious minorities living in 
Afghanistan. The chance to form a pluralistic society based on tolerance and 
civil rights vanished. Nadir instead assembled a “ten-man cabinet mainly from 
among his kinsmen” and endorsed the customary Pashtun system. He went to 
great lengths to “secure the strong support of the Fazl Omar Mujaddidi, also 
known as the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar,” the country’s leading Sunni cleric 
(Sykes 1940, 325). Moreover, Nadir funded the newly formed Council of Ulema 
in Kabul, which was comprised of Sunni theologians, who did not speak or act 
in favor of Shi’a equality. This council not only interpreted and administered 
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the religious laws, but Nadir consulted with them on political, judicial, and 
educational policies that affected the future of the Millions of residents.  
  The state approved Council of Ulema embarked on the Islamization of 
modernity rather than focusing on the equitable modernization of the society. 
Tribal elders with the support of the Council of Ulema furthered their personal 
status with the restoration of honorary titles while the society regressed to the 
old practices of forced labor. Women’s schools remained closed and the dated 
posture toward women was restored. Nadir’s increased state religiosity created 
a deep rift with the Shi’as and the reformers, both groups were sidelined. Any 
dissenter critical of Nadir Shah’s regime was brutally silenced. 
  To subdue the sociopolitical situation in Kabul, Nadir quickly issued a 
ten-point policy declaration that showed the attitude of the new government. 
The new policy appeased the tribal forces and the religious establishment while 
alienating the Shi’a population. The Hanafi jurisprudence was acknowledged as 
before and “complete autonomy of Sharia courts was guaranteed (Gregorian, 
1969, 305). The Sunni clerics occupied the judicial branch of the government. 
The civil and criminal codes were brought in line with the norms of the Hanafi 
laws. This principle subjected the country’s other minorities like the Hindus, 
Jews, and Shi’as to the Hanafi interpretation. The Qizilbash reverted to the 
practice of taqiyya until Shah Mahmud’s liberal interlude after the Second 
World War. The first of Nadir’s ten-point policy reads: 
Government was to be conducted according to the commands of 
Islamic law of Hanafite interpretation. The presidium of the 
national council and the Ministry of Justice were to be 
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responsible for the enforcement of Islamic law throughout 
Afghanistan. The department of ihtisab, which supervised the 
strict adherence of Muslims to the moral code of Islam, was to 
be organized. All Afghans were declared equal in Islamic 
brotherhood and no one was to enjoy any special privileges. 
Women were required to be veiled. 
 
 
  Two years later, the 1931 Constitution solidified the Musahiban power 
and Afghan nationalism. Nadir Shah’s legal charter, Usul Name-i Assasi, was a 
mix of Pashtun tradition with “a hodgepodge of unworkable elements, extracted 
from the Turkish, Iranian, French and 1923 Afghan constitution” (Dupree 
1980, 464). In contrast to the anti-hereditary standard of Islamic law, the 1931 
Constitution states, “the noble Afghan nation, therefore, agrees that the crown 
of Afghanistan will be transferred to the family of this king, who desires the 
progress of the country… ” (Constitution 1931, Article 5). Progress revolved 
around the principle of nationalism. The constitution declared, “all persons in 
the kingdom of Afghanistan are called Afghan subjects without any distinction 
of creed and religion…” (Constitution 1931, Article 9).  
  There was a noticeable gap between the impersonal state policies and the 
biased institutional practices. Shi’as were treated as “subjects” rather than as 
“citizens” (Khan Jan 2014). For instance, when Kabul University was opened in 
1932, Shi’as were not allowed to enroll. A year later, Nadir was assassinated by 
a Shi’a named Abdul Khaliq. Nadir’s brother, Hashim Khan, the Prime Minister 
of the time used the opportunity to imprison and intimidate rivals (Sarwary 
2014). 
  Under Hashim Khan’s Premiership, the Musahiban ethno-nationalism 
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expanded into the realms of language, military service, and education. In 1937, 
Hashim Khan banned Persian in favor of Pashto from the education system. 
Due to the shortage of textbooks and educators, he reversed his decision after 
the country’s students lost an entire academic year due to his shortsighted 
course of action. To produce textbooks in Pashto, he created the Pashto Tulana, 
Pashto Academy in 1940. Two year later, the Historical Society of Afghanistan 
was established with the aid of the régime for the purposes of disseminating 
the views of the state and international prestige. 
  At about the same time, to resist the absolutist policies of the state, the 
Shi’a people did not sit idle. Ayatollah Hojat established the country’s first Shi’a 
seminary howza, at a private house in Behsud 1936 (Wardak Province). A year 
later, Ismael Balkhi arrived to Herat after the completion of his education in 
Mashhad. Hashim Khan banned Balkhi from coming to Kabul because of his 
strong anti-government opinions. Hojat did not have the same type of critical 
views as Balkhi held. Thus, he was able to receive approval from the state to 
establish a congregation hall in Chindawol, Takia-Khana Omomi (near Takia-
Khana Mir Akbar Agha and Takia-Khana Mir Faqir Husayn).  
  Takia-Khana Omomi became a public space for the Shi’a residents to 
gather and collectively commemorate their rituals without any inflammatory 
anti-state rhetoric. On the other hand, despite the travel restrictions, Balkhi 
secretly toured Qandahar, Kabul, Central, and Northern Afghanistan. Balkhi, 
who was an exceptional orator, spoke openly against the absolutist measures 
of the state. In 1945, Hashim ordered the closing of Takia-Khana Omomi, which 
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stayed closed until the seventh of Muharram of that year. It was opened once 
Hojat assured Zahir Shah that Takia-Khana Omomi was not the site of any 
anti-state undertakings. 
  In 1946, Ismael Balkhi with the help of activists from various parts of 
Afghanistan (Abdul Qhafar Baydar, Latif Jan Sarbaz, Sayyid Hayder Shah 
Qutb, Sarwar Joya, Ali Asghar Bashir Herawi, Sayyid Fazlullah known as “Mir 
Agha Herati”, Akhundzada, and Abdul Husayn Munjim-bashi) started Hizb-e 
Irshad or the Party of Enlightenment. Hizb-e Irshad sought to alter the electoral 
laws in the Lower House so people could choose their own candidates and they 
demanded the release of the political prisoners. This was a period of intense 
political activities. To avoid the situation from getting out of hand, Zahir Shah 
replaced Hashim Khan with his other uncle Shah Mahmud Khan (Ayoubi 
2014). 
 
C. From Cold War to Soviet Invasion, 1946-79 
  The history of Qizilbash took a different turn after the Second World War. 
The brutal reign of Hashim Khan’s Premiership ended in 1946. The Qizilbash 
saw Hashim’s resignation as a positive step (Ayoubi 2014). His successor, Shah 
Mahmud, however, did not move swiftly to meet the demands of the reformists. 
Hizb-e Irshad was busy amassing armaments and attracting prominent people 
from the ranks of civil and military to topple the state in a military style coup, 
but a clandestine agent by the name of Gul Jan Wardaki exposed the plot to 
the authorities in 1949. Soon, Balkhi and eleven other Hizb-e Irshad members 
198 
 
were arrested from Takia-Khana Mir Akbar Agha. Next day, there was a 
peaceful protest of about 10,000 people (including Sunnis and liberals) who 
marched from Chindawol to the Arg, the Shah’s Palace. The protestors 
demanded an end to the isolationist policy from the outside world, amnesty for 
political prisoners, and direct representation through free elections. Shah 
Mahmud reacted quickly to meet the demands of the outspoken protestors 
before it could escalate into a nation-wide upheaval (Ayoubi 2014). 
  In 1949-52, there were direct elections held for urban mayors and for the 
country’s national assembly (Kaker 2011). In 1950, a permissive press law was 
passed.  Freedom of expression led to the spread of political publications, the 
importation of major political works from abroad (mostly translations via Iran), 
and social commentary/satire by the liberal intelligentsia. With the expansion 
of liberal press, the reformists became very outspoken. The Awakened Youth 
Movement started at Kabul University by Hasan Sharq, Ishaq Usman, and 
Abdulwahi Sarabi to show the college students an alternative route to social 
transformation was possible than Balkhi’s militarism. In 1950, Hizb-e Watan, 
Homeland Party, under the guidance of intellectuals such as, Sarwar Joya, Asif 
Ahang, Ghulam M. Ghobar, and Amin M. Farhang started the country’s Second 
Constitutionalist Movement, Junbish-i Mashrutyat Khawan. Zahir Shah and his 
Prime Minister, Shah Mahmud felt defenseless to continue with their liberal 
press experiment (Dupree 1980 494-98). Conservatives Sunni clerics and tribal 
chieftains, however, wanted Shah Mahmud gone. To appease the conservatives 
Zahir appointed his first cousin and brother-in-law, Daud Khan, as the next 
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Prime Minister of the country in 1953. 
  Daud Khan favored an authoritarian social progress. He was opposed to 
structural and cultural changes within Afghanistan’s political system, or what 
David Apter refers to as theory of “political modernization” (Apter 1965). Daud 
favored the preservation of the established social order at the cost of individual 
freedoms and progressive “public sphere.” Once Daud Khan took office, the 
newspapers ceased publication. Political parties ceased public activity. Rigged 
elections for the national assembly were held. In 1957, Daud ordered the arrest 
of Abdul Malik Abdul Rahimzai and a number of Qizilbash notables such as, 
Mir Asgar Shuha, Mir Ali Ahmad Shamil, Mahdi Zafar, Asif Ahang on flimsy 
charges of coup and corruption (Rahimzai 2014). Daud and his conservative 
backers closed the sense of progressivism that had prevailed in the aftermath 
of WWII from 1949-52.23  
  On the other hand, under Daud Khan’s authoritarian reign, expansion of 
the state’s education system (K-12 and universities), state controlled radio and 
television took place. Non-compulsory removal of the veil occurred in 1959 to 
keep a lid on the reformist discord. To finance his reforms, Daud gravitated 
towards the Soviet Union after his repeated attempts to form closer bonds with 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration fell upon deaf ears. He relied 
on Nikita Khrushchev’s aid to finance his Pashtunistan ambitions. As a result, 
Soviet aid and political ideology entered the Afghan army institution. Marxist 
                                                          
23 The impact of FDR’s Four Freedoms and Truman Doctrine on Afghanistan’s liberalization in 1949-52, are outside 
the scope of this study. 
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and Leninist ideologies penetrated the urban social fabric. In 1959, Abdul Baqi 
started to introduce some disenfranchised Shi’a youth to Marxism (Sarwary 
2014).       
  By early 1960s, Zahir Shah was alarmed by the level of Soviet actions in 
Afghanistan. Daud’s insistence on Pashtunistan issue brought the country to 
the brink of a war with Pakistan. General Ayub Khan and the U.S. had become 
close allies. Pakistan was perceived in the U.S. as an integral bulwark against 
Communism. Zahir Shah lastly replaced Daud with a popular liberal politician, 
Dr. Muhammad Yusuf. Yusuf’s two immediate goals involved normalization of 
relations with Pakistan, and political modernization of the dynastic apparatus. 
Yusuf formed an inclusive government in 1963. In the following year, Yusuf 
pushed through the ratification of a new constitution by the Loya Jirga, which 
transformed the Afghan state from an absolutist monarchy to a constitutional 
monarchy.  
  The 1964 Constitution excluded members of the royal family, including 
paternal uncles and cousins, from entering politics. The national assembly, 
provincial assemblies, and municipal councils were to be directly elected by the 
people. Zahir Shah was to nominate members of the cabinet, but they were to 
be confirmed by a vote in the national assembly. People were guaranteed the 
right of free expression, of peaceful assembly, and of association. The police 
could neither make arrests nor enter private homes or confiscate property 
without warrants granted by the courts. Furthermore, individual freedom was 
guaranteed, except for those found guilty of crimes in the courts (Constitution 
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1964).  
  Islam stayed as the state religion. The state was to conduct its affairs in 
accordance with Hanafi law, which in the eyes of the Shi’a people belittled their 
faith, as did the previous two constitutions (Khan Jan 2014). Moreover, Shi’as 
interpreted this constitutional article as a way of conveying that Afghanistan’s 
top politician could not be of the Shi’a faith. Shi’as must abide by the Hanafi 
law in the country’s judicial system. Moreover, the word Dari and not Farsi was 
inserted in article 3, without the vote of the country’s Persian speakers. Aside 
from the imposition of the word Dari, below is a list of articles that Shi’as found 
to be problematic in the 1964 Constitution: 
 ARTICLE 6 - In Afghanistan the King Personifies Sovereignty 
 ARTICLE 8 – The King shall be an Afghan national, a Muslim and a 
follower of the Hanafi doctrine 
 ARTICLE 13 – Royal expenditures shall be fixed in the state budget 
according to the law of the royal expenses 
 ARTICLE 15 – The King is not accountable and shall be respected 
by all… 
 ARTICLE 16 – The succession to the throne of Afghanistan shall 
continue in the House of his majesty Muhammad Nadir Shah, the 
Martyr, in accordance with the provisions of this constitution. 
 ARTICLE 18 – On the King’s Abdication or death, the throne shall 
pass on to his eldest son. If the eldest son of the King lacks the 
qualification set forth in this constitution, the throne shall pass on 
to his second son and so on 
  
  Despite its explicit and implicit biases, the 1964 Constitution in reality 
found traction in elite and ordinary social circles. The legal charter introduced 
women rights and civil rights. Dr. Yusuf exonerate political prisoners who were 
held without trial, among them was Balkhi (Hayder 2014). Balkhi gave his first 
potent speech, in over a decade, in Chindawol at Takia-Khana Mir Akbar Agha. 
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The state-owned press and media reduced their censorship. Shi’a scholars were 
able to speak and write without the state obstruction. Several political parties 
materialized under the free association article of the legal charter (Constitution 
1964, Article 32).  
  The Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the Maoist 
Democratic Current (Shole Jawid), the Islamic Association (Jamiat Islami), and 
the Afghan Social Democratic Party (Afghan Mellat) were able to recruit student 
and non-students, urbanites and non-urbanites to their political camps. Apart 
from the above political parties, Balkhi established another Takia-Khana in the 
district of Behsud. His two primary goals were social justice and constitutional 
equality for Shi’as (Afshar 2014). Both goals were articulated under the aegis of 
a new phenomenon, religious nationalism. To prevent the Shi’a youth from 
joining the growing leftist parties, the Guardian Movement (Nezat-e Pasdaran) 
was launched in 1968 to “awaken” the Shi’as (Afshar 2014). Five years later, 
another Shi’a activist party (Group Mostazahefin) The Powerless Group, formed. 
Group Mostazahefin sought social justice, which included the systemic neglect 
and underdevelopment of Shi’a muhallas that had occurred for many decades 
across the country.  
  The representatives elected to the national assembly in 1965 and 1969 
came from the liberal, leftist, and social conservative factions. Representatives 
mostly failed to agree on issues to authorize the much-needed legislation. It 
contributed to a state-level gridlock. As a result, student discontent and social 
agitation grew when royal nepotism, corruption, and the Muhammadzai-led 
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social hierarchy was not supplanted with meritocracy. Hardly ever Shi’as and 
other ethnic minorities were given the chance to study abroad (Afshar 2014). In 
1973, with the assistance of leftist military officers, former Prime Minister 
Daud overthrew his cousin’s monarchy and declared Afghanistan a Republic. 
Daud, this time around, launched an era of progressive measures to tackle the 
dilemma of underdevelopment and uneven development. When Daud became 
too close to the Soviet orbit, Jamiat Islami, plotted an unsuccessful overthrow 
in 1976. Daud, with advice from Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, began an effort 
to loosen ties with the Soviets. PDPA military officers seized the opportunity 
and overthrew him in a bloody coup in 1978. 
  The Marxist-inspired officials started a Stalinist style of purges once they 
grabbed power. Several Shi’a scholars, dignitaries, business elites, and clerics 
forever vanished (The Afghanistan Death List 2013). In Kabul, some of the Shi’a 
congregation halls were transformed into sites of adult literacy program. PDPA 
had an anti-religious attitude, which stemmed from Karl Marx’s famous phrase 
that “religion is the opium of the people” (McKinnon 2005). The PDPA literacy 
initiative focused more on indoctrination of Shi’as in their ideology rather than 
sincerely educating the masses. The state purges continued under Taraki and 
Amin reigns without any reasonable explanation other than petty rivalries and 
personal or familial retaliations.  
  The first anti-PDPA demonstration in Kabul in which more than 100,000 
urbanites participated started in Chindawol in 1979. PDPA reacted with more 
purges, confiscation, and intimidation. According to one of my interlocutors in 
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Kabul, “the Communists made a grave mistake by threatening people. Didn’t 
they realize anti-coercion and martyrdom are part of the Shi’a cultural fabric?” 
Whether the Marxist revolutionaries understood this or not remains uncertain. 
One thing is certain, an armed opposition group known as Party of Unity (Hizb-
e Tawid) was formed in 1979 in response to the PDPA actions, which targeted 
the Soviet supported Afghan officials. 
 
IV. Culture 
  The political autonomy and power of the Qizilbash has varied since the 
rise of Afghan dynasties in 1747. The modern state did not offer the Shi’as with 
same constitutional equality, 1880-1978. Shi’a people could not openly disclose 
their identity and practice their religious observances in public because of the 
hegemonic ethno-nationalistic state policies. Thus, most Qizilbash turned to 
dissimulation Taqiyya, by changing their name, hiding their place of origin, 
and when possible marrying outside of their own social community. Extended 
years of Taqiyya, however, alienated individuals from their ancestral muhalla 
and culture. The policy of inculcation created the phenomena of inter-
generational conflict or a sense of anomie.24  
  Qizilbash community life was noticeably weakened by 1978. With this in 
mind, what were the some of the strategies that the Qizilbash depended on for 
the preservation of their identity? Did visitation to shrines and rituals play key 
roles in the preservation of Qizilbash identity? The Ithna Ashari Shi’as consider 
                                                          
24 The concept of inter-generational “sociolinguistic problem” is outside the scope of this study (Suslak 2009).  
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sites associated with Ahl al-Bayt, Shi’a Imams, reputable saints and scholars to 
be sacred places and highly visible cultural practices. Shi’as see shrines as an 
embodiment of their collective religious identity, as well as quiet locations for 
redemption and transmission of necessary knowledge in the face of coercive 
state policies. To understand the importance of shrine visitation, remembrance 
of Ashura and celebration of mid Sha’aban, it is essential to hear the Qizilbash 
stories.  
 
A. Pilgrimage  
  Most Qizilbash of Kabul, in fact, seek to visit Mecca and Medina once in 
their lifetime, but visiting the nearby Ziyarat-e Sakhi (in Karte Sakhi previously 
known as Aliabad) is more practical and affordable. Ziyarat is a borrowed word 
from Arabic in the Persian lexicon that means to visit. Sakhi has two meanings: 
generous, and is one of the honorific titles bestowed upon Imam Ali. Qizilbash 
rationalize their visit to Ziyarat-e Sakhi by referring to a verse from the Qur’an, 
which enunciates, “no reward do I ask of you for this except to be kind to me 
for my kinship with you” (Qur’an 42:23). The shrine-keeper of Ziyarat-e Sakhi, 
a middle-aged man from the Chindawol named Sayyid Yusuf, responded to me 
with, “The Prophet himself used to visit his uncle Hamza’s grave. Shrines are 
considered a source of blessings for the visitor” (Yusuf 2014).  
  The shrine-keeper tells me “there are two other categories of pilgrimage 
sites: 1) nazargahs, sights of seeing, and 2) mausoleum of revered saints and 
scholars” (Yusuf 2014). The grave of a saint awliya, is a point of contact with 
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the saint where the conventional relations of cause and effect are suspended. 
Awliya are seen as having a close relationship with God. Pilgrims approach 
them as intermediaries. People even desire to be buried near awliya who are 
known for their piety so the time between death and resurrection (barzakh or 
purgatory) should be spent in a nazargah or near an awliya.  
  Pilgrims regularly visit shrines in the hopes of being the beneficiaries of 
divine favor in some palpable way tawassul. The experience of pilgrimage is 
also comforting taskin, and heart-opening dilbaz. If a request is granted, then it 
may be celebrated publicly through donation or food. Shrine visitation takes 
place in quest of seeking nearness to God and His receiving blessings barakat, 
which gives the pilgrim a degree of spiritual merit sawab. Yusuf, the shrine-
keeper tells me, “Shi’as send salutations salawats, to Prophet Muhammad and 
the Ahl al-Bayt.” When visiting, a pilgrim is not only keeping the memory of 
that person alive, but also the mixture of donation, food, and salutation 
strengthens and re-institutionalizes the fundamentals of the Shi’a cultural 
identity.  
  The shrine-keeper of Ziyarat-e Sakhi then asked me a rhetorical question, 
if things such as Ziyarat and Tawassul were innovations then why the Prophet 
himself did not prohibit people from visiting graves in his lifetime or kissing the 
scared black stone hajarul aswad, in the Ka’ba (Yusuf 2014). The curator then 
recited a hadith of the Prophet Muhammad that says, “He who visits my grave 
will be entitled to my intercession” (Yusuf 2014). Our conversation ended, when 
Yusuf said to me, “scared memorial is where the living and the dead encounter 
207 
 
each other every day, and it helps keep a person humble and balanced.” I 
thought about his statement for a long time on that day, after the silent pause, 
I asked Sayyid Yusuf if he could tell me about the history of Ziyarat-e Sakhi. 
 
B. A Glance at Ziyarat-e Sakhi 
  If Najaf is the famed site of Ali ibn Abi Talib’s mausoleum, then why is 
the shrine-mosque complex in Kabul referred to as Ziyarat-e Sakhi?  This 
subsection traces the creation, evolution, and function of Ziyarat-e Sakhi based 
on my conversation with Sayyid Yusuf. The origin of Ziyarat Sakhi is associated 
with the Prophet Muhammad’s Kherqa Sharif. Kherqa is a cloak that is believed 
to have been sewn by the Ahl al-Bayt, and worn by him toward the latter years 
of his life. Muhammad made a will, wasiya, to Ali and Omar to give his Kherqa 
as a gift to Weiss Qarni (Shahrani E. 2001). Weiss Qarni who had converted to 
Islam without ever being in Muhammad’s presence. After the Prophet died, his 
companions gave the cloak to Weiss, who guarded the sacred cloak diligently. 
After Weiss died, the cloak was transferred from Yemen to Cave of Hira in Hejaz 
until the Abbasid Caliph moved it to Baghdad. The Prophet’s cloak remained in 
Baghdad until the defeat and capture of Sultan Yildrim (Referring to Bayazid 
bin Sultan Qara-Usmanlu) by Timur in the Battle of Ankara in 1402.  
  Timur became the cloaks protector after his campagains in the Levant in 
1401-02. Timur took the sacred cloak and brought it back with him to the seat 
of his power in Samarqand, where it remained for years (Yusuf 2014). Some of 
the later power-holders attempted to relocate it to Delhi for their own personal 
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motivations, but it remained in Samarqand by the orders of Governor of Balkh. 
In 1691, the Kherqa was transferred to Badakhshan (Shahrani E. 2001). The 
Governor of Balkh built a sanctuary in Juzgon, where following sentence was 
etched, “Sunday 24 Muharram al Haram 1109 Hijri Qamari [August 11, 1697], 
because of the blessings of this noble cloak, Juzgon is renamed to Fayzabad” 
(Yusuf 2014). Fayzabad means the Blessed Bode. The Prophet’s cloak stayed in 
Fayzabad until mid-18th century, when Ahmad Khan Abdali the founder of the 
Durrani Dynasty relocated to Qandahar via the Kabul route (Yusuf 2014). 
   Ahmad Shah decided to relocate the Prophet’s cloak from Fayzabad to 
Qandahar for the purposes of deepening his political legitimacy. He appointed 
Shah Wali Khan, Etimad ul-Dawlat, along with a unit of Qizilbash cavalry with 
the task of relocation. On their way back from Fayzabad, Shah Wali placed the 
Prophet’s cloak in an unsoiled and non-residential district of Kabul for the 
residents of that city to come and see it in person. After two consecutive busy 
days, in the third night, Shah Wali Khan and the Qizilbash saw a charismatic 
person who was wearing green attire and praying next to the cloak in their 
dream. After the prayer, the person in the green attire took his sword out from 
its sheath and placed it on top of a rock that is now located behind the main 
structure. It was obvious from the spilt tip of his sword that the person in their 
dream was Ali ibn Abi Talib. Shah Wali Khan and the Qizilbash told about their 
dream to Ahmad Shah. He ordered those responsible for the relocation of the 
cloak to construct a mausoleum there. Shah Wali Khan raised a banner at the 
spot they saw Ali pray, which is now at the central court of this shrine complex 
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to mark it as a nazargah of Ali. After that night, the carriers of cloak noticed 
that the rock on which the Commander of the Faithful had placed his sword 
had cracked in the middle. Since that day, the rock has been called Sang-e 
Zulfiqar. The cloak remained in the newly built dome for eight months before it 
was transferred to Qandahar (Yusuf 2014). 
Figure 15. Ziarat Sakhi Single Dome 
 
   
  Amanullah Khan’s mother, Hayat Begum, made a vow on the eve of the 
Third Anglo-Afghan War, 1919. If Afghanistan was victorious, she would build 
a second dome and renovate the entire interior and exterior of Ziyarat-e Sakhi. 
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After Afghanistan’s victory, the Qizilbash residents of Chindawol received an 
official approval from Amanullah to bury their loved ones near this complex 
(Afshar 2014). The approval was given for several reasons. 1) Amanullah Khan 
wanted to end the anti-Shi’a stance of his two predecessors. 2) Amanullah 
wanted the Constitutionalists mashruta khawan some of them who were Ithna 
Ashari Shi’as on his side. 3) He wanted the children of Qizilbash bureaucrats 
and officials to be trained and inculcated as parts of the new cadre of civil 
servants and professional that the state needed. 4) Amanullah wanted to give 
some land back for the Qizilbash lands and burial places that were taken for 
the urbanization expansion of Kabul.   
Figure 16. Ziarat Sakhi Double Dome 
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  Despite Hayat Begum’s expansions, Ziyarat-e Sakhi’s courtyard remained 
small until the liberal Premiership of Shah Mahmud Khan, 1946-53. Ayatollah 
Hojat discussed this issue with Zahir Shah. With the monetary contributions of 
the Qizilbash Shi’as, Hojat purchased about 10,000 square meter of land in the 
vicinity of Ziyarat-e Sakhi. In the newly purchased lands, the shrine’s courtyard 
was expanded and the Mosque of Al-Ali that can hold up to 1,000 people was 
built (Hojat 2003). In the expanded courtyard, the arrival of Persian New Year, 
Nowruz, which corresponds with the spring equinox on March 20, is annually 
celebrated on a grander scale. On Nowruz, a special characteristic is the ritual 
of raising the banner jindah that is symbolic of Ali’s banner. The main emblem 
on the banner is the word taiyba, Army of the Righteous. Since Ali had always 
been the defender and flag bearer of Islam, this banner is raised in his honor. 
While the banner is being raised, people harmoniously chant, “Ya Ali Madad, 
Ya Ali Madad.” This ritual from the very beginning of Ziarat-e Sakhi has been 
conducted every year with the volunteer help of Kabul residents. At this ritual, 
thousands of Sunnis, Shi’as, and state dignitaries participate. At the beginning 
of the ritual, some Qur’anic verses are recited. Afterward, a number of Sunni 
and Shi’a Fuqaha give talks about the arrival of Nowruz and the remembrance 
of Ali’s heroic life. State dignitaries usually take this opportunity to underline 
national unity and prosperity. 
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Figure 17. Ziarat Sakhi Court Yard Banner 
 
   
  Below is the calendar of events in Ziyarat-e Sakhi. The events are divided 
into three categories: days of celebration, remembrance, and mourning. Shi’as 
observes these days. 
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Table 9. Shi’a Holidays, Celebrations, and Remembrances 
Event Explain Date 
Eid Fitr Marks the end of fasting during the month of 
Ramadan 
Shawwal 1 
Eid al-Adha Marks the end of the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca Dhu al-Hijjah 
10 
Eid al-Ghadir Marks the anniversary of the Ghadir Khum, 
when Muhammad announced Ali's Imamate 
Dhu al-Hijjah 
18 
Laylat al-Qadr Anniversary of Qur’an’s revelation   
Mawlid Muhammad's birth date. Unlike Sunni Muslims, 
who celebrate the 12th of Rabi' al-awwal as 
Muhammad's birthday or death-day. Shias 
celebrate Muhammad's birthday on the 17th of 
the month 
Rabi’ al-awwal 
17 
Ali Birthday Rajab 13 
Fatima Birthday Jumada al-
Thani 20 
Ashura Commemoration of Husayn ibn Ali's martyrdom Muharram 10 
Sham-e Ghariba Evening of Ashura Muharram 10 
Arba’een Commemorates the suffering of the women and 
children of Husayn ibn Ali's household. 
Safar 20 
Mahdi Birth date of the 12th and final Twelver Imam, 
Muhammad al-Mahdi 
Sha'aban 15 
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CONCLUSION 
 
“The Qizilbash are a classic example of a cohesive group tossed about by history 
and split among several nations, losing their cohesion and influence but neve 
their ethnic pride – in spite of the fact that many must practice taqiyya in order to 
survive.” 
         ~ Dupree, “Qizilbash” in Muslim People: A World Ethnography Survey, 1984 
 
 
 
 
  The major findings of this multisited study on the Qizilbash of Kabul are 
as follows. First, the effective utility and application of ethnohistorical method 
for minorities such as Qizilbash. Second, the Qizilbash writers and intellectuals 
in Kabul agree that Qizilbash is a Turkic compound word, which initially meant 
those wearing a distinctive crimson headgear. The Ottomans used this marker 
in a disparaging way toward the seminomadic Turkmen tribes (Aq Qoyunlu and 
Qara Qoyunlu) who steadily became dedicated murids of the Safavi Sufi Order. 
The Qizilbash constituted the military bloc of the Safavi Sufi Order, and helped 
Shah Ismael institute the Ithna Ashari form of Shi’a denomination in Persia in 
1501.  
  During the Safavid Empire, 1501-1722, the Qizilbash (Turk) merged and 
intermarried with Persian, Kurdish, and to a lesser extent with principal Shi’a 
academic families from Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon who built the Shi’a 
religious institutions in Persia and started to take part in the Safavid state 
affairs. At the same time, Safavid Shahs enacted wide-ranging reforms to 
consolidate and to expand their power by lessening the military muscle and 
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communal cohesion of the Qizilbash. The land grant initiative of the Safavids 
caused the semi-nomadic Qizilbash to become sedentary. Shah Tahmasp 
ordered the massacre of the Tekelu tribe on account of their irreligion ilhad 
who openly declared him the Mahdi. The institutionalization of the Ithna Ashari 
Shi’a denomination led to persecution, exile, and transformation of the Sufi 
religious identity. By end of the Safavid period, Qizilbash were mostly located in 
the main urban centers of the polity or concentrated in frontier forts across the 
Iranian Plateau as key border protectors.  
  Third, my primary source findings suggest the Qizilbash migration to 
Kabul predates Nadir Shah’s India expedition in 1739. The Qizilbash arrived to 
Kabul in successive waves that extend back to the early 16th century. A unit of 
Safavid forces (Baharlu tribe) arrived in the mountainous frontier city of Kabul 
with Babur, founder of the Mughal Dynasty in 1504. After the construction of 
Kabul as Mughal’s winter capital, more Qizilbash cavalrymen and officeholders 
arrived when Humayun with the assistance of Tahmasp’s Qizilbash forces, who 
were under the command of Bayram Beg (later Khan who enthroned Akbar the 
Great as Shahanshah) and nobles, reinstated the Mughal power in 1554. In the 
same year, Humayun’s son Mirza Muhammad Hakim became the Governor of 
Kabul province. Kabul stayed in the hands of the Mughals until Nadir Afshars 
reign. Another wave of Qizilbash arrival took place in 1738, when Nadir Afshar 
positioned his logistical base in Chindawol rearguard. Nadir Shah ordered part 
of his Qizilbash units to avoid a blindside attack by the Baluch or the Ghilzai, 
maintain order, and collect taxes from residents of Kabul.   
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  Primary sources further reveal that after Nadir’s assassination in 1747, 
additional Qizilbash cavalry and officials relocated to Qandahar. The Qizilbash 
of Qandahar supplied steadfast security, especially against the rival Pashtun 
tribes, and filled key posts within the fledgling court of Ahmad Shah Abdali, the 
founder of the Durranid Empire, 1747-1823. Ahmad Shah also reached an 
agreement with the Qizilbash of Kabul. The last Qizilbash migration to Kabul 
occurred when Timur Shah, Ahmad’s son, relocated the imperial capital from 
Qandahar in 1773-75. While in Kabul, Timur Shah offered plots of land to the 
Qizilbash royalgaurds and court officials to further cement their loyalty. The 
new settlement, located on the north side of Kabul River, near the Chindawol 
district, became known as Murad Khani.  
  The Qizilbash remained a vital part of the Durranid Empire up until the 
Succession Crisis between Timur’s sons and the rival Barakzai Pashtuns in 
1793. When tensions between Fath Ali Shah Qajar and Zaman Shah escalated 
over Herat in 1798, the Qizilbash of Kabul supported the Durranids because of 
their mutual material interest in the survival of the polity. However, because of 
their origin in Persia and religious relations with Shi’a Islam the anti-Durranid 
factions in the Kabul Riots of 1803-04 looted and damaged their properties. 
The inter-Pashtun dynastic rivalry badal resulted in the loss of key territories 
to the expanding British and Russian powers, including access to the Indian 
Ocean (1813-1907, the “Great Game”). 
  The Succession Crisis finally resulted in a dynastic shift from the Abdali 
branch of the Pashtun confederacy to the Barakzai, 1826. The Barakzai ruler, 
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Dost Muhammad Khan (1829-39, 1845-63) was not able to entirely end the 
domestic inter-Pashtun antagonism. In his first tenure, Dost depended on local 
strongmen to avoid further fragmentation of the polity. This policy caused the 
power of the monarchy to become relatively decentralized and prone to colonial 
intervention. The fear of a Napoleon-Qajar pact or a Russian expedition toward 
Delhi enticed the British to enthrone Shah Shuja, a friendly monarch in Kabul. 
This action led to the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1838-42. It had a devastating 
economic effect on Kabul’s Qizilbash and non-Qizilbash residents. British 
armies burnt Char Chattah (the main financial bazaar of the city) and Shirpur 
Project (the new administrative capital), which led to years of socioeconomic 
stagnation until Amir Shir Ali Khan’s reforms, 1863-79. Shir Ali’s 
modernization projects coincided with the rise of Tories to power in London. 
Tories started the tactical “Forward Policy,” which aimed to establish a 
permanent British establishment in Kabul to prevent any Soviet expansion. 
This preemptive move led to another costly war for the Qizilbash residents of 
Kabul – the Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-80.   
  Within few years after the war, the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission 
delineated the Barakzai polity’s internationally recognized borders in 1886. The 
new state of Afghanistan became a “buffer state” under British protection until 
1919. The Delhi-based British Governor-General managed the external political 
and commercial affairs of the state. British officers facilitated the coronation of 
a Barakzai prince, Amir Abdurrahman Khan, and rewarded him for accepting 
the controversial Gandomak Treaty of 1878 and the Durand Line of 1893. He 
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then used the subsidized cash and weapons provided to him by the British-Raj 
to centralize his power and rule Afghanistan with an “Iron Fist.” Abdurrahman 
quieted his real and imagined political rivals in a brutal manner. His political 
advice to his successors is compiled in an autobiographical publication (1886) 
in titled, Pandnama Dunya wa Din (Book of Advice on the World and Religion). 
This book had a lasting impact on the political culture of the new state. Based 
on my interviews, his shortsighted policies sowed the seeds of ethno-religious 
strife for generations to come. The period 1883 to 1946 was an era of intense 
taqiyyah dissimulation and economic difficulties for the Qizilbash (except for 
Amanullah’s reign, 1919-29). 
  My next crucial finding is that Abdurrahman killed or exiled the 
Qizilbash military elites who were supporters of his predecessor and rival, Amir 
Shir Ali Khan. Shir Ali had exiled Abdurrahman Khan to Bukhara. The 
elimination of Qizilbash military elites was decisive in the collapse of the 
Qizilbash as a main military force. In 1883, Abdurrahman Khan declared the 
Shi’as of Afghanistan “infidels” and “enemies of the state” for their refusal to 
pay hefty taxes for his domestic war campaigns. He claimed to have been God’s 
Shadow on Earth as he implemented his “policy of pacification” to enslave the 
Shi’as and subjugate them after the First Chindawol Uprising 1883. His son, 
Habibullah, succeeded him peacefully in 1901. Habibullah relaxed 
Abdurrahman’s anti-Shi’a policies, reformed his notorious intelligence network, 
and dismantled the underground Siah-Chah dungeons, as the interrelated 
concepts of Afghan nationalism and Constitutional Movement mashruta 
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khahan picked up steam in Kabul.   
  After the War of Independence in 1919, Amanullah Khan who was under 
the influence of nationalists (Mahmud Tarzi) and constitutionalists launched a 
rapid modernization program to bring a degree of progress in the country after 
four decades of isolationism. Unlike Abdurrahman, he did not claim to be the 
divine protector and propagator of Sunni Islam. He made official visits to Takia-
Khana Mir Akbar Agha and Faqir Husayn in Chindawol to bridge the gap with 
the Qizilbash. Amanullah aligned himself with the growing urban nationalists 
until a progressive constitution nezamnama-i asasi was ratified in 1923. The 
constitution’s principle of equal rights ended the legal ban on public Shi’a 
commemorations. Amanullah’s government opened modern schools, and sent 
many students (boys and girls) abroad for education. The Qizilbash youth took 
advantage of his education reforms. In 1928, Ayatollah Hojat, a Shi’a scholar, 
returned to Chindawol from Najaf. The modernization period, however, did not 
last long because the lives of ordinary citizens in rural areas did not experience 
any significant progress. The social conservatives that the British supported 
eventually ousted Amanullah in 1929.  
  Many Qizilbash elders belief the British-Raj opposed Amanullah in part 
because Afghanistan turned into an independent and self-reliant modern-state 
with zero budget deficit. Afghanistan could have become a successful model for 
other colonies and protectorate states in Africa and Asia. This development was 
dangerous for the British Crown since it disproved the Victorian conception of 
social evolution or civilizational hierarchy, popularized by Kipling’s White Man’s 
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Burden in 1899. Amanullah’s warm ties with Vladimir Lenin and the Bolshevik 
revolutionaries was not something the British-Raj favored. The Amani era was 
another critical missed opportunity for equitable political modernization. 
  The overthrow of Amanullah Khan by the counter-reformation forces of 
Habibullah Kalakani plunged the country into a Civil War, 1929. The Qizilbash 
initially refused to pay allegiance to Kalakani. Abdul Razzaq raised a flag with 
Amanullah’s emblem with the help of 400 residents of Kabul, but Kalakani had 
him hanged and issued an anti-Shi’a fatwa that resulted in Kalakani attacking 
Chindawol. Reza Shah sent an Iranian mission to aid the Shi’as of Kabul after 
Kalakani’s men looted Qizilbash homes, shops, and raped women. This awful 
event created a backlash by the Hazaras. To prevent the situation from turning 
into a sectarian war, the Qizilbash elders of Kabul finally paid their allegiance 
to Kalakani. Soon after, Kalakani sent Faiz Muhammad Katib, Nur al-din Agha 
Jawanshir (a Qizilbash from Kabul), and some Qizilbash elders to Bamiyan to 
negotiate with the anti-Kalakani Hazaras. At the same time, to heal the wounds 
of the Qizilbash in Kabul, Kalakani quickly appointed Kaka Muhsin Qizilbash 
as Governor of Hazarajat and Mirza Mujtaba Khan as Minister of Finance. In 
spite of these measures, Kalakani restored the authoritarian political culture in 
Kabul by weakening the nationalists and constitutionalists. Kalakani sought a 
docile society that did not reward institutionalization or allow men and women 
to participate in a representative form of government. 
  The Civil War concluded when Nadir Khan defeated Habibullah Kalakani. 
Afghanistan came to be ruled by another branch of the Barakzais, this time the 
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Muhammadzais, who established the last Afghan monarchy, the Musahiban 
Dynasty, 1929-78. Similar to Abdurrahman, Nadir Khan ascended the throne 
with the help of the British. Nadir’s Ten Point Guideline overturned Kalakani’s 
conservatism, but set the country on a trajectory of selective modernization for 
decades to come. He constructed state authority through custom and tradition 
of the state elites, which kept regular individuals away from the enlightenment 
values. Nadir Khan had a complex relationship with the Qizilbash. To avoid a 
pro-Amanullah takeover, Nadir and his successor, Hashim Khan, did not allow 
the Qizilbash to hold positions of power in the Ministries of Defense, Interior, or 
Foreign Affairs. Shi’a students were not allowed to study past sixth grade, and 
not allowed to enroll in Kabul University. Nadir’s constitution did not advance 
the legal or the socio-economic standing of the Qizilbash. A dire situation for all 
the Shi’as that lasted until the end of the Second World War.  
  After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union became more 
and more involved in Afghanistan. The mixture of external financial help and 
domestic pressure (Hizb-e Irshad 1946, Hizb-e Watan 1950, and the Awakened 
Youth Movement that started in Kabul University also in 1950) led to an era of 
relative stability, which lasted until 1978. In early 1950s, Shah Mahmud Khan 
reformed Nadir’s conservative policies and isolationist posture. The Qizilbash 
youth were amongst the leading beneficiaries of Shah Mahmud’s reforms. The 
subsidized university education produced a new urban middle class. The state 
provided the new Qizilbash professionals with jobs, mobility, and security in 
hopes of political quiescence. At the same time, Afghanistan’s post-WWII liberal 
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autocracy created a patronage system that turned professionals, intellectuals, 
and entrepreneurs into semi-depoliticized dependents. Personal ties, Waseta 
bazi, and not democratic forms of civic engagement to build trust between state 
and Shi’as remained the norm until Dr. Muhammad Yusuf’s Constitution in 
1964.  
  The Qizilbash professional class consisted of white-collar civil servants, 
physicians, engineers, teachers, nurses, and other educated specialists that 
filled the society’s basic needs. Professions that the state considered apolitical. 
The middle class struggled to rectify the enormous economic disparity that had 
developed between the elites and themselves. Some of the more affluent middle 
class families were able to send their children abroad for advanced training and 
education. The above social class was also receptive to exogamy as they moved 
out of their ancestral neighborhoods. Another layer of complication was added 
to the Musahiban -Qizilbash relations when ancestral Qizilbash neighborhoods 
became zones of mandatory relocation for Kabul’s urbanization. The expansion 
of the city broke down the spatial solidarity of the Qizilbash. The relocation led 
to a split between the new middle class and the untrained urban workers who 
remained in the older areas. The latter group, mostly traders and merchants, 
forged closer ties with the Shi’a clerics.  
  In conclusion, on the eve of the Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
coup in 1978, the Shi’a Qizilbash identity had remained one distinctive aspect 
of individual and communal identity among the Qizilbash residents. A singular 
aspect among many new identity markers. The manifestation of identity politics 
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is an anthropological phenomenon that ebbs and flows with political breezes in 
Kabul. Lastly, the Qizilbash perspective of state-formation helps us understand 
Afghanistan’s previous political culture and its legacies. Legacies that are at 
the heart of the recent rise of identity politics. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
A 
 
Abdal - Class of saints, rare, noble, righteous, and pious people  
Abed - Devout 
Adam Forosh - Seller of men. Qizilbash revile the Uzbeks for this practice and 
apply to them with great disgust the appellation  
Adl – justice, social justice 
Afwaj (singular Fawj) – Main pillar of the cavalry 
Ahd - Vow 
Ali Mardan Khan - A Persian nobleman, who built monuments and 
magnificent gardens in the area from Mashhad to Delhi  
Ajaq-zah - Children of the Safavid dynasty 
Al-Tashayo – The Shi’a, used when people do not want to reveal their sectarian 
identity 
Akhtarmah - Booty, war spoil 
Ashklik  - Wooden pipe placed through finger and pushed on to cause pain  
Alga - Property, land or area of commonage that government used it to settle a 
tribe  
Arkan-e Dawlat – State officials 
Amir al-Umara – Chief army commander 
Amir Sanjagh - The brigade commander  
Arba’een – Or the 40th day. Shi’a religious observance that occurs 40 days 
after Ashura 
Arg – Royal palace 
Asaker-e Monazam – Regular Qizilbash cavalry 
Ashura – An Islamic holiday that observed on the 10th day of month of 
Muharram. Among Shi’as, it commemorates the death of Imam Husayn 
Ayshyk Agassi Bashi - Head of the interior court and harem.  
Azoqa – Food 
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B 
Baad-pa - Fast horse 
Bai’ah - Allegiance 
Balla Hissar - A formidable fortress and spacious castle on the foothills of Shir 
Darwaza Mountain in Kabul the occasional residence of the Shah and where 
some nobility lived. It is only located in the west side of the Kabul River, from 
one side offers a panoramic view of the city, has some splendid halls, and 
pleasant gardens. It is now much neglected and discloses signs of decay.  
Bar Salar - Head of the caravan or convoy 
Batil - Falsehood 
Baihaq - Old name of Sabzevar 
Bazaz - Cloth-dealer, draper 
 
C 
 
Cartel - An invitation to war 
Charkhchi – Skilled archers in front of the legion as part of the warders   
Chindawol – Rear-guard, camp follower 
Chindawol Kohan – Ancient Chindawol, name of a local newspaper publication 
Cudkhuda - A townsmen chief who manages all transaction between the trade 
and the government. Had no power, but what he derives from the Shah, which 
is mostly concerned with the collection of the revenues and the calling out of 
the militia. He has enough weight to determine trifling disputes, but all-
important matters are referred to the Governor or to Qazi 
  
D 
 
Dabir - Secretary, clerk 
Dasta Saf Shekan – Special Forces 
Da’wa – Invitation 
Dawlat Melli – Nation Unity Government 
Dhikr (Zikr) - Remembrance 
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Diwan - Court, or the sum of the lyrics  
Diwan Begi - Title of administrative position equivalent to chief justice of the 
Safavids  
Dostaqchi - Warder 
Dorbash - Front and escort officers 
 
F 
 
Fakhr al-nisa - Queen 
Fanous - Lighthouse, a light place that holds candle 
Farash – Porter, servant, valet 
Farman – Royal decree, edict  
Farsang – Older unit of distance in Persia that equates to 3.5 miles 
Fatha-nama – Victory proclamation 
Fatwa – Religious decree or ruling made by a scholar 
Fiqh - Jurisprudence 
Fitna – Civil Strife 
 
G 
 
Gazargah - Place to wash, laundry   
Gazmah – Watchman, warder 
Ghazal – Rhythmic poem sharing the same meter 
Ghazi – Warrior 
Ghomrog – Customhouse  
Ghozar – Small commercial area 
Ghulu - Extremism 
 
H 
 
Halva – A popular sweet food in the wider Middle East 
Hanafi – The dominant Sunni denomination of Islam in Afghanistan 
Haqq - Truth 
Hayzat – Honor, prestige  
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Hesab-dan - Accountant 
Hamam - Public baths with rooms heated to different temperatures and in the 
hottest, the bather is scrubbed until every particle of dirt and death skin tissue 
is cleared off his skin  
Hindu - Represents themselves to be emigrant from India. The prohibition 
against taking interest makes most of the business of banking fall into the 
hands of the Hindus. They are often employed about the court in offices 
connected with money or accounts. The duty of steward and treasurer is 
exercised either by a Hindu or by a Persian.  
Hujum - Purge 
 
I 
 
Ilham – Inspiration 
Iklas – Sincere loyalty 
Insaf - Fairness 
Ithna Ashari – Twelver denomination of Shi’a Islam 
 
J 
Jabba Dar-bashy - Commander of cache of weapons 
Jabba Khana - Cache of weapons 
Jafari - Dominanat form of Shi’a Islam in Afghanistan 
Jarchi – Shouter, trumpeter, herald 
Javanmardi - Chivalry 
Jirga - The hunting grounds were surrounded for royal hunting, also an 
assembly. Afghan tribal council 
Junbish - Movement 
 
K 
 
Kalamraw-i Qizilbash – Qizilbash realm 
Kashknjyr- Stone castle with a catapult to throw 
Katib - Scribe 
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KhaD – PDPAs State Intelligence Agency 
Khalifat al-Khulafa – Person in charge of overseeing Sufi affairs 
Khan - Chief of the ulus. He is always chosen from the older family of the Ulus. 
In most cases, the selection rests with the Shah, who can remove a Khan at 
pleasure, appointing one of his relatives in his place. In some cases, the people 
elect the Khan. In both cases, some attention is paid to primogeniture, but 
more to age, experience, and character. In tribes that are obedient to the Shah, 
the Khan derives much influence from his employment of collecting the royal 
revenue and raising the militia, and indirectly, from the emoluments attached 
to those duties. The position of wealth, by enabling him to keep numerous 
retainers and to confer obligation on the heads of his Ulus, greatly strengthens 
his power. The fighting men receive no pay, but in some tribes, if a horse is 
killed, the owner receives the price form a fund formed by fines, and by a tax 
on the tribe. The Khan does not tax the Ulus for his own benefit and the Khan 
appropriates the customs collected on merchandise passing through the land 
of the Ulus 
Khanate - Commercial caravanserais in the city, which was a separate market 
Khanawada – family, household institution 
Khaqan - King and the title of Shah Ismael 
Khassa – Crown 
Khata’i - Sinner 
Khavari – Referred to Shi’a people who migrated from Afghanistan to Iran 
Kherqa - Some clothes or garment to the consecration of the Sufi masters to 
disciples after the conduct covered 
Khotbah – Religious sermon 
Khulafa – Qizilbash missionaries  
Kishikchi - Watchmen who are posted on different guards in the town under 
the supervision of the Mirshab 
Kitabdar – Scrivener 
Kocha – Small street 
Kolah-e Fakhr – Nobility hat   
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Kotaval - Keeper of the fort 
 
L 
 
Lala Bashi – A guardian, trainer, or teacher of young boys 
Loya Jirga – Grand Afghan tribal assembly 
Lungi - Turban 
 
M 
 
Madh’hab – An Islamic school of law  
Mahalla – Neighborhood 
Majlis – Advisory council  
Manjaniq - Catapult used to throw stones or fireballs 
Manqabat Khani – Recitation of elegiac poems 
Mansabdar - Person with a ranking post or office mansab 
Mamalik - Provinces 
Mashk – Large leather water sacks 
Maslak - Occupation 
Mir Miran - Title given to the prominent division leaders of the military  
Mirza – Nobleman, royal prince 
Modaris - A Mullah selected for his learning to instruct students at the royal 
mosque 
Mohtasib – An officer whose duty it is to superintend the public morals. He 
enforces the regular performance of prayer and it is considered impious to 
refuse to conform to the Sharia. It is enforced by the municipal law, who 
punished the omission of it or the breach of any other religious precept. The 
police of the towns in managed under the Sirdar by the Mirshab, the Mohtasib, 
and the Darogha-i Adawlat (supervisor who fixes the prices) of the Bazaars  
Mostofi – State accountant 
Motassadi – Fiscal officer  
Mufti - Give their religious law opinion supported by quotations from books of 
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authority 
Mullah - Are generally restrained to censuring the more important breaches of 
religion and morality, and, in many parts, they have no power at all. Mullahs 
do not hold offices; have pensions from the Shah or lands assigned to them by 
the crown or by the charity of individuals. Mullahs are numerous and are 
found in every rank, from the chief courtiers and minister to the lowest class in 
the poorest and wildest tribes. When mentioned as a body, they are usually 
called the Ulema or learned. Mullahs preach an austere life. There are no 
corporate bodies of Mullah and they are not under command of any chief or 
subject to any particular clergy  
Munshi Bashi - Head Secretary (write and read letters to dignitaries with 
striking distinctness and elegance  
Munshi Mamalik - Secretary, chronicler of events 
Murid – Devout Sufi follower 
Murshid - Sheikh, guide of the straight path. Murshid-kol, refers to Shah 
Tahmasp 
Mushrif - An accountant, chief administrative or financial officer 
 
N 
 
Nan - Bread 
Nasaq – Order and arrangement  
Nasaqchy bashi - Head of the security and military responsible for order and 
arrangement 
Naqib - Head and a caretaker of a tribe  
Nayib – Deputy 
Nazargah – Sight of seeing, sacred place 
Nazer – Servant 
Nifaq – factionalism 
Nishan Zani – Target shooting 
Nowruz – Persian New Year that is also celebrated in Afghanistan 
Nubuwa - Prophethood 
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O 
 
Oymaq - Clan or tribe, also live in today’s western Afghanistan 
 
P 
 
Padar (brother) Kushi - fratricide 
Pa-kar - Unarmed trooper or a doer  
Paymaan – Oath 
Pir – Honorary title for Sufi spiritual guide 
PDPA – Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
 
Q 
 
Qabaq andaz – Derby 
Qala - Fort 
Qanon-mardan - Gentlemen agreement  
Qaravol - Sentinel, watchman, patrol, warder 
Qaravol-khana - Guard houses  
Qarvarahchi - Army unit to burn the castle 
Qasida – Long poem, heroic   
Qawm - Tribe 
Qazi - Appointed by the Shah at the recommendation of the Imam of the 
household, peeshnumauz. The usefulness of the Qazi’s courts is in a great 
measure destroyed by the corruption, which prevails in them, and in towns 
and their neighborhoods, just is further impeded by the power and influence of 
the great. Jirga, and when a crime is not acknowledged by the accused most 
frequently decide on acknowledged crimes, then it is referred to the Qazi. Qazi 
have deputies in all places except in areas that are in open rebellion. 
Qiyama - Eschatology  
Quli – Slave of   
Quli Aghassi Bashi - Head of the royal servants 
Quloq - Place of sowing materials  
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Qur - Shah’s troops with firearms  
Qurchi - Special agent for prevention and escort, praetorian  
Quriltary – Political and military council  
Qushun - Old word for army, corps, host, legion, troops, reinforcements 
 
R 
Rayhat - Subject 
 
S 
 
Sakhlo - Garrison, barracks, some local soldiers who are assigned to guard 
Saqa - End of the army 
Sardar – Commander-in-Chief, post 
Saraf – Person who exchanges money 
Saram - Monastery, place where the dervishes gather 
Savar - Cavalrymen 
Sayyid – Descendent of Prophet Muhammad 
Senf-e Payada – Irregular infantry 
Senor-namah - Sign contract over the delineation of the border 
Sepah – Armed forces 
Sepah Salar – Commander-in-Chief, Supreme Commander of Troops 
Sepoy - A guard of a few hundred, which mounts at the gate of the Haram. 
Volunteer cavalry for the British-Raj 
Shabband – A strap that ties the sword to the waist 
Shabgeyr - Depart after midnight 
Shahnamah Khans - People whose profession is to recite the epic or heroic 
poems of Ferdowsi with proper emphasis and action 
Shahsevan (Shahsamand) – Perso-Turkic imperial bodyguards 
Sham – Historic word for the Levant 
Sharaba - Tassels strings that hang from the side of the sword 
Shaykh – Person respected for his religious learning or piety 
Shelan – Royal feast 
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Shura Insejam Qizilbash Afghanistan – Afghanistan’s Qizilbash Solidarity 
Council 
Siyasat - Politics 
Soroon - Command to start a war 
Sorud Melli – National Anthem 
Subadar – Provincial Governor  
Sufigari – Sufi probity 
 
T 
 
Taifa - Subtribe 
Takia-Khana – Congregation or ritual hall for Shi’a people  
Takht-e Rawan - Horse wheel-carriage or palanquins. Not for ordinary people, 
the most common way of travelling for both sexes is on horseback. The Shah 
himself often travels on an elephant while the royal women often travel in 
palanquins. In a region, destitute of navigable rivers, and not suited to wheeled 
carriages, commerce is often carried on camels.  
Tarikh - History 
Tarikh-e Zinda – Oral Story 
Tariqa – Sufi order 
Tarkash - Bag in which to put arrows 
Tanooraha - Portable heaters and stoves 
Taqiyya – Reservation to reveal full identity, to dissimulate  
Tawhid – Monotheism 
Tayyal – Property, land or water that had lost its king to make use of revenue. 
Land grants 
Tayyal Dar – Administrator who deals with money and treasure 
Tazkira – State issued identification card 
Teer Andazi – Spear throwing 
Topchi – Artillery  
Tufangchi – Musketeer 
Tujjarat – Commerce, business 
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U 
 
Ulema - Religious scholars 
Ulus - Means clan and it is applied either to a whole tribe or to one of its 
independent branches. Internal government of the Ulus is carried on by the 
Khans and by assemblies, Jirga, of the heads of divisions. 
 
V 
 
Vadi – Valley between mountains 
Vazier Azam Sadr al-mamalk - Chief Minister, representative of provincial 
forces 
 
W 
 
Wafq – Endowment 
Wikalat – Vizierate  
 
Y 
 
Yak Toman Lashkar - Unit of ten thousand troops  
Yaml Basta - Troop lines of four by four 
Yasawal - Escort, vanguard, macebearer. A short heavy stick. Servant of the 
master.   
 
Z 
 
Zamburak - A small canon without wheel mounted on the camel 
Zarad-khana - Arsenal or armory 
Zarb-zadan - Type of equipment for piercing the walls of the castle 
Zabangeran - Spy 
Ziyarat - Shrine, a sacred or holy place 
Zoobeen - Short spear thrown at the enemy during battles 
Zulm – Oppression 
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APPENDIX 1  
 
1250s  Mongols destroy the Qanats and pasturelands in Kabul,  
causes depopulation 
 
1258    After the Mongol invasion, the Twelver Shi’as experienced  
    gradual ascendency on the Iranian Plateau during the reign  
    of Il-Khanids, 1256-1335 
 
13th Century  The phrase Qizilbash was first used by the Ottomans to  
denote a variety of groups that flourished in eastern Anatolia 
and Persia 
             
1334                    Safavid Sufi Order became an increasingly decisive political  
    force in the Turkmen Aq Qoyunlu Dynasty 1378-1501 
 
1386                    Timur relocated a large number of Turkmen from Anatolia to  
    the Iranian Plateau - Khorasan region 
 
1405 Timur dies, decline and eventual partition of the  Timurid   
Empire   
 
1405-1510    Rivalries among the Timurids. Decentralization and struggle 
with the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu Turkmen  
 
1405-1447           Timurids unable to extend power on permanent basis in  
    Anatolia despite a number of expeditions. Turkmen tribes of  
    Aq Qoyunlu moved from Anatolia and upper Mesopotamia  
    to Persia 
 
1458-1467            Persia remained divided between the Qara Qoyunlu and the  
    Timurids 
 
1461 Mirza Abu Sa’id (great-grandson of Timur) in control of most 
of territory that is now Afghanistan 
 
1467-1473            At the pinnacle of Aq Qoyunlu power, Uzun Hasan puts  
    Abu Sa’id of Timurids to death. His own son was killed in a  
    battle with the Ottomans 
 
1469-1502   Mirza Abu Sa’id appoints Mirza Ulugh Beg II (4th son) as  
        Governor in Kabul   
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1478-1503           Succession Crises in the Aq Qoyunlu Dynasty as the power  
    of the Safavid Sufi Order expands. The Twelver Shi’a  
    scholarship develops freely in Hilla (central Iraq) 
 
Mid-15th Century  Ardabil was epicenter of Safavid Sufi Order designed to keep  
    the leadership in close contact with its Qizilbash followers,  
    murids. The Safavid Sufi Network was managed through the  
    office of Khilafat al-Khulafa 
 
1480-1514           Phase One of the Ottoman Persecution of the Qizilbash, who  
    refused to pay taxes and accept the expanding control of the  
    Ottoman Dynasty 
           
1488                    Shaykh Hayder married the daughter of Uzun Hasan.  
    During Hayder’s rule, the Turkmen tribes adopted the   
    distinctive crimson headgear that became known as Taj  
    Hayderi. Hayder’s son, Ismael, mobilized murids of the Sufi  
    Order    
 
1494 Babur at age eleven inherits his father’s appanage at 
Ferghana, but challenged by his uncles Sultan Ahmad Mirza 
of Samarqand and Sultan Mahmud Khan of Tashkent 
 
1494-1505 Babur involved in wars and struggles, forms alliance with 
Shah Ismael Safavid. Ismael sends Qizilbash aid to Babur 
 
By end of 15th   Uzbeks under the leadership of Shaybani Khan, enter 
Central Asia from Dasht-i Qipchaq area, eyeing the rich 
province of Khorasan 
                
15th Century         Qizilbash Murids combined Sufism with a militant form of  
    Shi’ism, which gave birth to the Safavid State 
                                  
1501-1722           Rise and fall of the Safavid Empire 
 
1501                     The Qizilbash formed the backbone of Ismael’s military who  
    pronounced Twelver Shi’ism as the official religion in Persia.  
    This event marks a major turning point in history of Islam  
 
1501-1524           Shah Ismael invited Shi’a scholars from Bahrain, Lebanon  
    and Iraq (Hilla), who built religious institutions and started  
    to partake in state affairs. Shi’a institutionalization was  
    predicated on the removal of batil, fabrication, with haqq,  
    truth.  
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1501-1524   The urbanization of Qizilbash started under Shah Ismael 
 
1502 Ottoman Sultan, Bayazid II, relocated large number of Shi’as 
from eastern Anatolia to the Greek city of Morea to weaken 
the Qizilbash  
 
1504                  Shah Ismael’s missionaries, Naqibs, dispatched to Balkh and 
Bamiyan to  proselytize  
 
1504 Babur arrives in Kabul, which was under the rule of infant 
heir of Mirza Ulugh Beg II. This event restores the strategic 
significance of Kabul as a frontier military base. Kabul’s 
garrison served as an assembly point 
 
1508    Babur’s son, Humayun, is born in Kabul 
 
1509?   Powerful earthquake rattles Kabul, new structures built by   
    Babur 
 
1510           Safavid Conquest of Khorasan. Shah Ismael defeated  
    Shaybani Khan at the Battle of Marv. Herat becomes the  
    second largest city of the empire and seat of the heir- 
    apparent. The heir-apparent was placed under the tutelage  
    of Qizilbash Governor General, who in his capacity as lala  
     or atabeg, was responsible for his moral and physical welfare  
          
1511 Pro-Safavid uprising known as the Rebellion of Baba Shah 
Quli in Qaraman erupted against the Ottomans. Khilafat al-
Khulafa directed these anti-Ottoman activities 
 
1512   Sultan Selim I acceded the Ottoman throne and crushed the  
Qizilbash in central Anatolia to reestablish order. Qizilbash 
(40,000) were massacred while thousands were imprisoned 
and exiled 
 
1514  Ottomans defeated the Safavids at the Battle of Childiran. 
Shah Ismael retreated from extravagant claims. It was in this  
context that the Shi’a jurists began to shape the legitimacy  
of the State with an understanding of orthodox Shi’ism that   
eventually replaced the blend of Sufism and militant Shi’ism 
known as Qizilbashism   
 
1524 Qizilbash took advantage of Shah Tahmasp’s inexperience 
and assumed control of the State 
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1524-1533  Qizilbash rivalries for power led to a Civil War. Tahmasp 
ended the Civil War in 1534. Under Tahmasp’s reign, not all 
Qizilbash belonged to the Sufi Order 
 
1526                  Babur’s Conquest of India takes place with the help of   
Qizilbash  
 
1526 Babur in Delhi, the Lodi nobility lost the Delhi Sultanate to 
the Mughals. This loss disqualified the Lodi from future 
leadership over Afghans 
 
1530    Babur dies and his son Kamran Mirza inherits Kabul 
 
1531-1532          Shah Tahmasp ordered the massacre of the Tekelu Qizilbash  
    tribe because of their irreligion, ilhad  
 
1532-1555        Ottoman-Safavid War 
 
1540-55 While Humayun was in exile in Persia, his son, Akbar, was 
raised by Kamran. Akbar married Ruqiya Sultan Begum in 
Kabul 
                              
1548          Ottoman Fatwa of Abu Su’ud equated the Qizilbash with  
           apostates   
 
1554-1555          Tahmasp put down the heresy of a Sufi group who declared  
           him the Mahdi  
 
1554 Humayun with the support of Tahmasp’s Qizilbash forces, 
who were under the command of Bayram Beg (later Khan) 
and noblemen, restored the Mughal power in Delhi  
 
1554-85 Humayun’s son Mirza Muhammad Hakim becomes Governor 
of Kabul 
 
1555         The Treaty of Amsaya signed between Tahmasp and Ottoman  
           Sultan, Suleiman 
                               
1556 Akbar enthroned as Shahanshah, King of Kings, by Bayram 
Beg. Akbar relocates wife and her family from Kabul to Delhi  
 
1560s-84 Kabul under Mirza Muhammad Hakim becomes a 
Naqshbandi Sufi hotbed. Naqshbandi Sufis held some 
administrative positions and kept ties with rulers in Central 
Asia  
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1571         Ottomans exiled some Qizilbash to Hungary and Balkans  
 
1574                   Qizilbash Civil War allows Ottomans and Uzbeks to make  
           inroads in Persia   
              
1576-1577          Shah Ismael II clashes with the Qizilbash, who remained 
loyal to Khalifat al-Khulafa and to the Shi’a jurists from 
Jabal Amel  
  
1577-1587         Qizilbash factionalism continued and appeals were made on  
          Shah’s behalf to the Sufigar, Sufi probity 
 
1580-1590          Second Phase of Ottoman Persecution of the Qizilbash. The 
Qizilbash marriage contracts were not considered legal. Their  
repentance after captivity was not accepted. Ottomans seized   
the Qizilbash wives, children and property 
  
1581 Akbar seizes Kabul from his brother Mirza Muhammad 
Hakim, put his sister Bakht Nisa Begum in charge of Kabul, 
1581-85. Begum (women) and Nawab (men) upheld the 
sovereignty of the Mughal and the administration in Kabul 
 
1586 Akbar and Abdullah Khan Shaybani reached an agreement.  
Mughals would remain neutral in the Uzbek raids of 
Khorasan. Uzbeks would not support the Afghans to rise 
against the Mughals 
 
1588-1629         Shah Abbas enthroned with help of a Qizilbash Amir, Quli  
Khan Ustajlu. However, Abbas never trusted the Qizilbash 
Sufis. Status of Sufis continued to decline 
 
1588    Shah Abbas brings the Abdalis (founder of Afghanistan) into  
    political prominence  
 
1588                  Shah Abbas instituted a number of administrative reforms  
    to ensure the Safavid State 
                               
1590 Peace of Istanbul: Second phase of Qizilbash persecution  
ended. The more militant Qizilbash tribes had either been 
eliminated or migrated to Persia. People begin to give their 
land as endowment, Waqf, to the Shi’a jurists (Sayyids and 
Mujtahids) to avoid confiscation - Emergence of aristocratic 
jurist landowners 
 
1595 Mughals take Qandahar with the aid of two Safavid officials, 
Rustam Mirza (Safavid Prince) and Muzaffar Husayn 
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(Governor of Qandahar), who were unhappy with the reforms 
of Shah Abbas, which weakened the power of the Qizilbash 
 
By end of 16th   Qizilbash Confederacy was being deliberately broken up and 
relocated in strategic areas of the Safavid State  
 
End of the 16th     “The Great Flight.” Central Anatolia lost many inhabitants     
    except for Haji Bektash, whose settlement contained the  
    shrine of a saint that became the center of Shi’a teachings  
 
16th-17th           The importation of Shi’a theologians from Jabal Amal and  
    Hilla continues by the Safavid State 
 
1600 Without the Uzbek subsidies, Akbar able to subdue the last 
of the Afghan tribes 
 
1611 Jahangir marries Nur Jahan, widow of Ali Quli Beg Ustajlu,  
the “Lion Tosser,” who was then appointed as commander of 
the imperial guard at Bengal 
 
1612 Mumtaz, niece of Nur Jahan, comes from a Persian nobility 
family and marries Shah Jahan, who builds the Taj Mahal 
for her 
 
1614-15  Abbas put to death some Qizilbash (Sufis of Qara-jadagh) 
who had defected to the Ottomans. The charge was on the 
crime of na-sufigari, without loyalty and obedience to Shah 
 
1618                    Abbas was pleased that Abdalis supported his mission  in  
    Qandahar. Abbas bestowed on the Abdali leader the title of  
    Mir-i Afghanah and decreased taxes on their pastoral lands   
    and sedentary farms 
 
1623-39         Ottoman-Safavid War over control of Mesopotamia  
 
1627  Jahangir comes to Kabul to restore his health 
 
1629-42               Shah Safi, start of a philosophical renaissance, which  
    produced the tradition of ir’fan, gnostic philosophy. The  
    notion of high versus low Sufism 
 
1630          Economic stagnation, plague and famine 
 
1638          Safavids lost Baghdad to the Ottomans and Qandahar to the  
    Mughals. The Safavid Governor, Ali Mardan Khan, and his  
    7,000 Qizilbash cavalrymen defected from the Safavid to the  
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    Mughal side, fearing his execution by Shah Safi. Ali Mardan  
    Khan, was appointed as the Governor of Kabul  
 
1638 Shah Jahan’s son, Prince Murad Bakhsh, subedar of Balkh, 
marries Sakina Banu Begum, a Safavid princess 
 
1639                     Treaty of Qaṣr-e Shirin (or Treaty of Zuhab) ended 150 years  
    of intermittent warfare between the Ottomans and Safavids.  
     Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin established a border between the  
    two empires, virtually unchanged into modern times, and   
    Ottoman sovereignty was restored in Baghdad 
 
1640                     Mullah Sadra Shirazi, the master of the Illuminationism (or  
    Ishraqi) School of Philosophy said there is no difference  
    between the mosque and the Sufi tekke, congregation hall.  
    Sadra defended high Sufism and criticized low Sufism of  
    qalandars 
 
1641-52 In Kabul Ali Mardan Khan and his Qizilbash cavalry built 
the grand bazaar of Char Chatta  
 
1642-66   Shah Abbas II marks the apex of high Sufism. He built  
tekkes in Isfahan. Sufi masters were respected and favored  
by Abbas II, whose official historians called him Shah-e 
darvish dust, Sufi-loving Shah. Mullah Sadra’s attempt to 
unify high Sufism with Shi’ism brought down on them the 
wrath of Muhammad Taqi Majlisi, who ascended from the 
Safavid Shi’a hierocracy 
 
By mid-1640s      In Persia the Akhbari School becomes a distinct full-fledged  
    Shi’a trend that rejected the use of reasoning in deriving  
    verdict and considered only the Qur’an and the Hadith. It  
    was crystalized by Astarabadi and crushed by Behbahani  
 
1646 Shah Jahan assembled an army of 60,000 with field artillery 
under command of his son Prince Murad Bakhsh, who was 
ordered to restore Nazar Muhammad Khan as a tributary 
ruler or to annex the Khanate of Bukhara 
 
1647 Mughal-Uzbek Treaty led to the establishment of a border 
about 50 kilometers north of Kabul 
 
1648-53 Safavid-Mughal War over Qandahar: Shah Abbas II retook  
Qandahar. Abdalis and Ghilzais sided with the Safavid in 
wars against the Mughals. Qandahar stayed in hands of 
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Safavids until the Afghan Revolt, 1709  
 
1666-94       Clashes over ir’fan and Shi’a hierocracy in the Safavid State,  
    which enabled Uzbek to restart raids in Khorasan that added 
    to the economic decline in the region 
 
1677-98 Amin Khan, Governor of Kabul, married Sahibjan, daughter 
of Ali  Mardan Khan. A skilled diplomat who kept the Afghan 
tribal  frontier quite by paying subsidies  
 
1681-1707   Mughal-Maratha Wars 
 
1690                   Georgian and Afshar tribesmen formed the backbone of the 
    Safavid military against the Baluch and Ghilzai raiders.  
    Shah Alam, son of Aurangzeb and the Governor of Kabul,  
    tried to incite the Ghalzai tribe to rebel against Safavids   
 
1694-1722            The final triumph of Shi’a hierocracy came with the rise of  
    Shah Sultan Husayn, who was under the influence of rigid  
    Shi’a religious scholars. The persecution of Sufis was  
     instituted. Majlisi obtained a decree for exile of Sufis from  
    Isfahan 
 
1694-1726 A new threat to the Safavid State materialized in the eastern  
provinces as the Shi’a conversion of Sunnis intensified that 
sparked off a series of revolts  
 
1699        Aurangzeb sent an embassy to Isfahan to restate the Mughal   
    claim to Qandahar 
 
1700                    Possible for Shi’a jurists to denounce Sufism under the new  
     post of Mullah bashi 
 
1703   Baluch tribesmen ravaged Qandahar and forced the Safavids  
    to take refuge in the citadel. Baluch uprising held in check  
    with the appointment of Gorgin Khan  
 
1707-12 Bahadur Shah I changed the prayer call to the Shi’a version, 
which started the Khotbah controversy in the Mughal 
Empire. He was previously the Governor of Kabul, 1698-
1707 
  
1709-11               Afghan Revolt, Mir Wais killed the Safavid governor and led  
    expeditions against the Shi’a Hazaras  
 
1710s The Shi’a Sayyid Brothers become kingmakers, who chose 
264 
 
Muhammad Shah (4th son of Bahadur Shah), 1719-1748. A 
period of ill administration for the Mughal Empire 
 
1715       Ghilzai Conquest of Herat. Abbas Quli Khan, Governor of  
    Herat was in charge of the Qizilbash garrison  
 
1719        Mahmud Ghilzai in charge of Qandahar marched to Kerman  
 
1720      Ghilzai-Abdali Battle at Dilaram, Asadullah Khan, the  
    Abdali leader was slayed by Muhammad Zaman Khan, who  
    gained control of Abdali controlled areas  
 
1720                    Revolts in the Caucasus, Kurdistan, and Khuzestan regions  
    against the Shi’a conversion policies of Isfahan 
 
Early 1700s  Asr-e inhitat wa soqut, an era of civil decadence, and absence 
of centralized power, which allowed for the prominence of 
clerics. Shi’a and Sunni clerics declared each other as 
“heretics” to justify wars of expansion 
               
1722      Battle of Gulnabad, Mahmud met the Safavid army at  
         Gulnabad, east of Isfahan, and started the seven-month  
    Siege of Isfahan. By October, many inhabitants died of  
    disease and starvation  
 
1722 Shah Sultan Husayn surrendered and declared Mahmud as  
Shah of Persia 
 
1722 Ahmad Khan Abdali was born in Multan 
 
1725 Sultan Husayn and most Safavid princes were imprisoned  
and executed. Russian forces invaded northwestern part of 
the country and the Ottomans reached Hamadan and 
Kermanshah 
  
1722-25      Mahmud Ghilzai overthrown by nephew, Ashraf. Ashraf  
    gains the enmity of Qizilbash by slaughtering 3,000 of them  
    in Isfahan  
 
1725-29 Ashraf lost Qandahar 
 
1729      Nadir assembles an army and led the resistance with the aid   
  of Qizilbash amirs 
 
1729      Battle of Kafer Qala. Nadir Afshar retakes Herat 
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1729-47 Nadir restored political unity within the Afshar. Created a 
Ghilzai-Abdali alliance to have a Sunni battalion in his army 
 
1730   Reconquered western and northern Persia from Russians  
 
1732 Nadir’s victory over Abdali. Resettles 60,000 Abdalis in 
Mashhad, Nishapur, and Damagan. Nadir enlists Abdalis in 
his multiethnic army   
1732 Ahmad Khan and his older brother, Zulfiqar Khan, 
imprisoned by Husayn Khan Ghalzai, Governor of Qandahar 
 
1732-33   Nadir besieges Baghdad. Ottomans agreed to return to  
  Treaty of Zuhab (1639) frontier 
 
1736   Nadir held a Qurultai, Nadir declared as the first Shah of the  
  Afshar tribe of Qizilbash  
 
1737-38   Nadir Shah Besieges Qandahar. He accuses the Mughals of   
  aiding the Afghans 
 
1738 Nadir Shah captures Qandahar and frees Ahmad Khan and 
Zulfiqar Khan. Appoints Ahmad as Yasawal in army. Nadir 
leaves a Qizilbash unit in Qandahar 
 
1738-47   Ahmad involved in Nadir Shah’s campaigns 
  
1739 Battle of Karnal. Nadir Shah defeated the Mughals with his  
Georgian, Qizilbash, and Abdali troops. He did not attempt  
to remain in India, but the Indus River became the agreed 
border between the Mughals and the Afsharids. Nadir leaves 
Qizilbash units in Kabul 
 
1739 Nadir Shah made enormous demands for taxation, death  
penalty for those who did not pay. Nadir became autocratic 
as the power of the bureaucrats declined 
 
1740-57 A branch of the Afshar family originating from Khorasan was 
able to take control of the Bengal Province for production 
and control of tin that were used for weapons 
 
1740 After return from Delhi, Nadir’s military campaign to Central 
Asia led to taking of Balkh, Samarqand, Bukhara, and 
Khiva. He left the Khan of Bukhara as a subject ruler and 
annexed lands up to the Amu River  
 
1737-40 Nadir Shah leaves sizeable Qizilbash units in various 
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strategic cities and towns on his military campaigns to India 
and Central Asia for logistical and taxation purposes 
 
1741 Nadir made Mashhad his capital after campaigns of Mughal 
India and Central Asia  
 
1736-44   Nadir Shah occupies Oman and Bahrain 
 
Mid 1740s Nadir Shah became morose and suspicious and had many of 
his loyal Qizilbash followers executed at the slightest hint of 
opposition  
 
1747  Rival Qizilbash assassinated Nadir Shah. The Afsharid polity 
disintegrated into three parts.  
 
1747 Ahmad Khan returns from Mashhad to Qandahar. While in 
Qandahar, Ahmad captures a caravan headed from Delhi to 
Mashhad  
 
1747 Ahmad Khan Abdali crowned as Shah in Qandahar, which 
marks the emergence of pre-modern Afghanistan. Ahmad 
Shah strikes a deal with the Qizilbash in the eastern cities  
 
1747 Conquest of Kabul. Ahmad Shah reaches an agreement with 
the Qizilbash units in Kabul 
 
1747-1823   Rise and fall of the Durrani Dynasty  
 
1747-72 Ahmad Shah uses the administrative skills of the Qizilbash 
  
1747-53   Ahmad’s First-Third Punjab Campaigns 
 
1749   Mughal Emperor cedes west of the Indus River 
  
1750 Ahmad captures Herat from Shahrukh, Nadir’s son. Ahmad   
relocates about 12,000 people from Nishapur to Herat, where 
his son, Timur Khan, was the Governor   
 
1751-54 Ahmad Shah captures Nishapur and Mashhad. While he is 
in Nishapur, he relocates Abbas Quli Khan to Kabul. Abbas 
succeeded in arranging a marriage between Ahmad and his 
sister, as well as a marriage between the daughter of Ahmad 
and his eldest son  
 
1752 Ahmad Shah subdues area north of Hindu Kush. Treaty of 
Ahmadiya in Kashmir 
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1756-57   First Battle of Panipat. Ahmad Shah sacks Delhi and installs   
  Alamgir on the throne. Marries the daughter of Muhammad   
  Shah, the Mughal Emperor, and also arranges the marriage  
  of his son, Timur Khan 
 
1757-59 Shah Waliullah, a Muslim leader of India, appeals to Ahmad 
Shah for help against the Maratha Confederacy  
1757    Revolts in Qataghan and Badakhshan 
 
1760   Second Battle of Panipat for control of northern India 
 
1761 Third Battle of Panipat, decisive win for Ahmad against the 
Hindus, 12 km front 
 
1762   Sixth India Campaign, crashes the Sikhs 
 
1762   Ahmad Shah sends letter to the Ottoman Sultan Mustafa III 
 
1764 Seventh India Campaign, even outcome. Ahmad has disease 
on his face 
 
1766 Eighth India Campaign, Sepah-Salar Jahan Khan and 6,000 
soldiers killed at Amritsar 
 
1768 Afghan-Bukharin Treaty. Surrender of the Kherqa, Cloak of 
the Prophet by Mir Muhammad Murad Beg, Khan of Kunduz, 
to Ahmad Shah 
 
1772 Upon Ahmad Shah’s death, the Durrani chieftains’ only 
reluctantly accepted Timur’s accession. Timur Shah 
depended on the Qizilbash and created a force of Qizilbash 
cavalry to serve as his personal bodyguards   
 
1772-75 Timur Shah with the help of the Qizilbash move the capital 
from Qandahar to Kabul. Most of Timur’s reign was spent 
fighting civil wars and resisting rebellions 
 
1793    Timur’s fifth son (had 24) Zaman Shah, who was Governor of  
     Kabul, succeeds him 
 
1793 Zaman Shah eliminates Sardar Payinda Khan, son of Haji  
Jamal Barakzai. Zaman’s mother, Fatima Sultani Begum, 
plays a key role in his ascendency  
 
1793-1801 Zaman imprisoned many of his half-brothers. The quarrels 
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among brothers provided the pretext for colonial intrusion  
1799 Zaman Shah removes Barakzai leaders from power and 
replaces them men of his own lineage. He also executes the 
Chiefs of the Nurzai, Alizai, and Qizilbash in Qandahar for 
aiming to dethrone him. Payinda’s family escape to Persia 
 
1798-99   Change in Qizilbash-Durrani relationship 
 
1799-1849    Ranjit Singh, Governor of Punjab (Lahore), founder of Sikh   
    Empire 
 
1800-39 Royal Dualism and Badal, vendettas, conflicts and wars  
between Payinda Khan’s 23 sons, especially Fateh Khan 
(Barakzais) and Zaman Shah (Sadozais) 
 
1801 Zaman Shah is blinded and overthrown by Payinda’s sons 
who then place Shah Mahmud on the throne. Not the end of 
royal dualism rather the start of great violence 
  
1801-1978    Payinda’s sons dominate the political arena 
 
1801 British-Qajar Treaty, protect India from any Afghan or 
French threat. Treaty used terms such as “king of the 
Afghan,” “Afghan dominions” and “Afghan nation” 
 
1801 Shah Mahmud appoints Fateh Khan Barakzai (Payinda 
Khan’ son) as the Grand Vizier to alleviate the royal tension 
 
1803     Shah Shuja imprisons Shah Mahmud and takes power 
 
1804    Kabul Conflict – devastating riots against the Qizilbash as 
    Qajars claim Herat 
 
1807  With the help of an Uzbek mullah, Sufi Islam, and Head of 
the ulema of Herat, Haji Mullah Musa, Jihad was declared  
against the Qajars in Herat   
 
1808 Napoleon sends the French embassy of General Gardanne to 
the Qajar court. Napoleon is interested in weakening British 
in India with the help of the Qajars 
 
1809 The British sent Mountstuart Elphinstone to Shah Shuja in 
Peshawar. British East India Company also sent a mission to 
the Shah of Kabul. Treaty of Eternal Friendship was signed, 
which marks the entry of Kabul into Western politics and 
academic circles 
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1809 Treaty of Amritsar with the British. Shah Shuja agrees to a 
joint response in case of a Franco-Qajar aggression. British 
refers to Shuja as “Shah of Kabul”  
 
1809 Shah Mahmud defeats Shuja in Peshawar. Shuja escapes to 
Punjab and takes refuge with Ranjit Singh  
 
1809-18 Shah Mahmoud’s second reign. He alienates the Barakzais, 
especially Fateh Khan, the son of Payinda Khan, who was 
blinded. Fateh’s brother, Dost Muhammad Khan, later got 
revenge 
 
1813-1907  The “Great Game” starts with the Russo-Persian Treaty of 
Gulistan in 1813, and concludes with the Anglo-Russian 
Convention in 1907.  
The Second “Great Game” a less intensive phase followed the 
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, but it quickly diminished after 
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union became allies in 
the Second World War 
 
1815 Shah Mahmud creates a Silk industry in Kabul (shawls) once 
the silk trade revenues were lost to the Qajars 
 
1818-26  Royal Dualism continued in Kabul. Ahmad Shah’s polity 
fragmented into several independent polities each ruled by a 
different Durrani leader. Chaos reigned as sons of Payinda 
Khan struggled for supremacy 
 
1818-19 Intense Sunni-Shi’a enmity in Herat. Afghans tolerated the 
slave trade carried on in Khorasan by Turkmen. The Qajars 
attempted to retake the highlands from Afghans  
 
1819-23 Ayub Shah, another son of Timur Shah. Kashmir was lost  
 
1820s-30s  British industrial goods and commodities reaches Kabul via  
Bombay. Products were mainly luxury fabrics (velvets, satin, 
cotton) copperware, and cutlery 
 
1823 Fall of the Durrani Dynasty. The Barakzais ruled Kabul and 
Qandahar, while Herat and Balkh remained semi-dependent 
 
1823-26   Interregnum in Kabul 
 
1826-1929   Rise and Fall of the Barakzai Dynasty 
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1826  Dost Muhammad Khan takes power. His mother and wife are  
  Qizilbash  
 
1826-39 Dost’s reign coincides with the British- Russian geopolitical 
rivalry in Central Asia. Dost ruled, 1826-63, except Shuja’s 
second tenure 1839-42, and his son’s, Wazir Akbar Khan in 
1842-45  
 
1827 Sayyid Ahmad Barelevi comes from India and encourages the 
Barakzais to rule 
 
1830 British argued that Qajars made two concessions in the 
Treaty of 1801. First, Afghans were an independent people. 
Second, recognition of Afghanistan as an independent state. 
The Qajars, however, denied that the treaty meant any such 
thing as British continued to support Dost Muhammad Khan 
 
1835 Dost wages a war against the British and drives Armenians 
and Jews out of Kabul 
 
1837 Alexander Burnes comes to Kabul and asks Dost not to 
pursue Peshawar. The Russian envoy, Ivan V. Vitkevich, also 
comes to Kabul 
 
1839 Lord Auckland orders the British military invasion of Kabul.  
Shah Shuja with the support of the British claims the throne 
 
1839-42   Anglo-Afghan War I  
 
1839    Kabul Uprising. Dost fights against Shah Shuja 
 
1839-70s   The “Pan-Islamic” appeal 
 
1840    Dost Muhammad Khan was unsuccessful to retake power  
 
1841    Akbar Khan (mother Qizilbash) kills Burnes and Macnaghten 
 
1842 Assassination of Shah Shuja in Kabul near Sia Sang by a 
Qizilbash. General George Pollock sets the Char Chattah 
bazaar on fire, which starts a period of economic stagnation 
that lasts (four decades) until Amir Shir Ali Khan’s reign  
 
1843 Ottomans attack Karbala, diverts Qajar attention westbound 
away from Herat 
 
1845-63   Dost Muhammad Khan second reign 
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1850 Shi’a Imambara on 10th of Muharram 1267 A.H. attacked.  
Many Shi’as murdered, including women and children, and 
their properties plundered. For years, Shi’as were prohibited 
from observing their religious rites.  
 
1854 Qajar envoy arrives in Kabul. The Barakzai rulers of Kabul 
and Qandahar publicly referred to as Governors. The Qajars 
never recognized the legitimacy of the Barakzais and 
considered them rebellious subjects 
 
1855 Treaty of Peshawar. British refers to Dost Muhammad Khan 
as “Walee of Cabool and of those countries of Afghanistan 
now in his possession.” North of Hindu Kush not included. 
Dost accepts British subsidy and halts territorial claims to 
Peshawar, a major shift in Dost’s policy toward British  
 
1857            Mutiny in India, Dost did not interfere  
 
1857 Treaty of Paris, British forces the Qajars to renounce their 
rights on Herat  
 
1858  The India Act led to the British  assuming direct control of 
India in the form of British Raj 
 
1861 Qajars and Dost Muhammad Khan agree on Herat Territory, 
which included the provinces of Farah and Ghor. Dost 
annexes Herat 
 
1862    British expand ties with Amir Shir Ali Khan 
 
1863 Revolt against Shir Ali by his half-brothers, Muhammad 
Azam and Muhammad Afzal Khan 
 
1863-66 Amir Shir Ali launches the Shirpur Project with the help of 
Qizilbash residents in Kabul  
 
1866-67 Muhammad Afzal Khan, some Kabul residents give loyalty to 
him near Bala Hissar. Afzal soon dies of cholera, woba 
 
1866   The movement of religious nationalism or Pan-Islamism 
grows with Sayyid Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani’s arrival in 
Kabul. Pan-Islamism, a reaction to European colonialism, 
focused on Sunni-Shi’a unity  
 
1867 Sayid Jamal ud-Din Afghani becomes Azam’s consultant 
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1868 Amir Shir Ali defeats Azam Khan who takes refuge in Persia.  
Abdurrahman escapes to Bukhara and Tashkent 
 
1868-79   Amir Shir Ali second reign 
 
1873 Granville-Gurchakoff Agreement. Amu Darya becomes the 
boundary 
1874 Amir Shir Ali appoints his thirteen years old son, Abdullah, 
as heir-apparent. Abdullah’s mother, Aisha Begum, daughter 
of Afzal Khan   
 
1874 Amir Shir Ali summons eldest son Yaqub Khan from Herat 
and imprisons him in Kabul 
 
1875 Rise of Tories in London. Tories launched the preemptive 
“Forward Policy” and wanted a permanent establishment in 
Kabul, which resulted in the Second Anglo-Afghan War 
 
1877 Sayyid Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani’s letter to Sultan Abdul 
Hamid during the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78. Afghani 
wants Muslims bordering on or within Russia to rebel 
(Afghani writes an influential essay, “Refutation of the 
Materialist” in year 1881) 
 
1878 Russia sends a mission to Kabul under General Stolyetov  
 
1878 British envoy, Sir Neville Chamberlain and his forces not 
allowed to visit Kabul, stopped in Khyber Pass 
 
1878 British Viceroy, Lord Lytton, cancels the previous treaty with 
Dost Muhammad Khan. British troops enter Afghanistan  
 
1878 Amir Shir Ali appoints Yaqub Khan as his representative as   
he travels to Balkh to seek Russian aid. Amir Shir Ali’s 
modernization projects ended. Sardar Yahya Khan, Governor 
of Kabul, unsuccessfully mediates with the British  
 
1878-80 Second Anglo-Afghan War. Both Sunnis and Shi’a of Kabul 
fought against the British. Qizilbash neighborhoods provided 
food, shelter, and treated the wounded  
 
1879 Ayub Khan defeated the British at the Battle of Maiwand and 
Muhammad Jan Khan Wardak defeated the British in Qal-e 
Qazi known as the Battle of Asmaie Heights, but Kabul was 
devastated and left without a single commercial building and 
a ruined economy  
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1879 Treaty of Gandamak ended the Second Anglo-Afghan War.  
Yaqub Khan referred to as Amir of Afghanistan, but Yaqub 
relinquished foreign policy decisions to the British for a fixed 
sum of subsidy. Cavagnari, British military administrator, 
comes to Kabul and stays in Bala Hissar. General F. Roberts 
invites Yaqub Khan to India who then lives in Dera Dunn 
until 1925 
  
1880 Liberals back in power in London, who wanted a Protectorate 
State in Afghanistan instead of a permanent establishment 
 
1880 Abdurrahman Khan in Khanabad receives a letter from the 
British Viceroy, Lord Lytton, to ascend the throne in Kabul 
 
1880-1919 Indirect Colonialism. Afghanistan becomes a protectorate of 
the British-Raj 
 
1880 Abdurrahman Khan launched his notorious state spy system 
 
1880-1901   Institution of Page Boys Ghulam Bacha, established to fill the  
    bureaucratic void in the provincial areas as well as to control  
    the government’s reliance on the Qizilbash bureaucrats  
  
1881-83 Ayatollah Hojat’s family property seized by Abdurrahman for 
proselytization of Shi’a Fiqh. Abdurrahman tried to eliminate 
the Qizilbash who were supporters of his rival, Amir Shir Ali, 
during the royal dualism of the 1860s 
 
1883  First Chindawol Uprising. Hazaras come to Qizilbash aid. It 
led to the establishment of Qala-e Hazara in Chindawol 
 
1883 Abdurrahman’s anti-Shi’a decree fatwa, was signed by Mir 
Ahmad Shah, which declared Shi’as as “enemy of the state”  
 
1890-93  Abdurrahman ordered the murder, exile, and confiscation of 
Shi’a assets in Hazarajat under the governorship of Sardar 
Abdul Qudos Khan, a large number of Shi’as were enslaved 
 
1893 Naser ud-Din Shah Qajar warns Abdurrahman about his 
anti-Shi’a policies 
 
1883-1946   Period of intense dissimulation taqiyya for Qizilbash, except  
    for Amanullah’s reign, 1919-29 
 
1901 Peaceful transition of power in the new hereditary kingship 
system that was created by Abdurrahman to Habibullah 
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1901 Origin of Afghan Nationalism. Mahmud Tarzi arrives from 
Turkey to Kabul, establishes the Young Afghan movement 
and starts the Seraj al Akhbar newspaper 
 
1904 Habibullah enlists a few Hazara units in the army as part of 
the nationalism project 
 
1905 The Japanese triumph over Tsarist Russia. Tarzi and Young 
Afghans praised the Japanese victory 
 
19?? Habibullah used the Shi’a army units to quell the Mangal 
and Solomon Khel uprising in eastern Afghanistan 
 
1906-11  Iranian Constitutional Movement enthused the 
Constitutionalists mashruta khahan in Kabul  
 
1909  Habibullah arrested and executed the mashruta khahan, 
which marginalized the Young Afghans who considered 
themselves as the vanguards of progressive socio-political 
change 
 
1912-13 Habibullah reformed his father’s notorious intelligence 
network and dismantled the Siah-Chah dungeons, but the 
death penalty was not rescind 
  
1914    Many Shi’a households (Hazara and Qizilbash) fled to Persia  
 
1919 Habibullah is assassinated; he declined the independence 
demand of the Constitutionalists mashruta khahan 
 
1919    Third Anglo-Afghan War  
 
1919  Amanullah publicly announces Afghanistan’s independence 
in front of the British envoy in Murad Khani  
 
1919     Treaty of Rawalpindi  
 
1923  Constitutional Monarchy. Approval of the first Constitution 
Nezamnama-i Asasi  
 
1923-29        Amanullah tried to transform the foundation of society from 
the top by committing to the ideals of progress, unity, and 
bringing socio-economic justice to the people 
 
1923 Amanullah visits Takia-Khana Mir Akbar Agha and Faqir 
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Husayn’s in Chindawol to bridge the gap with the Qizilbash 
 
1928     Anti-state revolts stirred by the British 
 
1928 Shi’a scholar, Ayatollah Hojat returns to Chindawol from 
years abroad in Najaf 
 
1929 Henry Cabot Lodge’s influential book, The History of Nations 
(1906), translated by Reza Alizada  
 
1929    Civil War 
 
1929 Kalakani break ties with the Soviets, which cuts Afghanistan 
from the outside world  
 
1929 Abdul Razzaq raised a flag with Amanullah’s emblem with 
the help of 400 Kabulis, but Kalakani had him hanged 
 
1929 Anti-Shi’a fatwa issued, which culminated in Kalakani 
attacking Chindawol 
 
1929 Reza Shah sends an Iranian mission to aid the Shi’as of 
Kabul after Kalakani’s men looted Qizilbash homes and 
shops, and raped women  
 
1929 Kalakani sends Faiz Muhammad Katib, Nur al-din Agha 
Jawanshir (a Qizilbash from Kabul), and some Qizilbash 
elders to Bamiyan to negotiate with anti-Kalakani Hazaras 
 
1929    Kalakani appointed Kaka Muhsin Qizilbash as Governor of  
    Hazarajat and Mirza Mujtaba Khan as Minister of Finance 
 
1929-78   Nadir Khan founded the Musahiban (Muhammadzai)  
    Dynasty 
 
1929     Nadir Khan’s Ten Point Guideline  
 
1931     Second Constitution 
 
1932     Kabul University opens, but Shi’as initially not enrolled 
 
1933     Nadir Shah assassinated by a Shi’a youth, Abdul Khaliq 
 
1933-73   Afghan State increases ethno-nationalism  
 
1936 Ayatollah Hojat runs the first Shi’a seminary howza, in small 
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city of Behsud  
 
1937  Persian is temporarily banned in favor of Pashto in the 
country’s education system 
 
1937    Ismael Balkhi returns from Karbala to Herat after the  
    completion of his seminary studies 
1938 Ayatollah Hojat opens Takia-Khana Omomi in Chindawol  
 
1940 Balkhi travels to Qandahar, Kabul, Hazaratjat, and northern 
Afghanistan  
 
1940     Pashto Tulana, Pashto Academy  
 
1942    Historical Society of Afghanistan  
 
1945    Takia-Khana Omomi in Chindawol is closed  
 
1946 Hashim Khan resigns and Shah Mahmud Khan becomes the 
Prime Minister 
 
1946    Hizb-e Irshad, Party of Enlightenment  
 
1948-49   Period of intense political and cultural activities under Shah  
  Mahmud Khan relative liberalism 
 
1950 Second Chindawol Uprising. When Balkhi and Hizb-e Irshad  
members imprisoned  
 
1950    The Awakened Youth Movement begins at Kabul University  
 
1950   Hizb-e Watan, Homeland Party 
 
1957 Abdul Malik Abdul Rahimzai (Finance Minister) and 
members of the Second Constitutionalist Movement, 
mashruta khahan arrested  
 
1958-89   Abdul Baqi introduces Shi’a youth to Marxism  
  
1964 Third Constitution ratified under the Premiership of Dr.  
Muhammad Yusuf. Dr. Yusuf frees Balkhi 
 
1968   Balkhi institutes a Takia-Khana in Behsud  
 
1968   Nezat-e Pasdaran, the Guardian Movement 
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1968   Balkhi poisoned by the state at Aliabad Hospital 
  
1973    Daud Khan topples Zahir Shah’s constitutional monarchy 
 
1973   Group Mostazahefin, the Powerless Group 
 
1978 Saur Revolution by the People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA) 
 
1978   Third Chindawol Uprising. Anti-Marxist demonstrations  
 
1979 Hizb-e Tawid. Party of Unity, armed resistance against the 
Soviet backed PDPA  
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APPENDIX 2  
 
Online libraries, depositories, and journals accessed from Indiana University, 
Bloomington 
  
 Afghanistan Digital Library  
 American Anthropologist 
 Ariana Encyclopedia 
http://database-aryana-encyclopaedia.blogspot.de/ 
 Central Asian Survey 
 Central Eurasian Studies Collection at IU Wells Library  
 Critique and Vision. Journal of Culture, Politics, and History in 
Afghanistan 
 Digital Persian Archives 
 Encyclopedia Iranica  
 Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd Edition 
 Herman B Wells Library 
 Iran Chamber Society. Calendar Converter 
 Iran Nameh. Persian Quarterly Journal of Iranian Studies 
 Journal of the International Society for Iranian Studies 
 Journey of Maps and Images on the Silk Road 
 Mahmud Tarzi Cultural Foundation 
http://www.mahmudtarzi.com/ 
 Storey, Charles Ambrose. 2004 Persian Literature: A Bio-
Bibliographical Survey. London: Routledge Curzon in association 
with the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. 
 The bounded files of Anis and Islah, and Kabul Times 
 The Cambridge History of Iran, volumes 6-7 
 The National Library and Archives of Islamic Republic of Iran 
http://nlai.ir/Default.aspx?tabid=554 
 The Sinor Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies (The SRIFIAS 
Central Asian Archives) 
 The American Society for Ethnohisstory 
 University Microfilms International (Thesis and dissertation 
collection) 
 Wadham College, University of Oxford. Discovering Persia’s 
Manuscript 
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                                    APPENDIX 3 
 
Year British Primary Sources Term 
Used 
1808 George Forster, A Journey from Bengal to England through the 
Northern Part of India, Kashmir, Afghanistan and Persia (1783) 
 
1815 Mountstuart Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and 
Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary and India 
Yes 
1842 Alexander Burnes, Cabool (1832, Pasha Kabul)  
Alexander Burnes, “On the Persian Faction in Cabool,” in A. Burnes, 
R. Leech, P.B. Lord and J. Wood, Reports and Papers, Political, 
Geographical and Commercial, 1939. Pp. 7-13 
 
1842 James Atkinson, The Expedition into Afghanistan: Notes and 
Sketches 
 
1842 R. Burford, Description of a View of the City of Cabul the Capital of 
Afghanistan with the surrounding Country 
 
1843 Florentia Sale, A Journal of the Disasters in Afghanistan: A Firsthand 
Account by One of the Few Survivors 
Yes 
1843 Vincent Eyre, The Military Operations at Cabul  
1843 Godfrey T. Vigne, A Personal Narrative of a Visit to Ghuzni, Kabul and 
Afghanistan, and of a Residence at the Court of Dost Muhammad 
 
1846 Mohan Lal, Travels in the Punjab, Afghanistan and Turkestan to 
Balkh, Bukhara, and Herat 
Yes 
1848 J. H. W. Hall, A Connected Narrative of Principle Military Events in 
Sind, Balouchistan, and Afghanistan 
 
1851 John William Kaye, History of War in Afghanistan: From the 
Unpublished Letters and Journals of Political and Military officers 
employed in Afghanistan throughout the Entire Period of British 
Connection with that Country 
 
1876 History of Central Asia: Afghanistan, Bokhara, Khiva, Khoqand from 
1740-1818. Edited, translated and annotated by Charles Schefer. 
Paris: Leroux 
 
1879 Malleson, Colonel G. B. History of Afghanistan from the earliest 
period to the outbreak of the war of 1878 
 
1882 Sydney H. Shadbolt, The Afghan Campaigns of 1878-1880  
1882 H. Howard, The Afghan War of 1879-1880  
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